For much of Sudan’s devastating civil war, the Rapid Support Forces appeared to be an increasingly formidable military force, sweeping across vast territories, seizing strategic cities and establishing a near monopoly over the western region of Darfur. But after more than three years of fighting, a series of battlefield reversals, internal disputes and high-profile defections is raising questions about the cohesion of the paramilitary organization and whether the balance of power is beginning to shift in favor of the Sudanese Armed Forces. The latest setback came on Sunday when Ahmed Hasab Al-Rasoul, an RSF commander in North Darfur, announced he was abandoning the militia and joining the army, urging fellow fighters to follow his example. In a video statement, Hasab Al-Rasoul accused the RSF leadership of favoritism, tribal discrimination and failing to maintain a unified command structure. According to the Sudan Tribune, he previously commanded an RSF unit in Saraf Omra, a town in North Darfur. It remains unclear how many fighters, if any, accompanied him in defecting. His departure follows several similar incidents involving senior commanders, suggesting that longstanding tensions within the organization may be becoming increasingly difficult for its leadership to contain. For Sudan’s Defense Minister Hassan Kabroun, the defections are evidence that the RSF’s traditional support base is beginning to fracture. “They have no popular support base in Sudan except among certain tribal communities,” he told Arab News in a recent interview. “Even these tribes have begun distancing themselves from the Rapid Support Forces.” The minister’s assessment comes as the army presses westward through Kordofan, a strategically important region linking government-held central Sudan with the RSF’s strongholds in Darfur. Although the militia retains substantial military capabilities, its recent losses have encouraged speculation that a conflict characterized by repeated reversals may be entering another decisive phase. Cameron Hudson, a former CIA analyst and former Africa director at the US National Security Council, believes the defections reflect a deliberate strategy by the Sudanese army to weaken its adversary from within. “It has been an unspoken strategy of the SAF to break the RSF from the inside, by fomenting tribal divisions and incentivizing defections,” he said on X on Thursday. “Say what you will about it, but that strategy has been working.” His assessment suggests that the struggle for Sudan is being fought not only through conventional military offensives but also efforts to exploit the personal, financial and tribal relationships underpinning the RSF’s power. Responding on Monday to reports of Hasab Al-Rasoul’s defection, Hudson went further, arguing that the shifting military balance should prompt a reassessment of international diplomatic efforts. “The fact is that the SAF is now winning the war on and off the battlefield. The war is not over but by any stretch, but it is certainly moving in that direction. At what point will that change the international community’s diplomatic approach to it?” he said on X. His remarks raise a question for foreign governments and mediators: whether continued diplomatic efforts premised on a military stalemate adequately reflect the changing situation on the ground. For the Sudanese government, growing evidence of divisions within the RSF could strengthen its negotiating position. But it could also reinforce the army’s determination to pursue a decisive military victory rather than compromise with its adversary. Whether these developments ultimately bring Sudan closer to peace or simply prolong the fighting remains uncertain. The RSF emerged from the Janjaweed militias mobilized during the Darfur conflict before being formalized under former President Omar Al-Bashir. Under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, it developed into a powerful paramilitary force with extensive economic interests and a command structure heavily influenced by family and tribal networks. However, the decentralized structure that enabled its rapid expansion may now be contributing to its internal divisions. “The RSF expanded by giving field commanders a lot of room to recruit their own fighters and keep them loyal. Hemedti and his inner circle may take the major decisions but their ability to enforce orders and hold commanders accountable looks very limited,” Areig Elhag, Arabic content editor at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told Arab News. “It’s one reason I’ve always been skeptical when Hemedti promises accountability for the atrocities in Darfur, especially when RSF troops are fighting under different banners.” In late October, senior commander Siddiq Ander publicly criticized the RSF leadership, telling Al Jazeera that Hemedti’s relatives exercised disproportionate control over finances, weapons and promotions. Earlier, in April, Maj. Gen. Al-Nour Ahmed Adam defected to the army following a reported disagreement over command responsibilities in North Darfur. Sudanese army chief Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan publicly welcomed his decision. These departures are particularly significant because some of the commanders involved belong to communities that have historically supplied the RSF with fighters. According to the conflict-monitoring organization ACLED, two senior commanders who switched allegiance this year came from the Mahamid branch of the Rizeigat, a community central to the militia’s recruitment networks. “Whether this is also starting to fracture tribal alliances is something we’ll see more clearly if other commanders, and their men, follow suit,” Elhag said. But tribal rivalries may be only part of the explanation. Financial pressures could also be undermining the patronage networks that have traditionally helped the RSF maintain the loyalty of its fighters. “Money may also explain the timing of some of these defections. Looting was how field commanders paid and held on to their fighters. With local economies collapsing in RSF-held areas, that model is getting harder to sustain,” Elhag said. “That is why switching to the army gives these militia leaders a way to protect their influence and negotiate a place for himself in whatever comes next.” ACLED has also documented growing friction among RSF-aligned groups following the militia’s consolidation of control over most of Darfur in October 2025. Competition over money, weapons and territory intensified as the RSF lost ground elsewhere in Sudan, placing additional pressure on the relationships holding its coalition together. Such divisions could prove militarily consequential. Commanders who defect with substantial numbers of fighters can weaken defensive positions, disrupt supply networks and provide the army with intelligence about RSF deployments. They may also encourage others to reconsider their loyalties, particularly if they believe the militia’s prospects are deteriorating. Elhag believes the impact of these defections will depend heavily on whether government forces can consolidate their recent territorial gains and whether departing commanders bring their fighters with them. “This could change the picture in West Kordofan, but only if the army holds what it has taken. That pressure may push more RSF commanders to rethink where their interests lie and the military impact will be much bigger if their fighters come with them,” she said. However, isolated defections do not necessarily indicate an impending organizational collapse. Their significance depends on the commanders’ influence, the forces accompanying them and the RSF leadership’s ability to replace those who leave. For now, developments on the battlefield are providing the clearest indication of the pressure facing the militia. On Friday Sudanese government forces and allied fighters reportedly recaptured El-Khuwai in West Kordofan, while advancing toward the RSF-held city of Al-Nahud. Footage circulating online showed residents of Khamis Al-Dunkey celebrating the arrival of army troops in communities previously under RSF control. Hudson highlighted the apparent change in morale in a post on X on Sunday. “More than turning the tide in the war, the recent string of victories in Kordofan seems to be injecting a new hope and momentum into the army and those liberated communities,” he said. Kordofan is particularly important because its roads connect central Sudan with Darfur, allowing fighters, weapons and supplies to move between the country’s eastern and western regions. Sustained government advances could threaten RSF supply routes and complicate its ability to reinforce positions further to the west. They could also undermine the militia’s claims to be establishing a viable alternative administration across the territory it controls. Following the capture of El-Fasher in October 2025, the RSF consolidated its dominance over most of Darfur, although its offensive was accompanied by reports of mass killings, displacement and other atrocities against civilians. The militia subsequently sought to strengthen its political position through a parallel administration, known as the Tasis (Founding) Government. Kabroun dismissed the initiative, insisting that the RSF could have no legitimate future as an independent military or political organization. “They have no opportunity to participate in a political settlement and the Sudanese people will never accept their presence in Sudan as a military or political force,” he told Arab News. He argued that any settlement must instead be based on the disarmament and demobilization of RSF fighters, followed by the reintegration of eligible Sudanese personnel into civilian life or state institutions. “They must withdraw from cities, disarm and surrender their heavy weapons to the Sudanese government,” he said. The minister maintained that the Jeddah agreement, reached during Saudi- and US-mediated negotiations in 2023, remained the foundation for resolving the conflict. Under the government’s proposed approach, fighters would assemble in designated locations, undergo screening and enter a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. Foreign combatants, whom Kabroun accused the RSF of recruiting from several countries, would be excluded. However, the government’s insistence that the militia cannot retain an independent political or military role presents a substantial obstacle to negotiations. It also raises questions about whether battlefield victories and defections could ultimately facilitate a settlement or encourage both sides to pursue military victory. The minister accused the UAE of providing military and logistical assistance to the RSF, allegations that Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied. He also accused neighboring countries of facilitating support networks. The conflict has increasingly drawn in regional interests, complicating international diplomatic efforts to secure a ceasefire. Meanwhile, the humanitarian consequences continue to mount. The war began in April 2023 following a power struggle between Al-Burhan and Hemedti, including disagreements over integrating the RSF into the regular armed forces. It has since devastated Sudan’s infrastructure, displaced about 13 million people internally and across borders and exposed millions more to hunger, disease and violence. Both sides have faced allegations of attacks affecting civilians. According to the UN human rights office, drone strikes killed at least 306 people during the first three weeks of October alone. Previous defections have also demonstrated how rapidly shifting allegiances can expose civilians to reprisals. Human Rights Watch documented attacks against civilians in Gezira state following the 2024 defection of Abu Agla Keikel, whose RSF-aligned force subsequently joined the army. That precedent raises concerns about the consequences for communities in areas where commanders are now abandoning the militia. The defections also raise difficult questions about accountability and the political future of commanders who previously fought for the RSF. Although their change of allegiance may strengthen the army militarily, Elhag warned that Sudan risks repeating a longstanding pattern in which armed leaders are rewarded with political influence rather than held accountable for alleged abuses. “There’s a political question too,” she said. “Sudan has a long history of armed leaders turning battlefield strength into government posts and financial rewards. So when commanders announce they’re ‘returning to the national fold,’ will anyone look into the abuses they’re accused of? Or will they keep their armed influence and eventually land government positions?” It also raises questions about whether a future settlement would dismantle the networks of armed patronage that have contributed to the conflict or simply redistribute their influence among those aligned with the victorious side. Even where government forces are welcomed, territorial changes do not automatically guarantee civilian protection or the restoration of essential services. For displaced families fleeing the latest fighting in Kordofan, immediate survival remains a more pressing concern than the strategic implications of the army’s advances. The government nevertheless insists that the eventual defeat or dismantling of the RSF would create an opportunity to rebuild Sudan’s political institutions. Kabroun said that the army supported a transition to civilian government through a national dialogue, constitutional reforms and elections. “A comprehensive settlement must not be dictated by the Rapid Support Forces or imposed by the armed forces,” he said. “Rather, it must emerge from discussions and consultations with national political forces to establish a permanent constitution, organize political parties and hold elections.”