The Strait of Hormuz and the price of selective principles

Is it realpolitik or hegemony’s classic face? When President Donald Trump declares that the United States would “control the Strait of Hormuz and get paid for it,” his statement generates a surprisingly muted reaction internationally. Yet whenever Iran suggests exercising similar control over the same waterway, it is immediately portrayed as a threat to international peace and freedom of navigation. The contrasting reactions expose more than diplomatic double standards; they reveal the geopolitical realities surrounding the world’s most critical maritime chokepoint.

The Strait of Hormuz is not simply a narrow passage separating Iran from Oman. Barely 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, it connects the Gulf with the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Every day, roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil consumption and a significant share of global liquefied natural gas exports pass through these waters. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar all depend heavily on the strait to export hydrocarbons. Any disruption immediately reverberates through global energy markets, shipping insurance premiums and financial markets.

Geography has given Iran a unique strategic advantage. The northern coastline of the strait belongs almost entirely to Iran, while Oman controls the southern side through the Musandam Peninsula. Much of the internationally recognized shipping lanes pass through waters over which Iran exercises territorial jurisdiction, although navigation rights are protected under international maritime law. This geographical reality has long provided Tehran with considerable leverage during periods of confrontation with the United States and its allies.
Iran has repeatedly described the Strait of Hormuz as part of its national security perimeter. Whenever sanctions intensify or military confrontation escalates, Tehran reminds the world that it possesses the capability to disrupt maritime traffic. During the current confrontation, Iranian leaders have once again declared the strait a “red line,” insisting they retain effective control over its waters.

The military balance in Hormuz explains why no power can easily dominate it. Iran has developed an asymmetric naval strategy centered on fast attack boats, anti-ship cruise missiles, naval mines, submarines and armed drones. Rather than challenging the United States Navy conventionally, Tehran seeks to make any attempt to seize or permanently secure the waterway prohibitively expensive.

The United States, meanwhile, maintains one of the world’s strongest naval presences in the Gulf through the Fifth Fleet headquartered in Bahrain, supported by aircraft carriers, destroyers, surveillance aircraft and regional military bases. Washington’s declared objective has always been to ensure freedom of navigation. Military analysts increasingly argue that a US attempt to permanently control the strait without Iran’s acquiescence would require enormous military commitments and carry substantial escalation risks.

Diplomatically, the Strait of Hormuz has become a contest over narratives as much as territory. Western governments generally characterize Iranian threats as coercive behavior against international commerce. Tehran, by contrast, argues that it is responding to sanctions, military pressure and repeated violations of its sovereignty. Both sides invoke international law, but each selectively interprets its provisions.

The Gulf Arab states occupy an especially delicate position. They rely heavily on uninterrupted exports through the Strait of Hormuz while also depending on American security guarantees. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested billions of dollars in alternative pipelines bypassing the strait, but these routes can only handle a fraction of their total exports. Qatar, the world’s leading LNG exporter, remains almost entirely dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for access to global markets. Consequently, even governments uncomfortable with Iranian policies also recognize that prolonged military confrontation serves nobody’s interests.

Ultimately, the Strait of Hormuz belongs to neither Iran nor the United States. Its security cannot rest on competing claims of domination but on mutually accepted rules.

Asif Durrani

For Asia, the stakes are even higher. Pakistan, China, India, Japan and South Korea import substantial proportions of their crude oil from the Gulf. Any closure or prolonged disruption would threaten industrial production, inflation control and energy security across Asia. China, in particular, has strong incentives to prevent prolonged instability because Gulf energy is still essential for sustaining its economic growth.

Commercially, not only oil but modern supply chains depend upon predictable maritime transport. Every increase in shipping insurance, freight rates or security costs eventually affects consumers worldwide through higher prices for fuel, food, manufactured goods and industrial inputs. Even the perception of instability pushes oil prices upward as traders price geopolitical risk into futures markets. During previous crises, insurers multiplied war-risk premiums severalfold, while shipping companies diverted vessels or delayed sailings altogether. Even a threat to block the strait is enough to disrupt maritime trade through this waterway.

International law provides the remedy. The principle of transit passage under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) seeks precisely to prevent strategic chokepoints from becoming instruments of political coercion. Neither coastal states nor external military powers enjoy unlimited discretion to restrict commercial navigation. The legitimacy of maritime security ultimately rests upon multilateral acceptance rather than unilateral declarations. The countries of the Gulf should make common cause to protect the sanctity of the Strait of Hormuz by using UNCLOS.

The current confrontation has already demonstrated the costs. Iran choked the strait, interrupting energy transportation and driving oil and gas prices to unprecedented levels. Pakistan itself was among the hardest hit, with petrol prices jumping from around Rs 270 per liter before the war to Rs 415 at their peak. On the transit fees proposed by President Trump, the International Maritime Organization said there was no legal basis for mandatory tolls on ships transiting an international strait. The US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, had said the same in June, when the fees under discussion were Iran’s: “No country is allowed to charge tolls or fees on an international waterway. That’s existing international law.”

The current controversy, therefore, requires a broader conversation. If Iran’s claim to control Hormuz is rejected because it threatens international commerce, then similar assertions by any other power deserve equal scrutiny. Conversely, if the international community accepts that external powers may militarily administer the strait when circumstances demand, it would establish a precedent that could reshape maritime disputes far beyond the Gulf.

Ultimately, the Strait of Hormuz belongs to neither Iran nor the United States. It is one of the world’s most critical international waterways. Its security cannot rest on competing claims of domination but on mutually accepted rules, regional dialogue and international cooperation.

The world has too much at stake to allow one of its most vital maritime arteries to become the exclusive preserve of any single power.

-Asif Durrani is Pakistan’s former Special Representative for Afghanistan. He has served as ambassador to Iran and the UAE and is a Senior Research Fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

X: @AsifDurrani20