South Sudan’s ruling elites rely on instability for survival

South Sudan’s slide toward yet another civil war will not be the result of state weakness alone. It will be the inevitable byproduct of a political order that survives by keeping the country unsettled. Since independence in 2011, the promise of elections, a permanent constitution, and a unified state has been endlessly deferred. These delays are often framed as technical problems or security concerns. In reality, they form a governing method. Instability is not a failure of elite rule in South Sudan; it is the operating system.

Fourteen years on, South Sudan has yet to hold a single general election. The transitional period has been extended four times. Elections are now penciled in for 2026, though few insiders expect them to happen. A permanent constitution remains unfinished. Key provisions of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan sit half-implemented. Security forces remain divided. Transitional justice exists mostly on paper. To even the most untrained eye, it looks like South Sudan’s drift is better understood as design.

After all, the ruling elite’s interest in governing through instability starts with how power actually works. Yes, formal institutions exist, but they are not where authority is exercised. Real control sits in informal networks that connect the presidency, security services, oil revenues, and ethnic patronage. These networks thrive in ambiguity. Clear rules would limit discretion. Elections would introduce risk. A settled constitution would fix power relations that are currently fluid and negotiable.

The state’s informal core is most visible in the security sector. South Sudan officially has a national army, but in practice it is a coalition of forces loyal to individuals rather than institutions. The failure to unify forces under the peace agreement is not a logistical error. Rival commanders retain separate chains of command because fragmentation protects elite survival. A unified army would require promotions, budgets, and authority to be regulated. Fragmentation allows rewards to be dispensed selectively, defections to be managed, and violence to be calibrated rather than eliminated.

It is a pattern that repeats across governance. Oil revenues account for roughly 90 percent of government income and 95 percent of exports. Yet these funds flow through opaque channels. Damage to the oil pipeline through Sudan in 2024 cut production from about 350,000 barrels per day at independence to as low as 45,000 barrels per day. The result was fiscal collapse for the population, but not for elites. Revenue shocks increase dependence on informal extraction, illicit taxation, and aid diversion. In short, even instability becomes a resource rather than a liability.

Moreover, economic fragility reinforces this system. Four out of five South Sudanese live below the poverty line. Inflation surged again in late 2024, with basic goods rising nearly 15 percent in a single month. Youth unemployment hovers around 50 percent. Yet only a tiny share of households relies primarily on aid. Most survive through subsistence farming, casual labor, or informal trade. It is a curious dynamic that creates a population that is poor but not fully dependent on the state, limiting collective pressure for reform while remaining vulnerable to local coercion.

The ruling elite also governs through instability by managing civil society rather than empowering it. On paper, South Sudan has an active civic space. In practice, civil society is fragmented, co-opted, and selectively repressed.

Instability is not a failure of elite rule in South Sudan; it is the operating system. 

Hafed Al-Ghwell

Organizations that align with elite narratives are tolerated or funded. Those that mobilize independently face harassment, deregistration, or worse. This produces a civil society that appears busy but rarely threatens power.

Elections are another arena where South Sudan’s quixotic sociopolitical dynamics are perfectly captured. Surveys show that South Sudanese strongly want to vote. At the same time, more than half of respondents say they feel unsafe just discussing politics, and nearly a quarter would feel very unsafe voting. This contradiction suits the elite. Popular demand for elections can be cited to donors, while fear ensures that mobilization remains shallow. In effect, elections are kept permanently “in preparation,” useful as an idea, but dangerous as an actual event.

Customary authorities are drawn into the same logic. Around 80 to 90 percent of disputes are resolved through traditional courts rather than formal ones. Chiefs and elders often command more trust than state institutions. Rather than integrate these structures into accountable governance, elites instrumentalize them. Intercommunal violence is framed as local and cultural, even when national actors incite it. In turn, it allows the center to deny responsibility, while benefiting from the disorder it helps sustain.

A persistent humanitarian crisis also adds to this cycle. In 2025, nearly 60 percent of the population is projected to face crisis-level food insecurity during the lean season. Over 5 million people need water and sanitation support. Maternal mortality stands near 789 deaths per 100,000 live births, among the highest rates globally. These conditions should provoke political rupture. Instead, they are normalized. Aid fills gaps just enough to prevent collapse, while funding shortfalls ensure suffering remains widespread. The state is neither absent nor effective; it is selectively present.

Worse yet, troubling regional woes add fuel. Spillovers from Sudan’s war have disrupted trade, damaged oil infrastructure, and brought new arms and fighters across the border. Regional mediation continues, but with declining influence. International actors press for timelines and benchmarks, while lacking enforcement power. This suits Juba’s elites, who trade compliance rhetoric for time, extensions, and diplomatic patience.

To them, governing through instability ultimately ties elite survival to the persistence of crisis. Violence justifies emergency powers. Delays justify extensions of rule. Fragmentation justifies repression. Peace is invoked constantly, but only as a promise deferred. National unity is celebrated rhetorically while being structurally impossible under the current system.

This is why South Sudan feels perpetually on the edge. The danger is not simply that another war might break out. It is that the political order is calibrated to make war always possible, but never decisive. In this system, peace would be more disruptive than conflict. A functioning state would expose corruption, redistribute power, and force accountability. Ironically, instability avoids all three.

South Sudan may not collapse tomorrow. But unless the logic of governing through instability is confronted, the question is not whether violence returns, but when it is again judged useful. In that sense, the country is not drifting toward war but is being kept ready for it.

• Hafed Al-Ghwell is senior fellow and program director at the Stimson Center in Washington and senior fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies. X: @HafedAlGhwell