Are the Taliban’s internal divisions widening?
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Since their ouster in 2001 and the subsequent return to power in August 2021, the Taliban have been known, barring some exceptions, for maintaining organizational coherence and discipline. For a Taliban-like large scale and decentralized movement, it is no small feat to stay intact for so long. However, when the Taliban assumed power, speculations were rife of their ideological differences and internal power struggles. These speculations gained more traction when the Taliban’s interim cabinet’s announcement was delayed inexplicably, prompting the intervention of Pakistan’s then spy chief Lt.-General (R) Faiz Hameed. Still, no conclusive evidence of the Taliban’s internal divisions existed.
However, on February 13, the Taliban’s Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani publicly criticized the Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, without naming him, for “monopolizing power and defaming the entire system.” His remarks came against the backdrop of rising public frustration following Akhundzada’s two edicts in 2022 banning girls and women from education and work. A few days later, the Taliban’s Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi also indirectly criticized the ban on girls and women’s education. Similarly, the Taliban’s Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob maintained, “we should never be arrogant and consider the legitimate demands of people.” In response to these statements, the Taliban’s spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid cautioned that the criticism of the Emir should be “respectful and private.”
Two things are worth noticing about these statements: they are from the younger generation of Taliban leaders and the rumors of the Taliban’s internal differences have not only been confirmed but they have become official and public.
Hitherto, the Taliban have largely managed to keep their differences away from the public eye. It bears mention that the Taliban’s internal differences are scattered across the movement’s generational, factional and ethnic divides. In other words, while bifurcations like moderates versus hardliners clarify these differences, we cannot pinpoint one faction as moderate and another as a hardliner. Rather, both categories can be found across the older and younger Taliban generations, ethnic factions as well as between those belonging to the military commission and the political officeholders.
How the Taliban navigate these inner dynamics will have far-reaching implications for their movement, Afghanistan and beyond.
Abdul Basit Khan
At any rate, the Taliban’s internal differences can be broadly classified into three, but not the only, categories; ideological (hardliners versus moderates) ethnic (Pashtuns versus non-Pashtuns and intra-Pashtun) and organizational (disconnect between fighters and the top leaders). It bears mention that these categories constantly overlap, evolve and get blurred.
Soon after the Taliban took over Kabul, there was constant bickering between Kandhari and Haqqani factions of the Taliban over who deserves more credit for the victory. The Haqqanis argued the war was won on the battlefield for which they rendered the most sacrifices and pushed the US out of Afghanistan. On the contrary, the Kandharis maintain, diplomacy in Qatar spearheaded in the final days by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar culminating in the Doha Agreement 2020 paved the way for the US exit and the Taliban’s victory.
Likewise, both factions also differed over the division of power and cabinet posts. The Haqqanis complain that Kandharis have accumulated power by bagging most of the ministries and accommodating their clansmen and friends in government jobs and institutions. The Kandharis were also opposed to the Haqqanis’ inclusion in the cabinet on the grounds that some of their leaders, including Sirajuddin, are on the UN-designated list of global terrorists and their inclusion will hurt efforts to get diplomatic recognition. Ironically, one year after Taliban rule, the international community finds Haqqanis more pragmatic and forthcoming in giving girls and women their right to education and work and inclusive political representation as compared to Kandharis. On the contrary, Kandharis complain that Haqqanis got disproportionately more slots (seven) in the cabinet as compared to their size, including the influential ministries of interior and refugees and repatriation. The Haqqanis are also responsible for maintaining Kabul’s security which Kandharis detest.
Then there are ethnic differences of Pashtun Taliban factions with Uzbek and Tajik groups. The non-Pashtun Taliban since power’s restoration feel marginalized, underrepresented and discriminated against by Pashtun factions and want more authority and autonomy in their respective areas, as well as more proportional representation commensurate with their size in the government.
Some Taliban foot soldiers also feel disenfranchised from their top leaders. The foremost reason of this alienation is their limited access on grounds of security. Before the fall of Kabul, they had unhindered access to their leaders and felt closer to the organization’s top echelons. Furthermore, Taliban fighters expected war spoils as a reward for the victory and were clamoring for revenge from their rivals. However, the Taliban’s call for general amnesty and directives not to damage or snatch public and private properties and other valuable belongings barred them from exacting revenge or plunder cities.
Finally, the ideological differences which played out between moderates and hardliners have spawned further since the Taliban’s return to power. Currently, there are two power centers in Afghanistan: political and ideological. The political center is in Kabul and the interim cabinet spearheads it under Prime Minister Mullah Mohammad Hasan Akhund. The ideological center is in Kandahar where Haibatullah and his inner circle of handpicked religious figures reside. The interim cabinet runs day-to-day matters of the government, but it seems helpless in front of Haibatullah’s inner circle which can veto any decision. Haibatullah has used his edicts to assert his authority and consolidate his grip on power. The edicts to ban girls’ education above the sixth grade and universities as well as work in non-governmental organizations are cases in point. Though such edicts are binding on all and sundry, the younger Taliban leaders, as outlined above, have now publicly spoken against them.
Though it will be premature to predict cracks in the Taliban movement, all is not well in their inner ranks. The Taliban can repair their differences to ensure organizational coherence, but they will have to think beyond their organizational interests to transition into a governing and political entity. For that, they will have to put the Afghan people, their needs, demands and aspirations at the front and center of their agenda. How the Taliban navigate these inner dynamics will have far-reaching implications for their movement, Afghanistan and beyond.
- The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Twitter @basitresearcher.
