After Soleimani: All options are bad for Tehran
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Will the killing in Iraq of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Quds Force push the 40-year-old tension between Tehran and Washington beyond the explosion point? This is the question that has been making the rounds in chancelleries across the globe for the past 24 hours.
Judging by a statement from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, just a day before Soleimani was killed, the best answer still available is “no.” That is also confirmed by a series of statements from American officials who, while crowing about the killing in Baghdad, have continued to shape the olive branch by repeating the mantra of negotiations on Mike Pompeo’s 12-point desiderata.
Ever since Tehran started its current series of saber-rattling by attacking oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and then hitting Saudi oil installations with drones, it was obvious that the ayatollah was testing President Donald Trump’s “threshold of pain.” Khamenei’s initial assumption seems to have been that Trump would not wish to enter into a full-scale war so close to this re-election campaign. That assumption was correct. However, Khamenei did not count on Trump trying to heighten his national security credentials through a limited operation with high targets. The Baghdad killing has reversed the situation by providing a test not of Trump’s but of Khamenei’s “threshold of pain.”
Is the killing of Soleimani, often praised by Khamenei as the greatest soldier of Islam, the maximum pain that the ayatollah could bear at this moment? My cautious answer is: no. In other words, I don’t think that Khamenei would try to up the ante simply to avenge Soleimani’s death. After all, Khamenei, in his eulogy, referred to Soleimani’s ardent desire for martyrdom; if the general has achieved his lost ardent desire, why should his friends and admires begrudge him that blessing?
I don’t think that Khamenei would try to up the ante simply to avenge Soleimani’s death. After all, Khamenei, in his eulogy, referred to Soleimani’s ardent desire for martyrdom; if the general has achieved his lost ardent desire, why should his friends and admires begrudge him that blessing?
Amir Taheri
A number of practical considerations limit Khamenei’s options.
The usual means of taking revenge by the Khomeinist rulers of Iran has been through proxies outside Iran. Of the over 300 terrorist operations across the globe traced back to the Islamic Republic since 1979, fewer than half a dozen involved Iranian citizens or could be proven to be of Iranian origin in a court of law. Dozens of Lebanese, Iraqis, Palestinians, Tunisians, and people belonging to other nationalities went to jail in more than a dozen countries for operations they carried out on behalf of Tehran.
Today, however, playing such cards is not as easy. The Lebanese Hezbollah, the best prepared of all Iran-financed groups for terrorist operations, is not prepared to risk heavy damage, even destruction, to itself by embarking on revenge operations on behalf of Tehran. This is why of all the huffing and puffing provoked by Soleimani’s death, the relatively less bellicose was that of Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrollah.
Tehran’s options in Syria are also limited. It has almost 100,000 troops in Syria, including around 4,000 Iranians. But they are cantoned in a desert corner close to the Iraqi border and more in a self-defense mode, due to repeated attacks by Syrian rebels and even some forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad. In any case, they would find it hard to identify American targets worth revenge attacks in Syria.
The mullahs cannot expect much from their Iraqi allies either. Many Iraqi Shi'ite groups have severed links with Tehran in recent years as a result of growing popular anger against Iranian presence in the country. In a recent visit, we were able to witness a dramatic deterioration of the Islamic Republic’s position in Iraq, partly due to Soleimani’s incompetence and arrogance. An anti-US proxy war in Iraq may have been possible and relatively low cost even two years ago. Today, however, the balance of power has changed against Tehran.
Tehran could, of course, order some attacks on Israel by Hezbollah or Hamas or even to target some Arab neighbors as suggested by the daily Kayhan, a mouth-piece for Khamenei. However, neither option is as easy as it sounds.
That leaves the option of a direct attack on the US, such as the CENTCOM base in Qatar or facilities in the Oman Musandam Peninsula, from Iran itself. But that could give the Americans an excuse to wipe out the Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ bases along the Gulf and the Sea of Oman.
And that would change the balance of power in favor of the Iranian regular army in its silent power struggle against the IRGC and its protectors among the mullahs.
Dealing with Tehran may require an extraordinary mixture of patience, resilience, and sobriety. If the region is to secure a measure of stability, it is imperative that the crumbling empire that the mullahs have built in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon must be dismantled. But this is not as easy as it sounds. Repatriating tens of thousands of mercenaries from Syria and Iraq may take years and require financial resources that Iran lacks. The redefinition of the Lebanese Hezbollah as a political party, rather than a foreign army, may prove even more complicated.
Part of the mess created is due to Soleimani’s utter incompetence and that, always a master of self-promotion, he ended up believing the myths created around his name by Islamic, Israeli and Western media and propaganda.
Self-taught amateur soldier, he spent more energy on self-promotion, often with “selfies” made during lightning visits to battleground long after the battle had ended, than working out an empire-building strategy. In a sense, Soleimani was a victim of the image created for him by mullahs seeking glory and their Western foes who needed a bogeyman.
Soleimani’s successor Gen. Ismail Qaaani is even more mediocre; Nut eh has the advantage of being fully aware of his mediocrity as a paper pusher and yet-man than a conqueror and empire-builder. Paradoxically, that might make the task of extricating Iran from the swamps hat Soleimani created for it may become easier.
*Amir Taheri is an international columnist and author. He worked as Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan, Iran's main newspaper, in the past. Currently, he is the Chairman of the Gatestone Institute in Europe. @AmirTaheri4
