Bangladesh’s Myanmar challenge is no longer only about the Rohingya

For nearly a decade, Bangladesh’s policy on Myanmar has revolved around a single question: how to manage more than 1 million Rohingya refugees who fled the genocide and ethnic cleansing in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. That question remains important but it is no longer the most important one. A far more significant transformation is taking place along Bangladesh’s southeastern frontier.
The Arakan Army, once an insurgent movement fighting Myanmar’s military, now controls most of Rakhine State and virtually the entire border with Bangladesh. In practical terms, Bangladesh is no longer dealing solely with a refugee crisis; it is confronting the emergence of a new political reality on its border. The implications of this extend far beyond the Rohingya issue. They affect regional security, cross-border trade, great-power competition, and the future political geography of South Asia.
For years, Dhaka’s strategy was built around engagement with the Myanmar state. Successive Bangladeshi governments sought international support to pressure Naypyidaw into creating the conditions for Rohingya repatriation. The assumption underpinning these efforts was simple: Myanmar’s government controlled Rakhine State and therefore held the key to any solution. That assumption is increasingly detached from the reality of the present situation. Since the military coup in 2021, Myanmar has experienced one of the most dramatic state collapses in modern history. The junta has lost effective control over large portions of the country.
Among the most successful resistance movements has been the Arakan Army, which has transformed itself from a relatively small, ethnic, armed organization into the dominant military and political force across much of Rakhine State. The organization now controls major towns, transportation networks, border crossings, and key economic corridors. In many areas, it administers territory more effectively than the Myanmar state itself. Whether the international community likes it or not, the Arakan Army has become the principal authority along Bangladesh’s eastern frontier.
This creates a strategic dilemma for Dhaka. Bangladesh has traditionally adhered to a state-to-state approach in terms of foreign policy. Engaging directly with a non-state armed actor carries political and diplomatic risks. Yet refusing to acknowledge the realities of the situation on the ground carries even greater risks.
Border security cannot be managed through conversations with authorities who no longer control the border. Trade cannot be facilitated through institutions that lack territorial control. Most importantly, any discussion of Rohingya repatriation is becoming increasingly meaningless unless it includes the powers who now govern the territory to which refugees would potentially return.
The uncomfortable truth is that the future of Rakhine State might be determined less in Naypyidaw and more in the areas administered by the Arakan Army. This shift transforms the nature of challenge faced by Bangladesh. The Rohingya crisis was primarily humanitarian; the emerging border challenge is geopolitical.

The Rohingya crisis was primarily humanitarian; the emerging border challenge is geopolitical.

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

Reports of cross-border crime, kidnappings, smuggling networks, arms trafficking, and growing insecurity demonstrate that Bangladesh’s concerns now extend far beyond the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. The border is becoming an increasingly complex security environment involving armed forces, competing political authorities, and transnational criminal networks.
At the same time, economic opportunities are emerging alongside the risks. Historically, Rakhine served as a gateway connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia. Should stability eventually return, Bangladesh could benefit significantly from expanded trade routes linking Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar to western Myanmar and beyond. But realizing those opportunities will require a coherent strategy relating to the authorities that actually control the territory.
This challenge is not unique. All around the world, governments have had to adapt when nonstate actors evolved into de facto governing authorities. Whether in Iraqi Kurdistan, Somaliland or other contested regions, policymakers have eventually discovered that refusing to engage with the realities on the ground rarely makes those realities disappear. Bangladesh faces a similar moment today. The international community faces an even bigger one.
Much of the diplomatic architecture surrounding Myanmar remains trapped in the assumptions of 2017. International conferences continue to focus almost exclusively on management of refugees and repatriation. These issues remain vital but they are increasingly disconnected from the rapidly changing political landscape inside Myanmar. The central question is no longer whether the Rohingya should return; of course they should. The real questions are who will govern the territory to which they return, who will guarantee their security, and who will enforce any agreement that is reached.
These questions cannot be answered solely through engagement with a weakened junta that controls little of the relevant territory.
This does not mean the Arakan Army should be given a free pass. Serious allegations remain regarding its treatment of Rohingya communities. Any future engagement must be accompanied by clear expectations regarding minority rights, citizenship, security guarantees, and accountability. But strategic realities cannot be ignored simply because they are politically uncomfortable.
The broader lesson extends beyond Bangladesh and Myanmar. Across the world, traditional assumptions about sovereignty are being challenged. States are fragmenting. Nonstate actors are acquiring unprecedented territorial control. Political authority is increasingly being exercised by entities that exist somewhere between insurgency and statehood.
Myanmar has become one of the clearest examples of this phenomenon. For Bangladesh, the consequences are clear. Its policy on Myanmar can no longer be based solely on relations with Naypyidaw or on managing refugee camps. It must adapt to a new reality in which power along its eastern frontier is increasingly exercised by actors other than the Myanmar state.
The Rohingya crisis is not over. More than a million refugees remain stranded in Bangladesh with little prospect of returning home anytime soon. But the challenge Bangladesh faces with Myanmar is no longer only about the Rohingya; it is about navigating the emergence of a new political order on its border, and preparing for a future in which the map might remain the same but the realities of power have fundamentally changed.

• Dr. Azeem Ibrahim is the director of special initiatives at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington.
X: @AzeemIbrahim