Iraq’s long road to reclaiming the factions’ weapons

In an interview with Al-Arabiya, Lt. Gen. Qais Al-Muhammadawi, who heads Iraq’s Disengagement and Arms Control Committee, made clear that the current phase of bringing weapons under state authority reaches only the factions already folded into the Popular Mobilization Units — not groups outside it. He credited an initiative by Sadrist Movement leader Muqtada Al-Sadr involving the Saraya Al-Salam militia, also known as the Peace Brigades, with setting the project in motion and said its purpose was to “end the linkage of weapons to any political or religious banner.” Any handover, he added, would follow “an agreement between the army command and those who hold the weapons” — a process requiring “time” that “cannot be settled in a single day.”

His comments give this sensitive file a political and legal character, situating it within state institutions rather than treating it as a simple security sweep against loose weapons. For now, Baghdad can neither practically nor legally dissolve the PMU, a body forged in the war against Daesh. The aim instead is to reshape it into a disciplined arm of the state, stripped of external or partisan loyalties.

The 2016 law that created the force (No. 40) defined it as an independent military formation, part of the Iraqi armed forces, answerable to the commander-in-chief, and with members bound by standing military law. Cutting partisan and political ties, then, is less a new departure than a return to a legal framework that went largely unenforced through years of war and the fragile balances that followed.

The aim is to reshape the PMU into a disciplined arm of the state, stripped of external or partisan loyalties

Hassan Al-Mustafa

PMU Chairman Falih Al-Fayyadh struck a similar note, revealing that the new committee had started drafting mechanisms for a clean break between the force and any political, factional or partisan structures, with the goal of turning it into an institution under a single command tied to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Remaining within a state institution means accepting its rules, shedding cross-border loyalties and avoiding anything that endangers national security or relations with Iraq’s neighbors.

None of this will come easily, least of all with “loyalist factions” devoted to the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist) refusing to comply. Still, three developments offer something to build on — if they prove genuine and are seen through without hesitation or compromise.

The first is Al-Sadr’s move on the Peace Brigades. The second is the decision by Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq and Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali to set up committees inventorying personnel, weapons and equipment in coordination with the commander-in-chief. The third is the PMU’s own pivot, through Al-Fayyadh, toward the language of professionalism and political disengagement. Yet such signals count for little unless concrete steps actually begin, are sustained, and end with authority resting in the hands of the Iraqi state alone.

The Associated Press characterized the announcement by Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq and Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali as a major step in the government’s bid to restore state control over armed groups that have long operated on their own, despite nominal ties to Baghdad.

The road, however, is neither smooth nor easy. Groups like Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat Al-Nujaba still reject disarmament outright, tying it to questions of “sovereignty” and the “presence of foreign forces.” This open defiance betrays a double standard: such factions do not reject the state as a source of legal and financial cover, yet they insist on keeping weapons and operational decisions beyond official reach. In other words, they want to reap money, politics and legitimacy from the state while ignoring the Cabinet’s decisions.

Some factions want to reap money, politics and legitimacy from the state while ignoring the Cabinet’s decisions

Hassan Al-Mustafa

The stakes climb even higher when weapons are fired across Iraq’s borders — notably the recent drone strikes launched from Iraqi soil against the vital interests, energy platforms and oil fields of several Gulf states. Al-Muhammadawi was emphatic that Baghdad “will not allow its territory to be used to attack neighboring countries,” disclosing that Iraqi forces had thwarted operations aimed at neighboring states.

Given these complexities, the effort to bring weapons under the control of the state leans heavily on moral and religious cover from the Najaf seminary, which has lent the campaign a political and ethical foundation. In a statement carried by the Iraqi News Agency in 2024, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani urged that foreign interference be barred, the rule of law upheld and weapons be confined to the state. This position drains religious legitimacy from the parallel arsenals and leaves the state as the sole arbiter of security.

With clashes between the factions and Iraqi forces a real fear, observers are left asking the hard questions: Can the government committee account for the drones, missiles, launchers and munitions depots? And will control of that arsenal pass to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, rather than into internal arrangements that keep the factions in control?

Should Baghdad manage to restrict the use of weapons, sever the armed formations’ partisan and political ties and halt the hostile strikes on its Arab neighbors, Iraq will have genuinely begun its passage from managing factions to building a state that controls its own security.

• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher specializing in Islamist movements, the evolution of religious discourse, and relations between the Gulf states and Iran.

X: @Halmustafa