Analysis: The Gulf’s strategic options in a time of regional escalation

• Gulf states seek to avoid being drawn directly into US-Israel strikes on Iran’s regime while protecting security and economic stability

• Regional governments balance deterrence, diplomacy and strategic diversification as war reshapes the Middle East’s security architecture

DOHA: The Gulf states are treating the ongoing war between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other as a pivotal moment — not merely in terms of the scale of the direct military threat, but in terms of the profound transformations reshaping the region’s architecture and the new maps of power and influence they may produce.

This complexity deeply weaves together the political, economic, defense and social dimensions of the crisis, making the decision to “avoid being drawn into war” part of a broader vision for repositioning the Gulf within regional and international orders.

Politically, the Gulf states have adopted an unambiguous stance: refusal to become embroiled in an all-out war despite the fact that their territories, military bases and critical installations now fall within the targeting range of Iranian missiles and drones at escalatory levels measured by the magnitude of the threat and its direct implications for sovereignty and national security.

Several Gulf officials characterized this escalation as a crossing of red lines and a flagrant violation of sovereignty — signaling a rejection of any attempt to turn Gulf geography into an extension of the military conflict between external parties.

Yet this position should not be understood as absolute neutrality; rather, it reflects a strategic awareness that the current war is fundamentally a US-Israeli confrontation with Iran, and that dragging the Gulf into the heart of this equation would not serve its interests but would instead expose it to prolonged security and economic attrition, constraining its ability to pursue its developmental priorities.​

In the same vein, the behavior of key states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar reveals a growing trend toward diversifying international partnerships and strengthening strategic decision-making autonomy, while simultaneously maintaining existing security relationships with the US.

The continuation of open channels of communication with Tehran — whether through the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement brokered by China or through the regional mediation efforts undertaken by Qatar and Oman — confirms that the Gulf states are not seeking to sever all bridges, but to manage the conflict within a diplomatic framework that mitigates risks and calibrates tensions.

This political compass represents one of the most significant shifts of the current phase and is likely to deepen in the future as the Gulf’s role expands as a balancing actor seeking equilibrium between deterrence and dialogue, rather than engaging in rigid alignments or direct confrontations.​

Gulf air defense systems have demonstrated an advanced level of effectiveness in countering Iranian missile and drone attacks, successfully intercepting and downing more than 90 percent of these threats. This performance reflects a high degree of operational readiness and integration between surveillance, early warning, and interception capabilities — limiting potential damage and reinforcing the Gulf states’ ability to protect their airspace and critical infrastructure.

Nevertheless, these developments have revealed that possessing state-of-the-art air defense systems does not entirely eliminate the risks associated with low-cost, high-density missile and drone warfare. The attacks exposed coverage gaps in certain areas and confirmed that defense systems cannot remain confined to a narrow national framework but require an integrated regional approach and diversified international partnerships.

In this context, there is growing discussion of accelerating the establishment of joint early warning systems, linking radar and air defense networks across the Gulf states, and updating defense doctrine so that it extends beyond the protection of military bases to encompass cities, economic infrastructure, and society as a whole.

Going forward, the Gulf states will move toward greater investment in multi-layered air defense, cyber warfare capabilities, and both defensive and offensive drone systems — while seeking to avoid appearing as an offensive party that invites broad-scale targeting. This pragmatic defense posture is part of a larger transition from complete reliance on the Western security umbrella to building growing indigenous capabilities, without reaching a rupture with traditional partners.​

Economically, strikes targeting facilities and areas near oil and gas infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and elsewhere have exposed a growing degree of fragility in what is considered “the heart of the global economy.” The Gulf states supply approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil, meaning any disruption to production or export is swiftly reflected in global energy prices and international financial markets.

Clear indicators of this impact have emerged, including the temporary suspension of gas production in Qatar and oil production in Kuwait under force majeure clauses in certain investment contracts, the temporary closure of some facilities, rising insurance costs for shipping, and the rerouting of maritime transport lanes. These developments signal a gradual transformation of the crisis from a regional security threat into an economic risk with repercussions extending across the global economic system.

At the level of Gulf development models, the persistence of tensions threatens the image these states have sought to establish as stable, attractive hubs for investment, tourism, logistics, and financial services. The suspension of some flights, the postponement of international events and conferences, and the implementation of precautionary measures to protect civilians all raise the cost of doing business and deepen market uncertainty.

This may compel Gulf governments to reassess their economic strategies — balancing the continuation of economic diversification with protecting gains already achieved, while enhancing supply chain resilience, reducing risk exposure, and expanding investment in energy security and defense technologies linked to the protection of critical economic infrastructure.​

Socially, the recurring scenes of missiles, repeated alerts, and a state of “permanent mobilization” have produced a new social reality in Gulf societies. These communities, accustomed for decades to high levels of stability, prosperity, and relative insulation from regional conflicts, found themselves suddenly confronting direct manifestations of modern warfare.

The repetition of attack imagery and the disruption of daily life — even for hours or days — has left a tangible psychological impact on citizens and residents alike, reviving deep questions about the concept of safety, the limits of the state’s ability to provide protection in a turbulent regional environment, and the nature of the relationship with major powers whose geopolitical conflicts are conducted in the region’s space in defense of their own strategic interests.

Over the long term, this experience may strengthen feelings of social cohesion and rally around the idea of “protecting the homeland,” alongside a deeper appreciation for stability as one of the most important national achievements.

However, these developments may simultaneously open broader debates within the public sphere regarding the priorities of public policy — particularly the balance between defense spending and investment in human development sectors such as education and health — as well as a reassessment of the efficacy of external security alliances that failed to prevent threats from reaching Gulf cities’ skies.

These questions are likely to become part of the gradual shifts in political and social consciousness among younger generations and may contribute to reshaping the contours of the social contract in the Gulf states, reflecting a more complex regional reality and increasingly interwoven security, economic, and social challenges.​

The Gulf is undergoing structural transformations that extend beyond the repercussions of the current war to affect the very foundations upon which the regional order rests. On one hand, the premise of “complete Western protection of the Gulf” is being subjected to a serious test, as developments have demonstrated that the presence of military bases and the deployment of foreign forces do not guarantee the neutralization of threats or the prevention of targeting — they merely limit the scale of damage or alter the nature of deterrence.

On the other hand, this turbulent environment reinforces the Gulf states’ conviction of the need to reconfigure their international relationships on the basis of strategic diversification — including expanding partnerships with China, Russia, East Asia and Europe — and distancing themselves from unconditional involvement in any alignment within the battles of major powers, whether in the context of US policy or broader Western interactions.

Looking ahead, we are likely to witness greater interplay between de-escalation and escalation tracks: behind-the-scenes negotiations and mediation efforts led by states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman, set against the continuation of targeted strikes as each party seeks to improve its negotiating position through force.

In this context, the Gulf states appear to be adopting a pragmatic option that blends avoidance of full alignment in the war with an attempt to play a balancing or mediating role, when possible, while focusing on protecting the home front and energy infrastructure. If successful, this strategy could position the Gulf as one of the defining players in shaping the new regional order — rather than merely serving as an arena for others’ conflicts.​

 

• Dr. Khalid Al-Jaber has held several high-profile leadership roles, including director of the Al-Sharq Studies & Research Center and Editor-in-Chief of The Peninsula, one of Qatar’s leading English-language newspapers.

His work and research primarily focuses on the Gulf region, broader Middle East, and North Africa, encompassing political science, public diplomacy, international communication, and international relations. He is the author and editor of several books and has contributed numerous academic studies and articles in his fields of expertise.