Russia’s vaccine diplomacy challenges West in Southeast Asia
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Russia’s vaccine diplomacy is now targeting Southeast Asia in a direct manner. Surging infections have strained this region’s healthcare systems, with countries struggling to roll out vaccination programs as Delta variant cases rise and lockdowns are enforced. Russia sees this as an opportunity to use its vaccine diplomacy in a different part of the world to help fulfill President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy objectives during the pandemic.
The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has enabled Moscow to expand its influence in many regions. Southeast Asia is no exception. While Russia is already selling military equipment and creating defense partnerships with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, vaccine diplomacy offers it another opportunity to build bilateral relationships.
Research shows that vaccines are a vital component in all countries’ efforts to turn the tide in the COVID-19 pandemic. Partly due to so-called vaccine nationalism, questions and issues surround the reliable supply of vaccines to Southeast Asia. Vaccine diplomacy is growing, allowing “vaccine powers” such as Russia, China and the US to help address supply gaps in Southeast Asia, but there are costs associated with dependency. Local vaccine production is key to maintaining some type of independence from an ecosystem of depending entirely on foreign vendors or the Covax system. The race to achieve domestic production is hugely important.
Southeast Asian states, with the support of ASEAN, need to restore travel and work toward vaccine independence to avoid potential geopolitical vulnerability. Providing Southeast Asia with a safe and effective vaccine boosts Moscow’s reputation, with Russia emerging as an alternative to China or the US in the vaccine race. In August 2020, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam asked Russia for Sputnik V. Others followed suit based on their immediate requirements. From this moment, Russia’s vaccine diplomacy in Southeast Asia began. The Russian ambassador to Malaysia said that Moscow has no ulterior motives for producing the vaccine so quickly. Western criticism of Sputnik V’s efficacy helped to dent Russia’s initial vaccine reach. That situation seems to have changed, as the vaccine has been approved by international bodies.
The Russian ambassador to Malaysia said that Moscow has no ulterior motives for producing the vaccine so quickly
Dr. Theodore Karasik
In March, Vietnam approved Sputnik V for use against COVID-19. Distribution of the vaccine began and other countries in the region mimicked Saigon’s approach of relying on a host of different vaccines to address the pandemic. Russia’s fight for vaccine market share led to a two steps forward, one step back approach at the beginning of the vaccination period. Now Sputnik V appears to be the tip of the strategic spear.
Russia is seeking to shift the center of vaccine power in different strategic directions, but the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has expedited this process. Moscow is reaching out toward Southeast Asia ahead of an important visit by President Vladimir Putin to Indonesia. Such actions have certainly grown its bargaining power with recipient nations. Russia is getting full political value from delivering these medicines. The distribution of its vaccines in Southeast Asia can be used to rescue many different industries, such as high-tech hubs, where lockdowns have disrupted supply chains.
Myanmar is part of Russia’s vaccine diplomacy because of the relationship between the two states and the former’s geostrategic position in Southeast Asia. Myanmar was last month negotiating to buy 7 million doses of Sputnik V as it is experiencing another wave of infections. Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing said that, after initially planning to buy 2 million doses, Myanmar is now looking to buy 7 million from Russia. He had just returned from a trip to Moscow, where he was looking for methods and means to halt the pandemic’s effects in Myanmar.
Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov last week traveled to several Southeast Asian countries, from Brunei to Indonesia. The topics discussed varied, but Myanmar was the principle point of interest in terms of building on Russia’s vaccine diplomacy. Lavrov met with Brunei’s Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, this year’s ASEAN chair, and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi. He explained to Marsudi that Russia considered the ASEAN position on Myanmar “a basis for restoring the situation back to normalcy.” Lavrov also affirmed deeper economic and political ties with Indonesia. Marsudi said Indonesia and Russia agreed to cooperate on health matters, including COVID-19 vaccines. Jakarta holds the G20 presidency in 2022, while Putin is set to visit Indonesia later this year.
From a strategic point of view, Russia’s vaccine diplomacy is one area in which it can help specific Southeast Asian countries, but it can also create rivalries over nations that already also have relationships with China and the US. This factor helps the Kremlin with maneuverability. With the US and the West building up capacity in the Indo-Pacific against China, Russia is making sure that its interests jut directly through the ASEAN states in order to challenge the Quad — the strategic grouping of the US, Australia, India and Japan — as and when necessary. Moscow is still playing chess. As the pandemic continues into further waves, ASEAN states and their neighbors need to weigh up the mix of geopolitics and pandemic measures.
• Dr. Theodore Karasik is a senior adviser to Gulf State Analytics in Washington, D.C. Twitter: @tkarasik
