Politics behind Army Amendment Act
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Pakistan has a history of problematic civil-military relations that resulted in four military takeovers and several behind the scenes changes in the tenures of elected governments. Mian Nawaz Sharif got elected three times to the premiership, but each time he was unable to complete his tenure. His rhetoric of popular mandate and constitutional authority to run the country the way he wanted collided with hard realities of institutional imbalance between the powers of the security establishment and the elected governments. As long as Sharif remained within the jurisdictional boundaries of civilian institutions, he found the military supportive and cooperative. But when he stepped into what has generally been acknowledged as the ‘domain’ of the military, he encountered resistance.
By temperament or principle, he wanted to extend his power and influence over the military by appointing and removing army chiefs. When he overplayed his hand by removing Pervez Musharraf, then the army chief, the latter ousted him from power by imposing a military rule. Sharif was shown the door again through a controversial court conviction in 2015 that resulted him in losing his job. The invisible power of the military in Pakistani politics has been known for long.
There is a question about why the Supreme Court entertained a petition, questioning the convention of extending the army chief's tenure in the first place. More troublesome was the court granting extension itself for six months, which is an executive power, and even stepping farther beyond the line by asking the sovereign parliament to amend a law
Rasul Bakhsh Rais
The ‘democratic’ system that Pakistan runs is hybrid, if not in its constitutionality, in terms of practical power politics. As such, it requires collaboration, cooperation, and recognition of respective domains of authority between the civilian governments and the military—the most organized, coherent and self-governing institution of the state. Sharif’s two successors, Asif Ali Zardari, co-chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party and president of the country (2009-13), and the current prime minister, Imran Khan, understood the limitations of their power and proved to be more pragmatic. President Zardari gave three-year extension to General (r) Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in 2012. Likewise, Khan notified the extension of the current army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, in August 2019, much before the expiration of his term in December.
The Army Act of 1952 governs the matters relating to the appointment of three services chiefs—Army, Air Force, and Navy. The president appoints the chiefs on the recommendation of the prime minister. This has been the practice over the decades. However, the Act was silent on the issue of extension of tenure until it was amended on January 8, 2020. Since the appointment of services chiefs is an executive prerogative, the country’s prime ministers have granted extensions as well. For the last sixty-four years, this has been the norm and well established convention. There have been discussions and some controversies over why to grant extension to the army chief when there are equally well-qualified generals in line, and why would an army chief deny an opportunity to his fellow soldiers to lead the country’s land forces.
The bigger question raised over the extension of General Bajwa and his predecessors is: Why did he or they assume their indispensability, and what kind of national affair or security emergency justified their staying in the most powerful position in the security establishment? As the relations between the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government and the security establishment have remained harmonious, and both find each other “on the same page” on national security and foreign policy issues, it was considered a done deal. The role of the opposition was another matter. Every opposition party, generally the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), has consistently attacked the military for political intervention, its backing to the PTI government, and even for its alleged role in rigging the electoral process in favor of Imran Khan. When the PTI issued notification of extension in August last year, the PPP and PML-N raised serious questions, affirming their public narrative that the PTI government was a “political front” of the military.
Since his third ouster from power, Mian Nawaz Sharif has built his narrative on the supremacy of the elected governments. His popular theme is to “give sanctity to vote,” which is clearly directed at the military and requires of it to stay out of politics. Quite contrary to a defiant public posture against the extension, the PPP and PML-N voted in favor of the Army Amendment Act. This rare show of accord between the opposition and the treasury benches is actually about the invisible power of the establishment.
The way the bill was pushed through and passed by the Senate, where the opposition has a clear majority, in 20 minutes made a mockery of parliamentary democracy. Even some of the saner amendments, like the PM would justify extension, were withdrawn.
There is also a question about why the Supreme Court entertained a petition, questioning the convention of extension in the first place. More troublesome was the court granting extension itself for six months, which is an executive power, and even stepping farther beyond the line by asking the sovereign parliament to amend the law. The whole episode that has dominated the television screens and discussion forum over the past six months is about institutional imbalance, powerful struggles, unrealistic ambitions, and the hard fact that democracy in Pakistan functions within the long shadow of military regimes.
- Rasul Bakhsh Rais is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, LUMS, Lahore. His latest book is “Islam, Ethnicity and Power Politics: Constructing Pakistan’s National Identity” (Oxford University Press, 2017).
Twitter: @RasulRais
