Is there a Baloch separatist-Pakistan Taliban nexus: Separating fact from fiction
https://arab.news/gw46f
After the December 2022 upsurge of militant violence in Pakistan, one trend observed, among others, was the nexus between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatists. Soon after renouncing the cease-fire in November, TTP’s first suicide attack that targeted police guards protecting the polio vaccination team was in Quetta. In the recent past, TTP has carried out some high-profile attacks in Balochistan, such as the April 2021 suicide attack targeting the Serena Hotel.
Two contrarian views exist on the TTP-Baloch militants’ nexus. One school of thought believes there is no credible evidence available to suggest that TTP and Baloch separatists have forged cooperative ties. The contrary view is that given the underground nature of terrorist and insurgent groups, conclusive evidence of their cooperative linkages is unlikely to emerge. Hence, just because definitive evidence is unavailable, it does not mean that a nexus between them does not exist. Therefore, even circumstantial evidence coupled with discernible patterns of cooperation are sufficient to establish the possibility of a TTP-Baloch militants’ nexus.
The arguments forwarded to underscore the Baloch-TTP nexus include episodes of militant groups from Balochistan joining the latter in 2022. For instance, in December, a group led by Mazar Baloch from Makran Division joined TTP. Earlier, in June, the Aslam Baloch faction from Noshki district also pledged allegiance to TTP’s supremo Nur Wali Mehsud. It is also opined that the Baloch separatists have not reacted to TTP’s ingress in Balochistan. This lack of reaction is taken as a tacit approval and outcome of some understanding reached between TTP and Baloch separatists. Likewise, the Baloch separatists’ embrace of suicide terrorism is quoted as an outcome of training imparted to them by TTP in its training camps in Afghanistan. Finally, TTP has been openly expressing sympathy with Baloch ethnic grievances in its propaganda rhetoric. Nur Wali in his book Inqilab-e-Mehsud has noted that during TTP’s heydays, not forging cooperation with Baloch groups was a mistake.
The Taliban’s refusal to curtail TTP’s activities on Afghan soil and the latter’s decision to renounce the June cease-fire in November as well as the Baloch separatists’ growing operational sophistication, has pushed Pakistan into a new phase of asymmetric conflict.
Abdul Basit Khan
Against this backdrop, this piece critically examines the above-mentioned claims and counterclaims to forward a nuanced understanding of a nexus, or the lack thereof, between TTP and Baloch rebels.
TTP’s presence in Balochistan is as old as the group itself. It has pockets of presence in Balochistan’s Pashtun areas and the group has intermittently carried out attacks in the province as well. TTP’s recent ingress in Balochistan is in the Baloch areas instead of expanding its erstwhile pockets in Pashtun inhibited locales. However, it bears mention that the Baloch militant groups joining TTP are religiously-inspired outfits, not Baloch separatists. Therefore, conflating their allegiances to TTP with TTP-Baloch separatists’ nexus is flawed.
Generally, like-minded and ideologically similar groups forge varying levels (high-end to low-end) of cooperation against a superior common adversary. High-end cooperation involves strategic understandings and ideological mergers, while low-end cooperation is short-lived and includes tactical and transactional relationships. Furthermore, alliances among like-minded groups are more long-lasting as compared to coalitions between ideologically dissimilar groups. The TTP-Baloch militant nexus, if any, would fall under the tactical and transactional cooperative arrangements where they might have coordinated or facilitated each other in attacking targets of common interests.
Before the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the Baloch groups and TTP co-existed in their respective Afghan havens and no reports of their clashes ever surfaced. Since both groups are engaged in a conflict against the same superior adversary, it is logical for them to avoid opening an extra front against each other. Furthermore, since both operate in the same conflict ecology, it is possible that they utilize the same logistical and smuggling networks for moving their fighters and acquiring weapons. However, this does not mean they have formed a nexus or give space to each other against the Pakistani state.
Ideologically, the Baloch insurgents are secular and waging an insurgency for a separate homeland and their grievances are grounded in socio-economic marginalization and political deprivation. TTP, on the contrary, is a religiously-driven militant group and wants to transform Pakistan into a so-called theocracy in-line with its self-styled ideological outlook. Hence, a long-term alliance between them is unnatural and least likely. The Baloch separatists have not reacted to TTP’s growing footprint in Balochistan to avoid clashes and focus on its main adversary. The Baloch separatists’ behavior toward TTP is identical to how they reacted to Daesh-Khorasan’s ingress in Balochistan in the 2015-2017 period. They tolerated Daesh-K’s existence in Balochistan so as not to render an already fragmented threat landscape even more divisive. Furthermore, any potential conflict between Daesh-K and Baloch separatists would have given the Pakistani state an advantage in managing the conflict both from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism standpoint.
Even though TTP has been openly sympathizing with Baloch ethnic grievances and expressing a desire to forge a joint front against the Pakistani state, the Baloch separatists have not responded to these overtures in kind. The limited evidence of any possible cooperation between TTP and Baloch insurgents point to tactical and transactional cooperation at the informal and individual levels. No formal and organizational cooperation involving strategic and ideological cooperation exists between the two. It’s a myth at best.
The Taliban’s refusal to curtail TTP’s activities on Afghan soil and the latter’s decision to renounce the June cease-fire in November as well as the Baloch separatists’ growing operational sophistication, has pushed Pakistan into a new phase of asymmetric conflict. Therefore, a nuanced understanding of conflict trend-lines and cooperation or animosities of different militant and insurgent groups is crucial for right policymaking and responses. A flawed understanding would lead to counterproductive responses and faulty policymaking.
- The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Twitter @basitresearcher.
