The scenarios Egypt is preparing for in Sudan

Since the eruption of war in Sudan, Egypt has adopted a posture that many observers initially described as cautious, even restrained. Yet beneath that surface restraint lies a deeply calculated strategy shaped by history, geography and hard national interests. Egypt’s approach to Sudan is neither neutral nor improvisational. It is anchored in clearly defined red lines, long-term objectives and a set of scenarios that Cairo has quietly prepared for — some tolerable, others deeply alarming.
The central question is no longer whether Egypt is involved in Sudan’s conflict. It is. The real question is how far Egypt is willing to go and under what conditions that involvement could evolve from political and logistical support into deeper, potentially military, engagement.
For Cairo, Sudan is not just another regional crisis. It is strategic depth in the most literal sense. Any instability in Sudan reverberates directly across Egypt’s southern flank, affecting border security, migration patterns and, most critically, water security tied to the Nile.
Egypt’s leadership views Sudan through three existential lenses.
First, a fragmented or lawless Sudan creates a security vacuum that could facilitate arms smuggling, militant movement and uncontrolled migration northward.
Second, the collapse of a large Arab-African state reinforces a regional pattern Egypt deeply fears: the normalization of state failure and militia rule.
Third, Sudan is a pillar in Egypt’s Nile equation. Any hostile, chaotic or externally dominated authority in Khartoum complicates Cairo’s already fragile position on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
From Egypt’s perspective, Sudan cannot be allowed to become another Libya — a permanently fractured arena of militias, foreign patrons and competing authorities.
Despite its careful diplomacy, Egypt has drawn several nonnegotiable red lines in Sudan.
The first is the rejection of militia rule. While Cairo avoids overtly naming sides, its position is unmistakable: the Sudanese Armed Forces, however flawed, represent the concept of the state. The acceptance of armed nonstate actors as legitimate rulers is a scenario Egypt considers disastrous not only for Sudan but for the regional order as a whole.
The second red line is territorial fragmentation. Egypt will not accept a Sudan divided into de facto zones controlled by tribes, militias or foreign-backed actors.
The third red line concerns external engineering of Sudan’s future. Cairo is deeply skeptical of international arrangements that bypass national institutions and reward armed actors with political legitimacy. Egypt’s experience in Libya, Iraq and Yemen has reinforced its belief that premature political formulas imposed amid war only harden divisions.
At its core, Egypt seeks: the survival of a unified Sudanese state; the preservation of a central military institution capable of preventing total collapse; the containment of foreign influence that could shift Sudan into rival regional axes; and time for exhaustion, recalibration and an eventual political process that does not reward fragmentation.
Egypt’s worldview prioritizes stability before politics. In Cairo’s assessment, a weak state is preferable to no state at all and bad stability is often less dangerous than idealistic chaos.
So far, Egypt has operated below the threshold of direct military intervention. Its involvement has taken the form of diplomatic backing for state institutions, intelligence sharing, logistical coordination, humanitarian facilitation and sustained engagement with regional and international actors to prevent the recognition of parallel authorities.
This model allows Cairo to shape outcomes without becoming belligerent. It preserves leverage, limits exposure and avoids the reputational and operational costs of overt intervention.
But this posture is not static. It is conditional and scenario-driven.

Sudan cannot be allowed to become another Libya — a permanently fractured arena of militias.

Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy

The most likely trajectory, and the one Egypt is currently operating within, is a prolonged stalemate. Neither side achieves decisive victory. Fighting ebbs and flows. International efforts focus on ceasefires and humanitarian access rather than political resolution.
For Egypt, this scenario is uncomfortable but manageable. It avoids military entanglement while preventing total collapse. Cairo continues to support state institutions quietly, resist militia legitimization and coordinate diplomatically to contain the damage.
The risk, however, is that prolonged stalemate entrenches fragmentation. Militias gain de facto legitimacy simply by surviving. The humanitarian crisis deepens. Over time, the very red lines Egypt seeks to defend begin to erode by inertia rather than confrontation.
A second scenario involves a partial political process that involves ceasefires, interim arrangements or power-sharing frameworks that stop large-scale fighting without resolving the conflict’s root causes.
Egypt is not opposed to negotiations but it is highly selective. Cairo will tolerate imperfect political deals only if Sudan remains formally unified, the army retains a central institutional role and militias are not rewarded with unchecked political authority.
This scenario offers breathing space but little certainty. Political arrangements reached under pressure often collapse. Armed actors regroup. External sponsors hedge. Egypt views such outcomes as temporary containment, not resolution.
While Egypt does not seek military involvement, it has not ruled it out. Cairo’s doctrine is clear: military action is a last resort, triggered only when existential thresholds are crossed.
Several developments could alter Egypt’s calculus: the complete collapse of the Sudanese Armed Forces; the emergence of a hostile authority controlling northern Sudan; direct threats to Egypt’s southern border or Nile interests; or the permanent entrenchment of hostile foreign military forces in Sudan.
In any of these scenarios, Egypt’s intervention would likely be limited, targeted and framed as stabilization rather than occupation. The focus would be on border security, strategic infrastructure and containment zones rather than nationwide combat.
The risks are enormous, ranging from regional escalation and long-term entanglement to the transformation of Egypt from a stabilizing actor into a party to the conflict. This is precisely why Cairo treats this scenario as a contingency, not a preference.
The scenario Egypt fears most is total state collapse. In this outcome, Sudan fractures into competing zones ruled by militias, tribes and foreign-backed actors. Central authority disappears entirely.
For Egypt, this is a strategic nightmare. Its southern border becomes permanently unstable. Arms, fighters and refugees flow north. Nile negotiations become unmanageable. Regional balance tilts against Cairo’s core interests.
Under such conditions, Egypt’s choices narrow dramatically. Forced security measures, buffer zones and long-term militarized containment become unavoidable. This is the future Cairo is most determined to prevent and the one that shapes its current restraint.
Egypt understands that military power can stop collapse but cannot build legitimacy. Sudan’s conflict is as much social and economic as it is military. Direct intervention risks turning Egypt into another actor in a crowded battlefield.
Moreover, Cairo is already navigating a region saturated with unresolved wars. Strategic patience aligns better with Egypt’s long-term doctrine than rapid escalation.
Whether history judges Egypt’s approach as cautious wisdom or excessive conservatism will depend on how the war evolves. What is clear is that Cairo is not neutral, not indifferent and not unprepared.
The real danger is not that Egypt intervenes militarily. The real danger is that Sudan collapses so completely that Egypt no longer has a choice.

• Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy has covered conflicts worldwide. He is the author of “The Copts: An Investigation into the Rift between Muslims and Copts in Egypt.” X: @ALMenawy