Breaking point as US allies look beyond Trump era

US President Donald Trump’s first term of office strained relationships with much of the world, especially Europe. However, the shockwaves from his second presidency since 2025 may now mean that even more consequential tipping points are approaching in relationships between the US and its major allies with profound implications for international relations.

Much of Europe, and indeed many other key countries across the world, are preparing more seriously than they did from 2017 to 2021 for break points from the US. These countries know that even if Trump does not seek an unconstitutional third term of office, one of his Make America Great Again proteges, such as Vice President JD Vance, may well be the 2028 Republican nominee.

Vance was widely criticized in Europe, in particular, after his speech at the Munich Security Conference last year. It was there that he made the extraordinary assertion that the Continent’s main security threat comes not from Russia, but from erosion of democratic norms inside the region, including alleged censorship, and suppression of populist voices.

While much of Europe is hoping for the best, including a Democrat victory in the 2028 US presidential election, many states believe it is increasingly important to prepare for other scenarios. The UK, for example, this week announced an intensification of its Brexit reset with the EU, partially in response to cooling ties with Trump.

Since Trump took office again in 2025, a steady stream of US actions has challenged core, long‑standing assumptions in Europe and beyond about shared interests and mutual restraint, sapping trust among long-standing allies.

In Europe, where this dynamic has perhaps come into sharpest focus, it is accelerating shifts toward more strategic autonomy. This includes defense independence, energy diversification, and economic measures to protect against US coercion. 

Frustration is boiling over among long-standing loyalists.

Andrew Hammond

Of course, these dynamics are not wholly new. Last June, the Pew Global Research Project found that perceptions of the US had already nosedived under the second Trump administration compared with a year before in the last phase of Joe Biden’s presidency. In many countries surveyed, there was already a double-digit reduction in the percentage of people with an overall favorable view of the US.

This includes in Poland from 77 percent to 55 percent; Sweden 47 percent to 19 percent; Spain 48 percent to 31 percent; Netherlands 48 percent to 29 percent; Germany 49 percent to 33 percent; and France 46 percent to 36 percent.   

Moreover, research from the European Council on Foreign Relations in January showed significantly more people in several key European nations perceive the US as a “necessary partner with which we must strategically cooperate” rather than an “ally that shares our interests and values.” In the UK, the relevant data is 53 percent and 25 percent, respectively; the so-called EU10, including France and Germany, 51 percent and 16 percent; and Switzerland 42 percent and 8 percent. 

Recent actions by the Trump team have only increased economic and political concerns. Proof of this includes the frustration boiling over among long-standing loyalists to the US leader, including UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who this year are publicly disagreeing with him for the first time.

The resulting series of US presidential threats and public rebukes may weaken these alliances further. 

EU policymakers have grown increasingly uneasy.

Andrew Hammond

Tensions with allies first became apparent this year in the controversy over Trump’s territorial designs on Greenland when he appeared to leave open the possibility of military action, and threatened key European nations with additional tariffs. This prompted France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the UK, and Denmark to issue an extraordinary joint statement that “Greenland belongs to its people. It is for Denmark and Greenland, and them only, to decide on matters concerning Denmark and Greenland.”

During the Greenland debacle, which has faded away from view for now, the EU even left open the option of imposing retaliatory tariffs, and also a so-called trade bazooka, the Anti-Coercion Instrument. This was created in 2023 to deal with the threat posed by China which has been called a “systemic rival” to the EU. The ACI would allow the EU to change customs duties or take other trade-related actions to deter or respond to coercion from the US.

These remarkable developments have fed into a wider reassessment of US power in key Europe nations, including in the economic domain. For example, Washington and Brussels last year reached a landmark tariff agreement under which the EU committed to buying $750 billion of US liquefied natural gas, oil, and nuclear energy.  

However, as transatlantic trust has ebbed, EU policymakers have grown increasingly uneasy about the implications, in the words of European Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgensen, of “replacing dependence on Russian gas with heavy dependence on US supply.” This assessment is felt especially strongly in Germany, the EU’s largest economy, where LNG imports now derive overwhelmingly from the US. It is no surprise that Merz has begun actively diversifying, including with outreach to Qatar and the UAE.

Of course, Washington has pushed back strongly against European criticism that US energy could be weaponized. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, for instance, asserted that “Commissioner Jorgensen’s comments are rather unfortunate. The US is a rock solid supplier of energy. You can’t have a better partner.” He also argued that US energy exports have been increasingly central to Europe’s security since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Nonetheless, there is growing economic and political concern in much of Europe. For many, ongoing developments have showcased a renegade Trump team that is increasingly willing to pursue strategic objectives unilaterally and to pressure allies when convenient. The result is a growing urgency in European debates about how to rebalance relations in an era of seemingly ever more volatile US behavior.

• Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE Ideas at the London School of Economics.