Sino-Saudi partnership and the many opportunities for Pakistan
https://arab.news/g54c6
In the past few months, the Middle Eastern political spectrum has witnessed developments that are bound to have long lasting impacts both on the prevalent political order in the broader Middle East but also on the nature of the state-society relationship. Eventually these changes will result in the reconfiguration of regional power dynamics rewarding players who have best utilized their geopolitical assets. Pakistan with its indispensable connections with the Middle East and in particular the Arabian Gulf States will also be impacted by these changes and thereby must position itself accordingly to gain maximum dividends from this political re-ordering.
The most significant political occurrence concerning the foreign policy outlook of the Gulf States and that of the whole Arab world has been the recent visit of President Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia. During the four-day long visit President Xi not only held meetings with the Saudi leadership but also attended the China-Arab States summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting. The presence of the leadership of the whole Arab World and that of the GCC States reaffirmed the centrality and leadership position of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. Furthermore, this Chinese strategic posturing in Riyadh signalled the strengthening of China-Saudi bilateral relationship and the great power’s increased relevance in the regional political, economic, strategic, energy and security domains.
A second critical development that is also shaping the regional power equilibrium has been the protest movement in Iran. Now in its fourth month, the protest movement is indeed far from over and it would not be wrong to assume that it is the first time the Iranian ruling regime is facing a significant and organic challenge to its hold on power. Even though this movement might not result in the departure of the current regime and a change of the political system, it has the potential to weaken it significantly and resultantly usher the restructuring of the regime’s internal power hierarchy. All of this will invariably reduce Iranian political capital on the regional scale, one that has been amassed over the years through a mixture of shrewd politicking and militant interventions. Iran’s recent alignment with Russia on the Ukraine conflict through the supply of drones has further dimmed prospects of a renewal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and a rapprochement with the west.
Unfortunately, Pakistani governments have used CPEC as a buzzword in their interaction with Middle Eastern partners while failing to develop an orderly roadmap to attract foreign direct investment from these friendly states into CPEC projects.
Umer Karim
Saudi Arabia on the other hand is continuing its policy of diversifying its foreign relations and its engagement with China fits in this pattern neatly. As China remains the largest market of Saudi petroleum exports and also the second largest world economy, it remains vitally important for Saudi Arabia’s economic wellbeing and therefore one of its most important global partners. Similarly for China, Saudi Arabia’s position as the leader of energy markets and its geostrategic presence on the western edge of the Indian ocean makes it a lucrative partner from every aspect. Although China does have a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) with Iran, the Chinese have started to tilt towards the Gulf States.
This was evident from the joint statement issued at the end of the China-GCC summit in Riyadh. In a major snub to Iran, China endorsed efforts by the United Arab Emirates for the peaceful resolution of the issue of the three islands that have been previously under the control of the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah but were taken over by Iran in 1971. As a result, the Chinese ambassador in Tehran was summoned by Iranian authorities and a protest was recorded. This Chinese move indicates a future political trajectory and a Chinese reluctance to back a state that is increasingly becoming a regional pariah.
These developments on the Arabian and Persian banks of the Gulf waterway also have implications for Pakistan. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) still remains one of the flagship projects of the
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and remains of critical importance for the country’s future economic growth. Saudi Arabia did show an interest in constructing an oil refinery in Gwadar, a port on the western edge of Balochistan developed as part of CPEC. However, due to bureaucratic lacunas and infrastructural issues within Gwadar, this project has been largely shelved. Unfortunately, Pakistani governments have used CPEC as a buzzword in their interaction with Middle Eastern partners while failing to develop an orderly roadmap to attract foreign direct investment from these friendly states into CPEC projects.
The recent uptake in the Sino-Saudi partnership offers Pakistan again a fresh opportunity to market CPEC projects and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) for third party Saudi investment. Geopolitically, this will also serve to balance Indian outreach to Riyadh. Meanwhile, with China also choosing Gulf States over Iran, its time Pakistan improved the infrastructure within Balochistan and reduced the province’s economic and energy dependence upon Iran while facilitating its connectivity with other parts of Pakistan.
— Umar Karim is a doctoral researcher at the University of Birmingham. His research focuses on the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s strategic outlook, the Saudi-Iran tussle, conflict in Syria, and the geopolitics of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.
Twitter: @UmarKarim89