Iran facing its most severe set of challenges

Iran and the US are on the brink of a direct confrontation, and considering the American military buildup in the Gulf and the wider region, this could result in a much broader round of hostilities, ending in a regional escalation and possibly regime change. It may make the US military intervention in Iran last June in support of Israel appear a mere prelude to something much bigger.  Back then, the US carried out short and precise airstrikes against Iranian nuclear sites. The message to Tehran appears uncompromising: Accept Washington’s negotiation conditions or face severe military consequences. The message might have been more effective when huge crowds of anti-regime protesters took to the streets across Iran early last month.
Washington’s approach presupposes, and dangerously so, that there is enough pragmatism among the Iranian leadership, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, not to test Washington’s resolve by rejecting the Trump administration’s demands. So far, the Iranian leadership’s response to this could be seen as either contradictory or complementary. While Khamenei warned that any US attack on his regime would ignite a “regional war,” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has said Iran is ready to negotiate with the US after requests from “friendly governments in the region” to respond to a proposal for talks. Furthermore, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told the media that he was “confident that we can achieve a deal” with the US on Tehran’s nuclear program.
One of the countries with the most interest in this development, Israel, reacted with skepticism. Its Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen Eyal Zamir, traveled to Washington last week to coordinate with the Americans in case of a military operation against Iran, which could likely end in Iran retaliating against Israel. To state the obvious, there is complete distrust in Israel regarding Iranian intentions, and vice versa, and the working assumption in Israel is that Tehran will be unable to accept all or even most of the American demands and instead will enter negotiations with no intention of reaching a conclusion. During meetings in Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, to be wary of Iran’s promises, claiming that Tehran would not honor them. Israel believes that Iran is using delaying tactics in the hope that the moment for the US to use military force against it will pass, and other issues on the saturated international agenda, plus the short attention span of the current administration, will divert Washington’s focus elsewhere. Objectively, the Iranian regime enters these negotiations from a position of weakness, which paradoxically makes it both dangerous and vulnerable. Over the last two years, its so-called Axis of Resistance has suffered severe setbacks, whether for Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to a certain extent the Houthis in Yemen. It lost Syria as a major ally with the fall of the Assad regime, and the recent popular uprising in Iran demonstrated the extent of discontent with the regime among broad segments of Iranian society. The use of excessive force, which reportedly left many thousands dead or injured, and mass arrests in suppressing the uprising has further eroded the legitimacy of the Iranian leadership. However, this also means it is a regime that fights for its survival, something that has always been its primary motto, more than ideology. This might result in it turning against neighboring countries in a bid to save itself at home.

When Tehran says it is ready to negotiate, it is referring to the nuclear issue.

Yossi Mekelberg

The dilemma under these circumstances for the leadership in Tehran is that if it refuses to accept the main elements of a deal as demanded by the US, it risks a war with a superior military power, which could also bring renewed discontent inside the country. However, to accept such a deal and be seen as weak at home and abroad could open deep rifts between the pragmatic and the hard-line elements in the regime. When Tehran says it is ready to negotiate, it is referring to the nuclear issue, while refusing, as the White House has repeatedly demanded, to discuss topics such as its ballistic missiles or support of its proxies, which it sees as interference in its legitimate affairs. Some sources in Iran have argued that the country could show flexibility on uranium enrichment, possibly handing over its 400 kg of highly enriched uranium, but nothing beyond this.
With the main protagonists disagreeing on the agenda for their meetings, and even the venue becoming a point of contention, the risk of confrontation, even accidental or unintentional, remains high. Last Wednesday, an Iranian drone described by a US military source as “aggressively approaching” an American aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea was shot down. Moreover, the US military deployment in the region, referred to by Trump as an “armada,” has been an explicit declaration of intent. If Iran rejects the main American demands, it leaves relatively little room for the US to make a U-turn and not use force, as that might be regarded as losing both deterrence and credibility.
The best-case scenario is that the negotiators reach an agreement for Iran to halt uranium enrichment and ballistic missile development, while agreeing to refrain from intervening in other countries’ affairs, which is not likely. Hence, if the discussions reach a stalemate and the US decides to attack Iran, it still leaves open the question of the nature and scope of such a military operation. It could resort to surgical attacks that target the military bases of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Basij unit, in the hope that the regime then agrees to a deal or collapses. The Iranian government could retaliate by targeting US forces and neighbors as far away as Israel, which would drag the latter into such a war. Such a scenario would affect the entire region, particularly if civilian populations and energy production facilities are hit, which would also affect the global economy.
Should the regime in Iran collapse, it would not necessarily guarantee a more accommodating and liberal government; instead, it might lead to a prolonged period of chaos, adding to regional uncertainty. To be sure, the Iranian revolution is facing its most severe set of challenges, both domestically and externally, and they require careful handling.

• Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg