Israel’s buffer-zone fallacy

Territorial buffers rarely, if ever, deliver the peace and security their advocates promise. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, Ukraine was seen as a neutral cordon between Russia and NATO. Instead, it became a zone of increasingly fierce geopolitical contention, followed by open war.

French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau made the same mistake when he assumed that the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe would serve as a buffer against encroachment by Bolshevik Russia. Instead, they were early targets of Hitler and ended up as part of the Warsaw Pact following his defeat.

In an era when ballistic missiles, drones and other projectiles can hit distant strategic targets with growing accuracy, the idea of a protective buffer zone is not just faulty, it is nonsense.

Yet the Israeli defense minister, Israel Katz, insists that the Israel Defense Forces must occupy a large part of southern Lebanon to protect “displaced residents” in northern Israel. He recently boasted that Israeli troops had destroyed five bridges on the Litani River, about 30 kilometers from the border between Lebanon and Israel, thus creating a buffer zone that will be maintained “until northern Israel (is) safe.”

But this occupation, an obvious violation of international law, is unlikely to achieve its stated goals. If anything, it will leave Israelis, especially Israeli soldiers, more vulnerable.

By pushing for the occupation of even more land, Israel risks turning local civilians into front-line targets

Daoud Kuttab

After the horrors of the Second World War, the international community agreed that no country was permitted to take land from another by force. The “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” features prominently in the preamble of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which called for the “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in (June 1967).”

Yet the entire world is watching as Israel deliberately acquires large swaths of land by force in Gaza and southern Lebanon.

In Gaza, one of the most densely populated areas in the world, the Israeli army is reportedly occupying more than 50 percent of the land. In Lebanon, Israel is pursuing an indefinite occupation of between about 850 and 1,060 square kilometers, nearly 10 percent of the country’s total territory. And in the West Bank, Israel has long insisted that it must keep the Jordan Valley west of the river as a buffer zone in any peace deal.

But with Iranian missiles and drones reaching Tel Aviv, Beit Shemesh, Haifa and Dimona — and Ukrainian drones penetrating deep into Russia — the justification for such demands has collapsed.

Moreover, by pushing for the occupation of even more land, Israel risks turning local civilians into front-line targets. Some critics even warn of a dynamic in which civilians will effectively serve as human shields, which would then provide a political/media bonanza for Israel’s hasbarists (propagandists).

At the same time, by occupying land in southern Lebanon Israeli soldiers will be closer to Hezbollah fighters and therefore in greater danger.

As the political scientist Dominic Tierney has shown, military power alone rarely wins wars, because modern conflicts are political, social and ideological struggles, not merely tactical battles.

“While a dominant military can win battles, secure terrain and destroy conventional forces,” he explained, “it often fails to create lasting peace or achieve political objectives — known as ‘winning the war’ — because it cannot fix underlying issues such as lack of legitimacy, insurgency or deep-rooted political instability.”

Far from acknowledging these limitations, Israel has already declared that it will prohibit the return of Lebanese citizens who fled before its latest ground invasion began. Such a policy is hardly new. Since 1948, Israel has denied the right of return to about 750,000 Palestinians and their descendants, despite numerous UN resolutions urging it to provide this option.

Rather than taking more land where opponents will always exist, the wiser strategy is to pursue a political settlement. Solutions already exist for both Gaza and Lebanon but Israeli politicians, especially Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government, appear more interested in preserving the status quo than in making real progress.

As the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu pointed out long ago, harming an enemy or simply taking land does not necessarily constitute a victory. On the contrary, a displaced enemy might return with even greater resolve, or the cost of holding the new ground might prove unsustainable. In a competitive, hostile environment, a retreating enemy can regroup, adapt his tactics, acquire new technologies and eventually strike back. The fight never truly ends.

But no ancient wisdom is needed to understand that countries should aim to resolve any underlying tensions rather than trying to create buffers. Holding territory does not erase the other side. Hezbollah’s opponents within Lebanon, and Palestinian leaders who oppose Hamas, have offered to cooperate with Israel, but Israel has adamantly refused. Its current leaders seem to believe that perpetual conflict and occupation better serve their interests than the unpopular political concessions peace would require.

But peace is the only sustainable option. Security in Gaza and Lebanon cannot be achieved through buffer zones, only through a political settlement that addresses humanitarian needs and the root causes of the conflict. That requires respect for international law, accountability for actions that affect civilians on all sides, and a genuine readiness to negotiate.

The alternative is endless cycles of violence.

• Daoud Kuttab is an award-winning Palestinian journalist and former Ferris Professor of Journalism at Princeton University. He is the author of “State of Palestine Now: Practical and Logical Arguments for the Best Way to Bring Peace to the Middle East.” X: @daoudkuttab

Copyright: Project Syndicate.