Misreading the Gulf: Why diplomacy did not fail — the law did

Recent commentary has suggested that diplomatic engagement in the Gulf has faltered under the weight of renewed regional escalation. Yet such interpretations risk misdiagnosing the nature of the current crisis.

What is unfolding is not the breakdown of diplomacy, but a more fundamental challenge to the legal framework that governs the use of force in the region.

In this context, the recent detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been described in some quarters as having failed under the pressure of escalation.

Yet such a characterization risks overlooking a more fundamental point: diplomacy did not collapse under its own logic, but was overtaken by conduct that strains the legal principles governing the use of force.

The recent phase of instability has exposed the limits not of diplomatic strategy, but of the legal norms upon which that strategy depends. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the failure of engagement and the erosion of the rules that are meant to structure state conduct.

The Saudi-Iran rapprochement, often characterized as a political gamble, was in fact a calculated exercise in risk management.

Its objective was not to eliminate conflict, but to reduce friction, stabilize expectations, and create a framework within which escalation could be contained. In a region defined by economic interdependence, particularly in energy markets and maritime transit, such an approach reflects strategic necessity rather than miscalculation.

Diplomacy, however, operates within a legal order. It is not self-executing. Its effectiveness ultimately depends on the extent to which the rules governing the use of force are observed.

At the center of that legal order lies the prohibition on the use of force, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations.

This principle is foundational to the maintenance of international peace and security. It is designed to prevent the expansion of hostilities beyond their immediate participants and to safeguard the sovereignty of states not directly engaged in conflict.

Recent developments suggest that these protections are under strain.

The extension of missile and drone activity beyond immediate theaters of confrontation has placed third-party states at risk, notwithstanding their efforts to remain outside the conflict.

In several instances, such actions have occurred despite explicit efforts by Gulf states to avoid involvement in the underlying hostilities.

From a legal perspective, this raises questions not of political alignment, but of conduct. The projection of force into or across the territory of states not party to hostilities engages core principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.

The difficulty with prevailing interpretations is that they treat diplomacy as the variable that has failed, when in fact it is the rules governing the use of force that have been tested and, in some cases, disregarded.

This distinction is not merely conceptual. It has practical implications for how responsibility is understood and how risk is managed.

International law does not evaluate state conduct through the lens of political expectation, but through established legal standards, including necessity, proportionality, and distinction.

Where these standards are placed under pressure, the consequences extend beyond the immediate parties to the conflict.

The continued relevance of diplomatic engagement must also be considered in this light. Diplomacy does not guarantee compliance; it creates channels through which escalation may be mitigated and managed.

The absence of such channels does not reduce exposure to risk. On the contrary, it may intensify it by removing mechanisms for communication and de-escalation.

In this sense, recent events do not diminish the logic of diplomatic engagement. They underscore its importance in an environment where legal constraints are increasingly contested.

The implications are not confined to regional politics. The Gulf occupies a central position within the global energy system, and instability in the region has immediate consequences for supply chains, pricing mechanisms, and market confidence.

Disruptions affecting maritime transit, particularly those linked to the Strait of Hormuz, illustrate how rapidly geopolitical developments translate into legal and commercial uncertainty.

The Strait itself is governed by the regime of transit passage under international maritime law, which guarantees the right of continuous and unimpeded navigation. This regime is integral to the functioning of global trade. Any interference with it raises broader questions about the resilience of the legal architecture underpinning international economic activity.

Yet it would be a mistake to assume that this moment of instability will define the region’s long-term economic trajectory.

The Gulf has, for decades, demonstrated a remarkable capacity to absorb shocks, whether geopolitical, financial, or structural, while continuing to attract investment and sustain growth.

Its strategic location, deep integration into global energy markets, and ongoing diversification efforts position it not merely as a region exposed to risk, but as one capable of managing and adapting to it.

As Joseph Nye has argued, resilience in international systems often lies not in the absence of shocks, but in the capacity of states and markets to absorb and adapt to them.

That resilience is particularly evident in the Gulf, where state-led investment, infrastructure development, and financial capacity continue to anchor long-term economic confidence.

In that sense, while escalation introduces immediate uncertainty, it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the region’s economic direction.

The deeper reality is that the Gulf remains indispensable to the global economy and continues to offer compelling reasons for capital, trade, and strategic engagement to return, even after periods of disruption.

Viewed in this context, the current moment represents less a failure of diplomacy than a stress test of the legal order that supports it.

Diplomatic strategies are necessarily shaped by the assumption that certain rules will be observed. Where those assumptions no longer hold, the issue is not the strategy itself, but the conditions under which it operates.

For those in the Gulf, this distinction is not abstract. It reflects a reality in which states may seek de-escalation while simultaneously facing the spillover of conflict beyond their control.

Because the question is not whether diplomacy was misplaced, it is whether the legal order that sustains it is being upheld.

• Dr. Bashayer Al-Majed is a professor of law at Kuwait University, and a visiting fellow at Oxford. X: @BashayerAlMajed