Can Israel be restrained in Lebanon?

Amid the overwhelming tsunami of confusing global and regional events that 2026 has already bestowed upon us, many will have missed the latest developments — good and bad — on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

It is now 14 months since a ceasefire agreement formally brought the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, which had continued at varying degrees of intensity since October 2023, to a halt. But the violations are almost daily. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon has documented more than 10,000 Israeli ceasefire violations, with over 300 killed.

Yet, as with Gaza, this is a ceasefire in name only. Also like Gaza, one party — Israel — is actively engaged in military operations with little to no restraint. As with Gaza, Israel has refused to honor its obligation to withdraw from territory it is occupying. In the case of Lebanon, it is five hilltops in the south. As with Gaza, Israel is in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions, notably 1701 and 2790. As with Gaza, the Israeli military regularly attacks UN agencies, notably UNIFIL, as it did most recently on Dec. 10, Dec. 26 and Jan. 2. As with Gaza, all the pressure is on the Lebanese authorities and absolutely none on Israel.

Lebanon has, in contrast, been fulfilling its obligations. On Jan. 8, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam confirmed that the Lebanese army had completed the first phase of the five-phase disarmament plan and had a monopoly on the use of force in the area south of the Litani River. One exception to this is of course UNIFIL, but more importantly there are also areas still under Israeli military control. Hezbollah is therefore no longer militarily active in this area.

As with Gaza, all the pressure is on the Lebanese authorities and absolutely none on Israel

Chris Doyle

Cynics would be right to at least question this claim. UNIFIL has confirmed the removal of many weapons and the destruction of tunnels. But Hezbollah is also no longer the power it once was. It was massively degraded during Israel’s onslaught against it in 2024, with the decapitation of its leadership and destruction of much of its military arsenal.

Israel accuses Hezbollah of rearming. But is it? The Lebanese government is meant, under the ceasefire agreement, to prevent this, including through better control of its borders, both maritime and with Syria. Yet this should be questioned too. The Assad regime, which was allied to Hezbollah and all too willing to facilitate the transfer of Iranian weapons into Lebanon, is no longer in charge in Syria. The new Syrian authorities view Hezbollah as a hostile force. Iran itself is weakened, less able to arm and fund its allies across the region, including Hezbollah. Israel has hardly furnished any evidence of its claims. Any rearmament that is taking place is likely to be small in comparison to the past, though it should still be thwarted.

The failure to achieve a genuine ceasefire has huge implications on the ground in southern Lebanon. Many Lebanese are waiting to return to their homes. A major reconstruction effort is required but is being held back due to the lack of security.

What underpins all this is the opposing ambitions of all sides. The Lebanese government has outlined very clear priorities. It has shown genuine determination to make the Lebanese army the only armed actor in Lebanon. It demands an end to Israeli attacks and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. The Lebanese are also seeking the release of about 15 Lebanese prisoners Israel holds.

The failure to achieve a genuine ceasefire has huge implications on the ground in southern Lebanon

Chris Doyle

For Hezbollah, survival is key. Retreating from the south of the Litani is one thing but disarming — including in its south Beirut stronghold — is quite another matter. It needs political cover to do this, with a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon a minimum.

The Israeli agenda is not so clear. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has his views but others in his leadership circle do not share them. Do Israeli leaders envisage a strong Lebanese government able to control its sovereign territory or a fractured, weak Lebanon that Israel can exploit? Whereas the Lebanese side may be willing, once the border is demarcated, to entertain a security agreement with Tel Aviv, it is far from ready to deliver what many Israelis and US President Donald Trump dreams of: full normalization. The Lebanese position is that the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 must be implemented first, which would mean Israel having to end all its occupations.

The fear is that Netanyahu, in an Israeli election year, may consider that returning Lebanon to hell suits his interests, meaning he would pursue a military option to smash the last vestiges of Hezbollah. Or maybe he considers he has already beaten Hezbollah. Typically, he views Lebanon in terms of what is happening in Iran.

The hope is that international actors, not least the US, will convince Israel to play ball and achieve lasting peace, including a full Israeli withdrawal, a Hezbollah that is disarmed and demilitarized, and a Lebanese government that is properly sovereign over its own territory.

• Chris Doyle is director of the Council for Arab-British Understanding in London. X: @Doylech