Ideological disagreements may be the Taliban’s Achilles heel
https://arab.news/8mgb2
Since returning to power in 2021, the transition from a militant to a political movement has been the Taliban’s Achilles’ heel. Uncertain about their future political trajectory, the Taliban have been thinking deep inside the box and clinging onto a hard-line playbook of governance. However, governing 2025’s Afghanistan with the 1990s’ playbook has created unique challenges of its own for the clerical movement.
Instead of evolving politically by building bridges with the international community, the movement’s spiritual leadership from Kandahar has doubled down on enforcing ultraconservative policies, including a ban on girls’ education. Resultantly, the lack of diplomatic recognition has reduced Taliban-ruled Afghanistan into an international pariah. This is in sharp contrast to Syria’s Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, which, despite its genesis in Al-Qaeda and Daesh, reoriented itself by addressing the international community’s reservations and embracing Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity.
Ideological disagreements and policy differences in a Taliban-like decentralized movement are normal. However, the Taliban’s Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada’s centralizing tendencies of accumulating power and silencing moderates have widened the internal rifts. The Taliban, in a way, have become prisoners of their own hard-line rhetoric. Akhundzada has firmed his grip on power through the local ulema councils to monitor political officeholders in different provinces.
Akhundzada has sidelined dissenting leaders by replacing them with his loyalists rather than navigating ideological differences through negotiations. For instance, in September 2022, Akhundzada replaced the education minister Noorullah Munir with his close aide Mullah Habibullah Agha. Similarly, in May 2024, he substituted Health Minister Dr. Qalandar Ebad, the only technocrat, with a hard-line cleric and former deputy interior minister, Noor Jalil. In a recent shake-up, he has appointed his loyalist and former police chief of Kandahar province, Samiullah Hezbullah, as the new governor for northern Takhar province, where Daesh-Khorasan killed a Chinese national in January. The security situation in Afghanistan’s northern provinces has been deteriorating where Daesh-K has been gaining influence.
Instead of silencing the moderate Taliban, the hard-liners will have to start the long-overdue internal negotiation process to forge a consensus.
Abdul Basit Khan
The Taliban moderates, like Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Baradar, Defense Minister Mullah Yaqub and Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, want economic reforms and international recognition. On the contrary, hard-liners, such as the Prime Minister Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund and the Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani and Akhundzada, prioritize strict enforcement of Sharia rule even at the cost of isolation.
More recently, the Taliban’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Abbas Stanikzai’s vocal critique of Akhundzada’s decision to ban girls’ education exposed internal disagreements. In February, he accused the Taliban of committing oppression and injustice against 20 million Afghan women and girls, sparking tensions. An audio leak revealed Stanikzai’s critical remarks about Akhundzada. “If you deviate even a step from God’s path, then you are no longer my leader; I do not recognize you.” He told his gathering, “Follow him, but not to the extent that, God forbid, you grant him the rank of prophethood or divinity.”
Following this, Akhundzada ordered Stanikzai’s arrest warrants and issued a travel ban against him. Akhundzada wanted to try Stanikzai in a military court to warn other officials who are unhappy with his policies, especially the ban on girls’ education. Reportedly, Stanikzai fled to the UAE with Defense Minister Mullah Yaqub’s help and is currently living in Sharjah.
On February 4, the Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid acknowledged on X the differences in viewpoints but ruled out physical conflict. He maintained that differences in viewpoints are normal. “Every member of the Islamic Emirate looks at an issue from a different perspective, and sometimes these matters even leak to the media. However, there are no disputes.”
Recent tensions aside, differences have also been growing between the Kandhari and Haqqani factions along ethnic lines. Though Daesh-K claimed responsibility for killing senior Haqqani leader and former minister for refugees and repatriation Khalil Haqqani, the group blames it on rival Taliban factions. Since the Taliban’s return to power, the Haqqanis have been responsible for maintaining Kabul’s security. When Kabul swiftly fell to the Taliban as former president Ashraf Ghani’s forces melted away, the Haqqani’s Badri 313 Battalion filled the security vacuum in the capital. However, Akhundzada has been deploying fighters loyal to him at key strategic locations in Kabul, including the Bala Hissar Fortress and the Kabul International Airport.
Furthermore, since 2021, Kandhari and Haqqani factions have constantly bickered over two key issues: division of power and credit for victory.
Akhundzada’s ploy of silencing dissenting Taliban voices under the obligations of obeying the Supreme Leader is losing its efficacy. As US President Donald Trump’s aid cuts to Afghanistan begin to take effect, people’s frustration with hard-line policies will grow further. In recent weeks, the Afghan currency has plummeted steeply, triggering price hikes. The unpaid salaries of government employees and rising inflation have left the Taliban highly unpopular. People are demanding jobs and better service delivery from the Taliban.
The Taliban have shown resilience and somehow managed their internal differences; however, rising tensions could threaten the group’s cohesion. Instead of silencing the moderate Taliban, the hard-liners will have to start the long-overdue internal negotiation process to forge a consensus. The longer the Taliban shy away from the critical internal dialogue to manage ideological disputes, the more cracks will widen. The strategy of governance through decrees has a shelf life, and it is not a substitute for a functioning constitution that has the buy-in of all the stakeholders.
— The author is a Senior Associate Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. X: @basitresearcher.
