A new security architecture for West Asia

The recent Iran-United States conflict has triggered one of the most consequential strategic debates in decades. Can West Asia continue to depend on external powers for its security, or has the time come for a regional security architecture led by the region’s own countries? The war exposed the fragility of the existing security order and highlighted a fundamental contradiction: West Asia remains the world’s most energy-rich region, yet it continues to be among the least secure. 

For nearly eight decades, the United States has been the principal security provider in the Middle East, protecting monarchies while pursuing a policy of containing revolutionary Iran. American military bases, naval fleets, intelligence networks and arms sales created a security umbrella that shaped the region’s strategic landscape. 

The Iran-US war, however, has exposed the fault lines in this paradigm. Washington’s overwhelming military superiority failed to coerce Iran or establish lasting stability, despite imposing enormous economic and military costs on the country. The eventual ceasefire and diplomatic interaction underscored an important lesson: sustainable peace in West Asia cannot be built solely through military deterrence. It requires inclusive regional diplomacy. 

At the center of any future framework stand Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Geography dictates that they remain neighbors regardless of political disagreements. Shared waterways, energy infrastructure and trade routes make their security indivisible. Neither side can attain lasting stability while viewing the other exclusively through the lens of rivalry. 

There are reports that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are supporting dialogue between Iran and the GCC. While such discussions remain in their early stages, they indicate a growing recognition that regional problems require regional solutions. Nevertheless, formidable obstacles remain. 

First, the foremost challenge is trust. For decades, Gulf monarchies have viewed Iran’s support for non-state actors and its ideological outreach with deep suspicion. Tehran, on the other hand, has perceived the extensive American military presence in the Gulf as a direct threat to its national security. 

Second, for any regional security framework to succeed, Iran would need to provide credible assurances of non-interference in the domestic affairs of neighboring states. Such guarantees are particularly important for the GCC monarchies, whose primary concern has always been regime security. Just as Iran expects the United States and its allies to abandon any policy aimed at regime change in Tehran, Gulf states will expect reciprocal commitments that their own political systems will not be challenged by Iranian influence. 

Third, another unresolved issue concerns the wider Levant. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon remain closely linked to regional rivalries. Iraq continues to balance competing Iranian and American influences and is moving to assert its Arab rather than its Shia identity. Lebanon remains politically fragile and economically distressed, while Hezbollah continues to be a target of Israel. Syria presents perhaps the greatest uncertainty. The country’s political transformation following years of civil war, combined with continuing territorial disputes and Israeli military incursions near the Golan Heights, raises serious questions about its future role within any regional security arrangement. 

Fourth, perhaps the greatest external variable is Israel. The Abraham Accords radically changed regional diplomacy by normalizing relations between Israel and several Arab states, especially the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The question now is whether these states can simultaneously sustain strategic partnerships with Israel while participating in a regional security dialogue that includes Iran. 

Fifth, Israel may view a proposed regional security architecture that reduces American influence with considerable apprehension. It could perceive the new alignments as a direct threat to its security. It may therefore launch more military operations in Lebanon or the occupied Palestinian territories, or renew regional escalation to derail the fragile diplomatic momentum. 

Sixth, this brings us to perhaps the most sensitive question: would Gulf states eventually ask the United States to reduce or even withdraw its military presence? Such an outcome appears unlikely in the immediate future. If regional confidence increases over time, Gulf states may gradually seek a more balanced security model, one that retains constructive relations with Washington while assuming greater responsibility for their own collective security. 

With the foregoing in view, rather than replacing the United States overnight, the likely trajectory is one of gradual strategic autonomy. In this evolving landscape, Pakistan possesses unique credentials that position it as an important stakeholder. 

West Asia remains the world’s most energy-rich region, yet it continues to be among the least secure. 

-Asif Durrani

First, Pakistan enjoys cordial relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Türkiye. Unlike many external powers, Islamabad has consistently sought to maintain balanced relations among competing regional actors. Its successful diplomatic involvement during the recent Iran-US crisis has enhanced its credibility as an impartial facilitator capable of closing gaps. 

Second, Pakistan’s strategic value goes beyond diplomacy. It remains the Muslim world’s only nuclear-armed state and possesses one of the region’s most experienced conventional militaries. Its defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and several other Gulf countries spans decades, encompassing military training, advisory missions, joint exercises and institutional partnerships. After the India-Pakistan four-day war, the professionalism of Pakistan’s armed forces has reinforced confidence among regional partners in Islamabad’s security credentials. 

Third, equally important is Pakistan’s geopolitical location. Connecting South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia and the Arabian Sea, Pakistan occupies a natural position as a bridge between regions. As connectivity initiatives expand and regional trade corridors develop, Pakistan can contribute not only to security cooperation but also to economic integration. Peace in West Asia would facilitate energy connectivity, maritime cooperation, infrastructure development and expanded trade, benefiting the entire region. 

The regional countries should take charge of their own affairs, with Pakistan, as the strongest among the region’s countries, acting as a lynchpin: benign in approach but firm in defense of the region. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye and the Gulf states may form the core, while Iran may be invited once credible guarantees of non-interference are provided. This is not an exhaustive proposal, but it could serve as a precursor to a future security architecture. 

History demonstrates that durable peace is established through negotiations, not imposed by force. The Iran-US war has amply demonstrated that geography remains a singular asset in defending national borders; the US and Israel could not send their militaries to occupy Iran for obvious reasons. The same holds for regional defense when it is maintained by the countries of the region themselves. The aftermath of the Iran-US war has opened an unprecedented diplomatic window. 

The writer is Pakistan’s former Special Representative for Afghanistan. He has also served as ambassador to Iran and the UAE and is a Senior Research Fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).