- The Rohingya have secured a historic legal victory in The Hague, but achieving justice on the ground will be harder
- A landmark ruling against Myanmar has strengthened international genocide law while exposing the limits of enforcement and accountability
LONDON: For the first time, the International Court of Justice has found a state responsible for committing genocide. The case began as an initiative of the Muslim world. Whether it changes anything for the Rohingya now depends on politics rather than law.
In May 2018, foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation gathered in Dhaka after visiting the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. At that meeting, The Gambia’s attorney general, Abubacarr Tambadou, tabled a proposal to create an OIC ministerial committee on accountability for the Rohingya.
A year later, the OIC summit in Makkah asked The Gambia to lead that committee and take the case to the International Court of Justice. The Gambia filed the case in November 2019 on behalf of the organization’s member states.
On Thursday, that initiative produced an unprecedented result. By nine votes to six, the court ruled that Myanmar “has committed genocide against the Rohingya group in northern Rakhine State” during the military’s 2017 clearance operations.
The court has found genocide before, at Srebrenica, but it had never held a state responsible for committing it. The OIC called the judgment “a victory for truth, justice, and the will of the international community.”
The court accepted UN estimates that at least 10,000 Rohingya were killed, and found evidence of mass sexual violence, the killing of children and the systematic burning of villages.
It also found that Myanmar failed to prevent genocide by civilians acting alongside its forces, failed to punish those responsible and destroyed evidence in breach of the court’s own 2020 order, including by razing villages and building over them.
It ordered Myanmar to legislate, investigate and prosecute, allow the safe and voluntary return of displaced people, and pay compensation.
Two parts of the reasoning will outlast the case.
The first concerns intent.
Myanmar argued that it was conducting counterinsurgency operations against the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.
The court found that the targeting of children, sexual violence and attacks on fleeing civilians could not be explained that way. It held that an intent to destroy a group can coexist with other aims, such as expelling or punishing it.
Croatia lost its genocide case against Serbia in 2015 largely because the court treated expulsion as an alternative explanation. That route is now narrower.
The second concerns identity.
The court treated the Rohingya as a distinct ethnic group protected by the Genocide Convention. Myanmar’s state has spent decades denying that the Rohingya exist as a people, labeling them “Bengali” migrants and stripping them of citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law.
That denial was the foundation of everything that followed. It has now been rejected by the world’s highest court.
The margin was narrow, and that matters. Six judges, including Myanmar’s own ad hoc judge, dissented on the central finding, arguing that intent had not been established by fully conclusive evidence.
Future respondents will lean on that dissent. But on the obligations that followed, the bench was far more united, voting 13 to two to order Myanmar to investigate and prosecute.
The court’s rulings are binding, but it has no means of enforcing them. Under Article 94 of the UN Charter, The Gambia can refer Myanmar’s noncompliance to the Security Council, which has never used its power to give effect to a court judgment.
China and Russia have shielded Myanmar there for years, and both are among its military’s main arms suppliers.
Inside Myanmar, the incentives run against compliance. Min Aung Hlaing, who commanded the armed forces in 2017, became president in April after military-run elections. The institutions the court has ordered to investigate the genocide are the ones that carried it out.
The order to restore the Rohingya to their homes faces a further obstacle. Most of Rakhine State is now held by the Arakan Army, an ethnic Rakhine armed group that has itself been accused of serious abuses against Rohingya civilians.
Many Rohingya villages no longer exist. The court has ordered a state to enable return to territory it largely does not control, while the force that does control it is not a party to the case.
For the OIC, the verdict vindicates a strategy that was never certain to work. A small West African state litigated for seven years on behalf of 57 governments, while OIC officials and Bangladesh warned more than once that the case was underfunded.
The next phase, in which Myanmar must report within two years and the court will then determine compensation, will require the same commitment.
In Southeast Asia, the ruling complicates a policy already in motion. In October, Malaysia’s prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, hosted Min Aung Hlaing and pledged to do everything possible to bring Myanmar back into ASEAN.
Malaysia hosts about 193,000 refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar, roughly two-thirds of them Rohingya. The judgment gives Malaysia and Indonesia a legal basis for defining what normalization should require: citizenship, humanitarian access to Rakhine and safe conditions for return.
The most immediate pressure is financial. Bangladesh hosts nearly 1.17 million registered Rohingya refugees, and food rations in the camps were cut in April to as little as $7 a month for some.
As traditional donors cut back, Gulf funding will do much to determine conditions in the camps during the years it may take for the judgment to make a difference on the ground.
Three early signals will show whether the ruling has practical weight.
The first is the Security Council session requested by Britain, which has also expelled Myanmar’s defense attache. A binding outcome is unlikely, but a vetoed resolution would record which states chose to protect a government found responsible for genocide.
The second is the International Criminal Court’s pending decision on its prosecutor’s 2024 request for an arrest warrant against Min Aung Hlaing. With warrants already issued in Argentina, the places Myanmar’s leaders can safely visit are shrinking.
The third is whether the OIC sustains the case through the reparations phase.
The reasoning will also be read closely in other cases before the court, including South Africa’s case against Israel. Each side will find material in it, and each case will turn on its own evidence.
When I began writing what became the first book on the Rohingya genocide, Aung San Suu Kyi was Myanmar’s opposition leader, and I was repeatedly advised to keep “genocide” out of the title.
Once she came to power, the argument went, she would fix the problem, and genocide claims would only create difficulties.
Instead, the clearance operations took place under her government, and in 2019 she went to The Hague to defend Myanmar against The Gambia’s case.
The court has now settled the question many preferred to avoid. Yanghee Lee, a former UN special rapporteur on Myanmar, described what remains. Justice “has been decided, but not yet delivered.”
Closing that gap is a political task, and much of it will fall to the states that brought the case.


