China–Africa: Who benefits from tariff-free trade?

China’s decision to suspend tariffs on imports from 53 African partners beginning May 1 has been heralded as a strategic breakthrough in South–South commerce. Framed as evidence of Beijing’s openness amid rising US protectionism, the announcement appears bold on paper: Every African country with diplomatic ties gains access to the world’s second-largest economy without tariff friction. Yet a closer reading reveals a story more complicated than the celebratory headlines suggest.

Even with the broadened scope, including middle-income economies such as Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt, and South Africa, the structural foundations of Africa–China trade remain largely unchanged. Several dynamics need unpacking to understand why some skeptics anticipate only modest gains, if at all.

China’s tariff suspension arrives against the backdrop of Africa’s widening deficit with its largest trading partner. Last year, the continent recorded a $102 billion trade deficit with China, a 64.5 percent jump from the previous year. The imbalance is mostly because Africa sells too little of the right kind of goods. To date, exports remain dominated by crude oil from countries such as Angola, copper and cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo, and ores from South Africa. Imports from China, meanwhile, skew heavily toward manufactured value: electronics, machinery, textiles, vehicles, and household goods. Even if African exports now enter tariff free, the composition of those exports continues to limit revenue potential.

Chinese regulatory standards also pose hurdles

Hafed Al-Ghwell

Besides, a tariff removed from an unprocessed commodity changes little. The real gains occur when exporters move into processed cocoa, finished steel, branded garments, assembled electronics, and agro-processed foods — products that capture higher margins. The policy creates an opening, but does not guarantee movement up the value chain. After all, without domestic industrial capability, preferential access offers convenience and mere prospects rather than actual transformation.

Furthermore, 33 African least-developed countries already enjoyed zero-tariff treatment under earlier Chinese arrangements. For these economies, the extension of benefits to 20 additional nations alters little mechanically. The main beneficiaries, at least theoretically, are the middle-income economies that previously faced tariffs as high as 25 percent on items like processed foods, apparels, and light manufactures. Exporters in places like Nigeria and Kenya could in theory gain a competitive edge. Yet advantage on paper does not immediately translate into market penetration in China’s demanding consumer environment.

African exporters face stubborn non-tariff barriers that will require a lot more than the stroke of a pen and a handshake to eradicate. Shipping goods from Nairobi to Shanghai can cost less than trucking them from inland Kenya to the port of Mombasa. Disorganized ports, high freight charges, and poor cold-chain capacity break the back of competitive pricing.

In addition, Chinese regulatory standards also pose hurdles: Phytosanitary requirements for agriculture, precision testing for manufactured inputs, and stringent packaging norms remain difficult for smaller African firms. Even when they meet these standards, navigating China’s vast e-commerce platforms such as Alibaba, JD.com or Pinduoduo demands marketing know-how and consistent supply volumes. Only a handful of exporters operate at that scale, which makes the proposed benefits of tariff-free trade accrue to a well-connected few.

Middle-income economies are the main beneficiaries

Hafed Al-Ghwell

Africa’s manufacturing shortfalls further blunt potential gains. Several countries, including Ghana and Ethiopia, have expressed intentions to discontinue exports of raw commodities in favor of local processing. The Africa Continental Free Trade Area also aims to create regional production corridors, lowering intra-African tariffs and harmonizing standards so countries can specialize across a single value chain, for example, cocoa grown in Cote d’Ivoire, processed in Ghana and then packaged in Ethiopia. Yet these value chains remain embryonic, hampered by financing gaps, unreliable electricity, port congestion, and inconsistent regulatory environments. Tariff-free access to China will not fast-track these sorts of transformations nor usher in a period of rapid industrialization.

Worse yet, some analysts argue that Beijing’s new posture risks entrenching Africa’s commodity-supplier role. By granting easier access for African exports without addressing bottlenecks in standards, logistics, and industrial financing, China creates an incentive structure that favors the status quo. Without stronger African capacity to process these minerals domestically, such as battery precursors, steel, or finished components, the continent may simply accelerate raw-material shipments while importing even more sophisticated Chinese goods.

Another concern centers on geopolitical dependence. Critics suggest Africa risks swapping one supplier-dominant relationship for another. The US Africa Growth Opportunity Act will likely remain untouched for the foreseeable future. At the same time, European Economic Partnership Agreements often come with political or governance conditionalities often construed as post-colonial paternalism.

In contrast, China’s tariff-free offer appears attractive precisely because it avoids those conditions while also signaling Beijing’s willingness to seemingly go “all-in” on Africa. Yet the absence of conditions should not be confused with equality. Trade patterns reveal dependency, not partnership: China’s exports to Africa consistently dwarf Africa’s exports to China. Preferential access, without domestic upgrading, may deepen asymmetry rather than bridge it.

A more optimistic reading argues that China’s decision could sharpen Africa’s bargaining power with Washington and Brussels. If China offers permanent tariff-free access, African negotiators can push the US to revisit and expand AGOA eligibility, extend validity windows, or relax rules of origin. Europe could face pressure to reduce EPA rigidity. The Chinese move essentially introduces a reference point that African policymakers can wield diplomatically.

A more catalytic effect could emerge if African states use the tariff window as a deadline for domestic reforms. Countries that streamline customs clearance, invest in export-processing zones near major ports, and expand trade-finance facilities could see measurable gains. Industrial parks in Ethiopia, automotive zones in South Africa, and agro-processing hubs in Ghana demonstrate what happens when governments align incentives with export ambitions. When paired with AfCFTA-driven regional supply chains, tariff-free access to China can reward economies that scale production beyond national borders.

Given the potential and pitfalls of this latest gamble by Beijing, a dual reality emerges. True, there is genuine opportunity, grounded in expanded market access and potential shifts in global trade diplomacy. On the other hand, there is also a high probability of missed opportunities, rooted in constraints that tariffs alone cannot erase. Structural bottlenecks, such as ports that delay cargo, roads that raise transport costs, and firms that lack the capital to meet scale, pose more binding constraints than duties at Chinese customs. Real transformation requires institutional capacity at home, not benevolence abroad.

The policy does not answer the central question facing African economies: whether the continent can shift from exporting what it has to exporting what it wants. Tariff-free access can play a supporting role, but Africa’s trade future will be shaped in Lagos, Nairobi, Accra, Addis Ababa, and Johannesburg — not in Beijing.

• - Hafed Al-Ghwell is senior fellow and program director at the Stimson Center in Washington and senior fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies. X: @HafedAlGhwell