Rational actors

The rather alarming recent flare-up in South Asia took me back a few years to a lecture on international relations in a US graduate school. The professor, a Straussian or an extreme hawk, was passionately arguing about the efficacy of a US “preventive war” in the Middle East.

Preventive wars, as opposed to preemptive wars, armed conflicts initiated in the belief that military conflict though not imminent, is inevitable, and that any delay in taking action would lead to greater risks.

In arguing for kinetic action, the professor was relying on a game theoretic model called the “game of chicken.” In this game, two drivers are speeding straight toward each other, where one must swerve to avoid a deadly collision. If both don’t swerve, both may die. But, if one swerves while the other doesn’t, the one who swerves is said to “chicken out” and is labeled a coward.

This game has largely been applied to analyze “mutually-assured destruction” in nuclear warfare, particularly the high-stakes brinkmanship seen during the “Cuban Missile Crisis.” Some analysts have also used this game to try to understand the nature of conflict in South Asia between India and Pakistan.

In game theory, however, all actors— drivers in the case of game of chicken— are always assumed to be perfectly rational. This assumption of perfect rationality is one form of the “micro-foundations” project also seen in neoclassical economics, political science and international relations.

However, the foundational assumption of perfect rationality in game theory is a major issue for analyzing kinetic conflict. For instance, in the game of chicken, the entire game is premised on the assumption that since both players are perfectly rational, neither wants to perish, meaning that, in all likelihood, one or both of these rational actors will swerve to avoid destruction. And, even in the event that both fail to swerve and destruction does take place, the explanation is attributed to miscalculation regarding the adversary’s intent, preserving the assumption of perfect rationality.

Given the high stakes, the international community must do its utmost in bringing India and Pakistan to the table.

Aqdas Afzal

The fact of the matter is that there is a lot of research that belies the assumption of perfect rationality. Herbert Simon rejected the idealized conditions of perfect rationality assumed in game theory. In its place, Simon presented the idea of “bounded rationality” meaning that human beings are only rational to the extent of their cognitive limitations.

What this points out is that if the mental model of a particular actor is flawed, then that actor can only be rational within the bounds of the flawed mental model. So, if a driver believes that their car can jump over other cars, they will be “rational” in heading straight at the other driver without flinching, making destruction very likely.

This presents a very scary scenario for the real world. If a particular nation relies on a model like the game of chicken to engage in kinetic action against their adversary, that is, working on the assumption that the adversary is perfectly rational and wants to avoid perishing, the adversary, in actuality, could be aiming to maximize their gains within their own mental model. Needless to say, not only are game theoretic models rendered inadequate in analyzing real-world kinetic conflicts, the failure to factor in bounded rationality actually increases the likelihood of destruction or “doomsday scenario.”

Constructivism, a school within international relations, is perhaps a better approach as it views the world and knowledge as socially constructed. Alexander Wendt has illustrated this by comparing 500 British nuclear weapons as less threatening to the US than five North Korean weapons as difference does not lie in the material structure, but in the ideas and assigned meanings. Nuclear weapons lack inherent meaning without social context. Constructivists emphasize ideas and beliefs, showing that reality is fluid, with meanings evolving based on actors’ point of view and engagement.

Conflict analysis between two nuclear states is too serious a matter to be left to game theorists alone. As the recent conflict in South Asia escalated many world powers got involved. The Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs visited both New Delhi and Islamabad, while US officials also worked tirelessly, speaking to both Indian and Pakistani leadership in order to encourage de-escalation and ceasefire.

Given the high stakes, the international community must do its utmost in bringing India and Pakistan to the table. All said and done, against the backdrop of game theory’s inadequacies as well as the emergence of an increasingly bellicose Indian media, constructivism is perhaps the optimal lens for approaching India-Pakistan relations in the future.

- The writer completed his doctorate in economics on a Fulbright scholarship. X: @AqdasAfzal