China’s Urumqi process can’t fix Pakistan-Afghanistan militancy alone 

Recently, Islamabad has held the global limelight, with the prime minister at the center of major world forums, flanked by the field marshal, especially amid the US-Iran war and Islamabad’s serious and formal mediation efforts. Notwithstanding its mediatory endeavors, it remains a polity, like all others, that needs support. 

Islamabad faces a protracted bilateral dispute with its western neighbor, one that is both internal and external: existential for Islamabad and systemic for Kabul. Interestingly, it is everybody’s problem to fix. 

Beijing offered to restart the Urumqi process, initially held in April 2026, to mediate between the two states over cross-border terrorism, especially after fresh airstrikes this June by Kabul. On Tuesday night, June 30, Kabul targeted an “Daesh joint center” and “elements of evil and corruption” in the Saranan area of Balochistan. Kabul maintained the sites were being used to coordinate sabotage and plan attacks on Afghan civilians. 

The TTP attacks Pakistan from Afghanistan, but succeeds through networks inside Pakistan itself. 

- Naila Mahsud

Those well-versed in the discussion are aware that Urumqi is a Chinese city that hosted talks between Islamabad and Kabul. As the name suggests, the Urumqi process has been an informal effort at bringing both states to the table, consistent with China’s “1.5 diplomacy” of testing ideas informally before giving out any formal stance. 

Beijing has had nothing to lose if diplomacy fails, but a lot at stake if it upsets either side. If it leans too heavily on Islamabad, it risks jeopardizing CPEC, Gwadar and its counter-India partnership. A fallout directly threatens CPEC and Gwadar, since those projects run through the same unstable border areas, more fighting means more attacks on Chinese workers, higher security costs, and delays that could destabilize the corridor. 

And if it strains Kabul, the Taliban may not move in the direction Beijing wants. The mineral corridor and Belt and Road extension would be the first casualties, and, most importantly, stability in the Xinjiang region will ultimately pay the price. If Kabul turns hostile, Uyghur militant groups gain more space. 

Beijing can only offer the table; Islamabad and Kabul decide what gets signed on it. That is the decisive variable behind why last year’s Urumqi process concluded with words like “restraint” and “continued dialogue” rather than a formal, binding agreement. 

Most importantly, both sides have made choices that keep the TTP problem alive. It sits right on the border and feeds off both sides. Kabul says the TTP is Pakistan’s internal problem. It was, in fact, a creation inside Pakistan, but it has since refractured and regrouped across the border and inside Afghanistan. Kabul remains quietly hesitant to crack down on TTP militants who were once partners in the fight against Western powers. 

Weak governance in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, and especially the bordering areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, makes it highly vulnerable to TTP recruitment, training in Afghan sanctuaries, and attacks on Pakistan. 

The TTP settles in Afghanistan because the terrain is remote and the Taliban government does not fully crack down on them. From there, they slip across into Pakistan’s KP and Balochistan. But crossing the border alone isn’t enough. To actually carry out bombings or assassinations, they need people and support inside Pakistan. 

So, the dynamic is this: it is neither Pakistan’s internal problem alone nor Afghanistan’s mess to handle alone. The TTP attacks Pakistan from Afghanistan, but succeeds through networks inside Pakistan itself. 

That is the fundamental reason the Urumqi process alone cannot resolve the problem. If, and only if, both sides want a serious and lasting resolution, substantive responsibility has to be assumed by both. 

- Naila Mahsud is a Pakistani political and International relations researcher, with a focus on regional politics and security issues. X: @MahsudNaila