Pakistan–Afghan crisis is deepening dangerously

The latest exchange of fire along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Spin Boldak–Chaman frontier) this past weekend has once again exposed the delicateness of bilateral relations. Heavy shelling on Saturday left five Afghan civilians dead and several others injured, while Pakistan reported three of its citizens wounded. As is now routine, each side blamed the other for triggering the confrontation.

The timing could not have been more telling. The clash unfolded barely days after peace talks in Saudi Arabia ended without a breakthrough, an illustration of just how thin the diplomatic safety net has become.

Only weeks earlier, in November, security forces killed more than two dozen Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in Kot Sultan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KP). The operation was a tactical success but also a sobering reminder of how resilient and deeply embedded militancy has become, raising the question: was this enough, or how much more is still to come, and what will lead to resolution?

Relations between Islamabad and Kabul have grown increasingly brittle since the Taliban returned to power in 2021. At the heart of the rupture is Pakistan’s charge that Afghanistan continues to host sanctuaries for the TTP; a group ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban but operationally focused on attacking Pakistan.

The result is a sharply deteriorating security environment across southern KP and the newly merged districts, an arc of instability that now troubles capitals far beyond the region, from Beijing to Ankara and Riyadh. TTP violence is not only persistent; it is geographically concentrated and increasingly sophisticated.

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and regional partners must urgently build a cooperative framework, or the frontier will remain a tinderbox, with ordinary people paying the highest price.

Dr Syed Kaleem Imam

The belt of D.I. Khan, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, Khyber, and the former tribal districts connect directly with Afghanistan’s Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika provinces. These cross-border corridors serve as the TTP’s operational rear, housing training camps, supply routes and logistical hubs that enable militants to strike with alarming ease.

More recently, the group has shifted its focus even more tightly toward security personnel, deploying suicide bombers, vehicle-borne IEDs, ambush teams, and coordinated assaults. Recruitment continues uninterrupted. Several districts now serve not only as operational bases but as revenue pools. Smuggling, extortion, drug trafficking, and informal levies fuel a thriving war economy.

Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts in 2025 have been assertive, with dozens of militants neutralized but at heavy cost. Still the gains remain fragile, threatened by political uncertainty at home and deep mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul. Pakistan insists the Afghan Taliban must dismantle TTP sanctuaries; Kabul, in turn, condemns cross-border strikes and deflects responsibility outward.

This endless cycle of accusation and retaliation, laid bare again in Spin Boldak this past weekend, reflects a deeper collapse in communication. Traditional tools that once helped manage tensions like jirgas, back-channel contacts, quiet diplomacy have withered, while war rhetoric and meddling regional actors beat the drums of confrontation. In this vacuum, force has become the default policy tool.

Until both sides rebuild channels of trust, stabilize their border, and confront the TTP threat with shared urgency, Pakistan and Afghanistan risk remaining trapped in a loop, one where every clash becomes both a symptom and a driver of a crisis neither country can afford to ignore.

Presently three fundamental drivers sustain the current crisis. First, Afghan sanctuary provides the TTP strategic depth and mobility, offering Pakistan a challenge that cannot be solved militarily alone. Second, unaddressed local grievances in the merged districts slow governance reforms; weak service delivery, unresolved land issues, and limited economic opportunities allow militants to present themselves as alternate power brokers.

Third, the regional geopolitical vacuum left by the US withdrawal, compounded by competing interests of China, Iran, Central Asia, and Gulf states has turned the Af-Pak frontier into a zone of calculated ambiguity. Everyone wants stability; few are investing consistently in creating it.

A conceptual shift is now overdue. Islamabad must engage Kabul as a sovereign authority, grounded in a single non-negotiable principle: cross-border terrorism targeting Pakistani citizens and institutions will not be tolerated. While Pakistan must prosecute those who commit crimes, collective punishment of Afghan civilians is neither ethical nor strategically wise, especially when border communities are already traumatized by decades of violence.

Local militant networks must be dismantled, infiltration routes sealed, and civil and military institutions must coordinate more closely. Order at home remains the first and strongest line of defense. At the same time, diplomacy supported by meaningful pressure from China, Gulf states, and Turkiye will remain indispensable.

Meanwhile, the human toll of the conflict continues to rise. Each attack erodes public confidence, diverts scarce resources from development to security, and disrupts critical trade corridors. Deep-rooted mistrust along the border fuels propaganda and extremist narratives, leaving civilians caught between competing claims of sovereignty and safety. The recent border deaths are not isolated; they reflect a deeper structural breakdown.

Without coordinated action on security, governance, economic, and diplomatic fronts, instability will only worsen. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and regional partners must urgently build a cooperative framework, or the frontier will remain a tinderbox, with ordinary people paying the highest price.

– The writer is former federal secretary/IGP- PhD in Politics and IR-teaching Law and Philosophy. X: @Kaleemimam. Email:[email protected]: fb@syedkaleemimam