Kashmir under nuclear shadow
This is not the first time that the Kashmir problem has entangled two nuclear powers – India and Pakistan – in a bitter confrontation. What worries Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan is not the statement of India’s Defense Minister, Rajnath Singh that India could review its No-First Use (NFU) policy for its nuclear weapons and that this “would depend on the circumstances.” Pakistan never took seriously India’s assertion that it would not be the first to launch a nuclear attack.
When China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964, it declared its commitment to NFU. India rejected this commitment and embarked on a nuclear armament program. India exploded its first nuclear device in May 1974, labeling it as a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” In the first week of May 1998, India became an overt nuclear-weapon state by exploding five nuclear devices. Pakistan responded by exploding six nuclear devices in the last week of May 1998, describing it as a security against India’s nuclear “blackmail.” Pakistani leaders justify Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as defensive measures against nuclear India that has a clear advantage in conventional weaponry and manpower.
What worries Pakistan most today is that India’s nuclear security system is led by a leadership that subscribes to an extreme right-wing Hinduism based ultra-nationalism that has targeted religious minorities, especially the Muslims, in India, and repeatedly expressed deep hostility toward Pakistan since Narendra Modi came to power in May 2014. Such a right-wing ideological leadership can resort to military adventurism against Pakistan which may escalate to a nuclear exchange between the two countries.
The past experience suggests that whenever a difficult military situation developed between the two countries, such as in 1986-87, 1999, 2002, 2018 and 2019 (February), rationality prevailed and two sides showed restraint. However, given the high stakes of the Modi government with reference to the recent changes in the status of Indian-administered Kashmir in the context of India’s domestic politics and a steep deterioration of relations between the two countries since August 5, 2019, when India forcibly integrated its part of Kashmir in India.
The past experience suggests that whenever a difficult military situation developed between the two countries, such as in 1986-87, 1999, 2002, 2018 and 2019 (February), rationality prevailed and two sides showed restraint.
Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi
There are three major scenarios that can lead to a major conventional war between Pakistan and India. First, the troops of two countries exchange fire across the Line of Control in Kashmir twice or thrice a week. This causes human (military personnel and civilians) and property losses on both sides. The clashes on the Line of Control can escalate and become a war first in Kashmir and then on the international border between India and Pakistan. Second, India can stage a 'false terrorist' attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, and use it as a pretext to launch airstrikes against what it would describe as terrorist camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir or mainland Pakistan. Pakistan is expected to strike-back by air raids, as happened in the last week of February 2019. On this occasion, India planned a response missile raid but did not launch it which saved the situation from escalation. However, this time tension is so high, such a dangerous strategy may escalate to a full war.
Third, India, relying on its conventional military superiority, may decide to launch a rapid ground and air strike either across the Line of Control into Pakistan-administered Kashmir or mainland Pakistan to capture a chunk of territory and hold it for bargaining with Pakistan. However, Pakistan will surely respond with its full conventional military power, which can cause a major conventional war.
In all three possible situations, there is a danger of escalation of conventional war to a nuclear exchange. Both sides have a different variety of nuclear weapons, including nuclear weapons, and their delivery system. Given the fact that both India and Pakistan share along borders, the response time to check the incoming missiles is very short-few minutes. This can cause misjudgment and miscalculation on both sides, plunging the whole region and beyond in a disaster. Such a situation will be most unfortunate because nobody can win a nuclear war. It is likely to have injurious impact for the rest of the world.
Given the gravity of the current situation, India and Pakistan cannot be left alone to settle to settle the Kashmir problem. They have failed in the past and there is hardly any chance now that they can resolve the problem on their own. The international community needs to adopt diplomatic measures to advice restrain in unambiguous terms. They should also advice India to improve human rights situation in Indian-administered Kashmir and the lock down of Kashmir must come to an end. There is a need for India to review to decision to unilaterally abolish Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. It needs to seek a mandate from the people of Kashmir for any change in Kashmir’s status.
The international community must be actively engaged with India and Pakistan in order to come up with a mutually acceptable solution of the Kashmir problem that also takes into account the wishes of Kashmiris. If India and Pakistan are left alone to bilaterally find a solution of the Kashmir problem, they are not expected to succeed.
