Pakistan's counter-terrorism policy: Will it deliver this time?

Former PM Imran Khan’s claim earlier this month that his policy for settling Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters and families in northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province was torpedoed by the provinces’ refusal to accept his government’s cost-sharing proposal, raises an important question: Was the arrival of armed TTP fighters from Afghanistan into Pakistan's bordering areas part of the former government’s policy towards the TTP?

In its most comprehensive National Security Committee meeting held last week, which lasted over two days and almost eight hours, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) government announced its policy decision to tackle the resurgent terrorist threat. It was decided that there would be no dialogue with terrorists, that the government would do all things required to enforce the writ of the state and secure its borders.

In many ways, the announcement is nothing new. Just a repeat of decisions made by successive governments over the last couple of decades. After all, the problem is not new either. Terrorism in Pakistan is no less than four decades old, beginning in the 1980’s, emanating from different tanzeems (organizations) and lashkars (armies), often initially mentored by the state and then becoming a proverbial Frankenstein monster. Pakistan has typically responded to the threat by engaging and fighting them.

And so did the last government. It opted to engage the TTP whose negotiating demand included reversing Pakistan's constitutional move of integrating the country’s tribal areas into KPK province, the enforcement of Sharia law, pulling the Pakistan army out of tribal areas and the release of TTP prisoners.

Some prisoners were released. Like all previous governments, the PTI government also seemed to have been led by security agencies on its counter-terrorism policy. The PTI sought the support of the Afghan Taliban, a policy approved by the Imran Khan government and implemented by the country's prime intelligence agency and subsequently, by the Peshawar corps commander. This involved talks with the TTP, and support from the Afghan Taliban to ensure a guarantee that Afghan territory would not be used to attack Pakistan, as well as allowing for the return of unarmed TTP groups with their families.

According to policymakers and policy implementers, the government had decided to take action against the TTP fighters involved in killing Pakistanis. Whatever the plan, such a policy was not implemented but armed TTP fighters entered Pakistan's northern areas including Swat and North Waziristan.

Like all previous governments, in the absence of an informed, rigorous and comprehensive policy dialogue on the TTP threat, the PTI government’s policy ended up not delivering on planned outcomes.

Nasim Zehra

Like all previous governments, in the absence of an informed, rigorous and comprehensive policy dialogue on the TTP threat, the PTI government’s policy ended up not delivering on planned outcomes. TTP fighters were targeted, made to surrender, disarmed and where possible, returned and resettled with their families in Pakistan.

In recent months however, multiple factors, national, regional and global have created a new context unleashing a dynamic that militates against the primacy of engaging with violent interlocutors that threaten, attack, or destroy law enforcement agencies of the state and demand the surrender of state authority in certain areas. Of the multiple factors that create the new context, seven are of particular importance.

One, the clear missteps and failures of the last dialogue policy cleared by the former prime minister and implemented by the military and intel top command resulted in the entry of hundreds of armed TTP men into Pakistan’s main cities.

Two, the arrival of armed TTP fighters in the densely populated towns of KP and Balochistan, extending into the capital Islamabad. September onwards thousands of local people rose up in opposition to what was seen as government policy allowing TTP fighters to return as part of negotiations.

Three, widespread terrorist attacks persist across Pakistan and continue to target policemen, counter-terrorism department (CTD)officials, soldiers, intel operatives, polio workers and local people.

Four, the people's uprisings against the presence of TTP fighters since September, in areas bordering Afghanistan, have persisted. Mindful of TTP-instigated violence in the name of religion and the state’s confused policy towards the militant group, thousands have protested in KP and Waziristan.

Five, the November change in Pakistan's top military command has prompted a policy review of Pakistan's policy towards the TTP. From the last National Security Committee’s meeting the message was clear—some changes to the existing TTP policy will be made. 

Six, there is a regional consensus among all countries bordering Afghanistan that no talks will be held with any Afghanistan-based terrorist groups. At several meetings, the special envoys on Afghanistan of most neighboring countries have declined the Taliban's suggestions and offers that they could facilitate talks with representatives of Afghanistan-based terror groups.

Seven, the global acknowledgment that Pakistan is under terrorist attack from Afghanistan-based TTP fighters. The UN Security Council Monitoring team on Afghanistan in its May 2022 report acknowledged that Afghanistan-based “several thousand” TTP fighters have conducted “cross-border” attacks. The US administration too has acknowledged the threat Pakistan faces.

Against the backdrop of these, elements now primarily include enhanced intel and policing operations. No major military operation is required since the TTP does not control territory.

In a renewed effort to counter the TTP’s ideological thrust to use Islam to recruit locals in its ranks, popular religious figures have issued ‘fatwas’ reiterating Islamic teachings against terrorism. Their collective message is that only the head of a government can declare legitimate jihad, not non-state groups.

This policy direction notwithstanding, Pakistan faces two contextual challenges in tackling the TTP threat. One, to ensure continuity of a shared approach and institutional coordination within Pakistan's civil-military institutions. Without this, Pakistan will find it almost impossible to effectively tackle the TTP threat - as experienced in the past with acute policy disconnect between civil-military institutions. Two, to ensure that TTP is denied the external sanctuary and support system within Afghanistan and beyond.

Like all previous policies, Pakistan's new TTP policy will not easily yield success. But it is one that must be implemented holistically and consistently.

- Nasim Zehra is an author, analyst and national security expert.