Pakistani Taliban’s resurrected spring offensive shows its growing strength
https://arab.news/m5um4
In March, after a hiatus of two years, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) declared its so-called spring offensive “Al-Khandaq” and launched a new wave of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. This is the second time the TTP has announced a spring offensive, taking a leaf out of the Taliban’s insurgency playbook. Before this, the TTP announced the “Al-Badr” spring offensive in March 2022, but refrained from announcing such campaigns for the next two years due to the Afghan Taliban’s pressure. The announcement of a spring offensive brings into sharp focus TTP’s growing operational and organizational strength.
Since the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, TTP has significantly evolved as a militant group, enhancing both its asymmetric kinetic and propaganda warfare capabilities. Alongside the fresh wave of attacks under the “Al-Khandaq” offensive, the terror group has also initiated a propaganda campaign “Al-Khandaq Updates.” Through these updates, including news bulletins and video footage of TTP’s attacks, the terror group is showcasing its growing footprint and expanding network. Through the propaganda warfare, TTP is also trying to build a narrative of attacking security forces while sparing civilians in a bid to exploit the existing state-society gaps and to blame the former for the plethora of challenges confronting Pakistan. In doing so, TTP frames itself as a suitable alternative and the Taliban system as a magic wand to Pakistan’s complex governance problems.
TTP’s evolving operational strategies, such as this spring offensive, are the outcome of its growing organizational structure which the group revamps every year imitating the Afghan Taliban’s framework of shadow provinces and military zones. Since announcing its administrative structure in 2021, TTP publicly disclosed the names of its 17-member ‘shura’ or consultative council for the first time in January 2025. The other notable change in the organizational structure has been the increase of the terror group’s shadow provinces in Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (where TTP has a strong footprint) from three to seven and the addition of two new military zones to oversee militant attacks.
TTP’s spring offensive, enhanced propaganda capabilities, incorporation of drones and efforts to expand into Punjab have far-reaching implications for Pakistan’s internal security.
Abdul Basit Khan
Another alarming aspect of the “Al-Khandaq” offensive has been TTP’s consistent efforts to expand its network into eastern Punjab province. The terror group has made at least 14 attempts in recent weeks to carry out attacks in Punjab which have been foiled by law enforcement agencies. Concurrently, it has also published videos of its militants riding on motorbikes in different parts of Punjab’s Dera Ghazi Khan and Mianwali districts. TTP has also circulated an audio statement of the head of its Darul Ifta Mufti Nadeem Darvesh appealing to the people of Punjab to support TTP to create a Taliban-like Emirate in Pakistan. To make inroads into Punjab, TTP’s propaganda arm, Al-Umar Media, has also started publishing its propaganda updates on Telegram and other messaging apps in Punjabi language. Besides, the terror group has issued a detailed statement as well, warning the people of Dera Ghazi Khan and Taunsa districts against forming peace committees (anti-Taliban militias) under the government’s patronage, while framing it as an alleged effort by the government to pit civilians against the group. Prior to this, TTP has included former factions of defunct Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Ghazi Force, comprising former students of the Lal Masjid, into its fold to expand into Punjab. Growing into Punjab is imperative for TTP to justify its propaganda of waging an armed insurrection for the creation of a new state system in Pakistan and dispel the impression of being a movement primarily comprising Pashtuns, mostly from the Mehsud tribe.
During the “Al-Khandaq” offensive, various TTP-linked social media accounts have shared videos of a drone dropping a small payload on a military vehicle without specifying the location. Though factions affiliated with the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group have carried out at least six drone attacks against security forces in North Waziristan in 2024, the group never officially claimed them. The security forces attributed the drone attacks to the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group. The circulation of similar footage from TTP-linked social media accounts points to the potential expansion of this nascent but dangerous capability in Pakistan’s militant landscape. It will help terror outfits like TTP and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group to hit targets in urban areas without risking life losses. Drones are more effective for attacks in built up urban environments where they can cause more damage as it is difficult to shoot them down in thickly populated areas.
TTP’s spring offensive, enhanced propaganda capabilities, nascent incorporation of drones and efforts to expand into Punjab have far-reaching implications for Pakistan’s internal security. Though Pakistan has launched the Al-Badr Operation in response to TTP’s so-called spring offensive, it will have to combine the security response with diplomatic efforts to address the challenge of the terror group’s sanctuaries in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s recent diplomatic outreach to the Afghan Taliban to address security challenges and decouple them from other facets of bilateral ties is a welcome step. Decoupling trade and diplomatic ties from security challenges, such as cross-border attacks will undermine TTP’s ability to hijack Afghanistan-Pakistan bilateral ties. At the same time, cooperation on trade and regional connectivity initiatives will also remove the trust deficit between the two sides to find a workable solution to TTP’s sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani state’s counterterrorism efforts against TTP will remain elusive without societal support under a whole-of-nation approach. Though states wage wars against terrorist groups, it is societies that win them by rejecting extremist narratives and ideologies. At the same time, a decisive victory is also not possible without addressing structural issues concerning governance, development and the growing state-society gap in the Newly Merged Districts (NMDs). The promises made to the NMDs while incorporating them into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province have not been fulfilled to date, allowing groups like TTP to exploit the anger and frustration of the local communities to their advantage.
— The author is a Senior Associate Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. X: @basitresearcher.
