Climate change can potentially exacerbate militancy in Pakistan’s conflict-hit areas

Since the end of the Cold War, the traditional state-centric concept of security has evolved significantly. The notion of security no longer revolves around external or internal threats from adversarial states or violent non-state actors. Now, it also includes challenges which until recently were considered outside the scope of security, such as climate change, pandemics and several other related issues.

Within this evolved paradigm of international security, the intersection of climate change and terrorism has also been a recurrent theme of academic and policy discourse. As such, there is no linear correlation between countries simultaneously affected by climate change and terrorism. Yet, the Germanwatch’s Long-Term Climate Risk Index (2009-2019) of countries most affected by climate-related extreme events includes both countries: those confronting significant terrorism challenges, such as Pakistan and Mozambique, and states where terrorism is minimal like Nepal and Haiti.

The combined effect of climate change and terrorism have been felt in regions and states grappling with both challenges like the East and Horn of Africa. Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces are no different and have been victims of flash floods and terrorism in recent years. If the past is anything to go by, the recent flash floods in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could lead to uncertainty, instability, a governance vacuum and resource scarcity, creating potential opportunities for militants to recruit, radicalize and fundraise.

Before discussing the ways in which militant groups can exploit climate risks in Pakistan, it is essential to understand their symbiotic relationship. There is no evidence to suggest that climate change in and of itself acts as a driver of militancy. Rather, it contributes as a threat multiplier by exacerbating the pre-existing drivers of radicalization as well as grievances and vulnerabilities of the affected communities.

Against the backdrop of a complex interplay of climate change and militancy, integrated approaches are needed to create an overlap.

Abdul Basit Khan

Militant groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Daesh Khorasan, among several others, can exploit climate-related natural disasters to advance their political objectives and strategic interests at four levels, ideological, social, financial and operational.

At the ideological level, militant groups can frame climate-induced disasters and other calamities in two significant ways. First, they can opportunistically portray them as ‘God’s punishment’ for deviating from the righteous path or committing transgressions to validate their ideological narratives. Second, while propagating their ideological narratives around natural disasters, militant groups blame the incumbent governments for such eventualities to undermine their credibility and position themselves as the alternative authorities.

At the social level, earthquake, flash floods and other natural calamities open opportunities for militant groups to manipulate people’s anxieties to advance their own influence. Arguably, they try to exploit governance gaps, especially in far-flung areas where rushing immediate aid and relief response is logistically challenging, to win the support and sympathies of the affected communities. They frame an inadequate response from governments as a failure and position themselves as the alterative service providers. In the past, defunct Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) have exploited governance gaps during flash floods in Balochistan to run disaster relief operations. Likewise, in Somalia, Al-Shabab forced the local population in areas under its control to rely on it as the only service provider, undermining the Somali government’s credibility while bolstering its own.

At the financial level, militant groups, both online and offline, can set up public donation calls to amass funds while posing as flood relief organizations. In the past, it came to the fore that criminal elements and fraudsters set up donation camps to collect money, medicine, food and other relief items without delivering them to the affected communities. Therefore, those donating for recent flash floods in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa should check the credentials of relief organizations to make sure that their good intentions and hard-earned money are not exploited by criminal or militant groups.

Operationally, floods and other natural disasters can divert security forces’ attention, resources and manpower from security to relief operations and thus expose them to potential physical harms. Terror groups can use such instances to attack government functionaries and security forces, especially in remote places where it becomes difficult to send immediate reinforcements. During the pandemic, Al-Qaeda and Daesh were urging their supporters in the West to target security personnel enforcing lockdowns and social distancing measures at public places to increase their security challenges.

Against the backdrop of a complex interplay of climate change and militancy, integrated approaches that combine political and security responses, are needed to create an overlap. The counter-extremism policies in Pakistan should factor-in climate related vulnerabilities that can contribute to radicalization and vice versa. Critically, instead of securitizing climate change, the counter-extremism framework in Pakistan should be made greener, i.e., environment friendly.

- The author is a Senior Associate Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Security, Singapore. X: @basitresearcher