MENA’s defense diversification and autonomy challenge

As countries across the Middle East and North Africa region increasingly seek strategic autonomy, a delicate balance must be struck between enhancing local production capabilities and engaging in international partnerships.

As regional militaries gathered for the World Defense Show in Riyadh this week, it was clear that dependence on foreign powers, especially in sectors critical to their security and technological future, was the ultimate strategic priority. This drive is often coupled with a desire to diversify partners, with some turning toward emerging industry players like China and Russia. However, while such diversification may appear to offer new opportunities, it carries significant risks that could affect these nations’ long-term autonomy and security.

Historically, MENA countries have forged close partnerships with Western nations, particularly the US, the UK and European NATO members. These long-standing ties have been foundational in shaping the region’s security architecture.

The rise of alternative suppliers has tempted some countries to consider new alliances in pursuit of diversification

Zaid M. Belbagi

Western powers have provided governments in the region with a variety of assets, from advanced military equipment, including combat aircraft and air defense systems, to secure communications and cyber defense technologies. In fact, the value of these arrangements goes beyond equipment, as they also ensure that local forces have access to continuous software updates and training programs that maintain high standards of operational effectiveness.

In addition to military hardware, these partnerships provide training, doctrine and access to advanced software. For example, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, BAE Systems and Leonardo DRS have long-standing partnerships in MENA countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco and the UAE, supplying fighter jets, missile defense systems and Patriot missiles. Several nations in the region, as major non-NATO allies, rely on sensitive American infrastructure such as fighter jets and rocket systems.

However, the rise of alternative suppliers to MENA defense markets has tempted some countries to consider new alliances in pursuit of diversification. These countries present an alternative to traditional Western suppliers, with their offerings often marketed as cheaper, faster to procure and politically more flexible.

China, in particular, has expanded its influence in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative, with many countries partnering with it in sectors such as drones, missiles and infrastructure. For instance, the Chinese Wing Loong drones, sold to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE, are priced at about $4 million each, significantly lower than the $16 million for US MQ-9 Reapers. This price advantage can seem appealing for countries looking to quickly scale up their defense capabilities.

Similarly, Russia, despite the challenges it faces due to sanctions and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, continues to seek to increase its position as a key supplier in the region. Russian arms sales to MENA countries, including the export of S-300 air defense systems and T-90 tanks, have maintained strong demand, especially in Algeria, Egypt and Syria. As of 2024, Russia’s strategic partnership with the region was still deepening, with Moscow’s trade volumes in MENA worth hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Its military cooperation is also expanding, particularly with countries seeking to diversify away from Western reliance.

However, financial savings often come with hidden dependencies. Chinese and Russian defense systems tend to use proprietary software and encryption, making it difficult for local authorities to perform necessary upgrades or maintenance. Moreover, the lack of transparency in how data is handled and the risk of backdoors being built into the systems pose a serious cybersecurity threat.

Another significant risk is the lack of genuine technology transfer and integration expertise. Western partnerships have often included robust offset programs, which transfer essential knowledge and technical capabilities to local industries. But this is not always the case with Chinese and Russian suppliers. Without the proper know-how and systems integration expertise, local production efforts are often relegated to mere assembly rather than true indigenous capability.

These challenges are not just affecting the choice of international partners, they also have tangible implications for local production strategies in the region. Strategic autonomy is not achieved through simple diversification of suppliers, but through the ability to integrate and maintain control over the systems that drive a country’s defense and technological infrastructure.

When building domestic capabilities, it is important to maintain compatibility with existing international standards

Zaid M. Belbagi

The push for local production, as seen in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the UAE’s Edge Group, is essential for achieving strategic autonomy. However, this autonomy can only be realized if local production efforts preserve interoperability with existing Western technologies. Saudi Arabia’s increase in defense localization — from 4 percent in 2018 to 24 percent in 2024, with a goal to reach 50 percent by 2030 — is a significant step forward. The Kingdom had licensed 296 facilities by the end of 2024 and signed industrial cooperation agreements worth more than $9 billion. Under Vision 2030, the goal is for defense production to contribute $3.7 billion to gross domestic product and create 60,000 jobs.

Similarly, Morocco’s adoption of local defense manufacturing initiatives, including the establishment of Tata Advanced Systems Maroc and partnerships with Turkish and Israeli firms, signals the importance of building domestic capabilities while still maintaining compatibility with existing international standards.

To preserve the benefits of these partnerships, regional countries must structure their contracts in a way that allows for knowledge transfer, sustainable capability growth and long-term collaboration. Western defense companies, such as Leonardo DRS in Saudi Arabia, have been instrumental in transferring technologies while supporting in-country production. These partnerships provide the knowledge and expertise necessary to build local manufacturing capacity, which can sustain itself in the long run without compromising security or operational effectiveness.

As such, the quest for autonomy is not just about diversifying international partnerships, but about carefully selecting those that strengthen, rather than compromise, long-term goals. Diversification of international partnerships may seem like a viable path to strategic autonomy, but MENA countries must be cautious of the risks associated with Chinese and Russian systems. The potential cost advantages of these systems can be outweighed by the long-term dependencies they create, particularly in terms of cybersecurity, system integration and technological know-how.

To achieve true strategic autonomy, the region’s countries must prioritize partnerships that preserve interoperability with existing Western systems, ensure access to continuous upgrades and training, and protect against cyber and data risks. By focusing on partnerships that build local capacity within proven, interoperable systems, they can secure their autonomy without sacrificing long-term stability and security.

• Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council. X: @Moulay_Zaid