Ukraine war has reshaped Europe’s strategic landscape

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a wakeup call for Europe, confirmation that the post-Cold War collective security architecture was shattered. This should have surprised no one since the crisis had been looming even before Russia brazenly and illegally annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea and supported pro-Russian separatists in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk to fight against the Ukrainian military.
It is now four years since the invasion of Ukraine, and the war is far from over, a situation that is not helped by international attention shifting to other arenas of conflict and crisis. In the meantime, Russian aggression has forced much of Europe to define what it stands for and how to protect itself against common enemies.
The post-Cold War era’s apparent global liberal-democratic honeymoon was fading long before the Russian invasion. With the war in Ukraine, a new reality is staring Europeans in the face, leaving them no choice, if they want to protect their values and way of life, other than to actively support Ukraine. The EU and UK recognized that failure to stand up to Russia would only increase its appetite, and it might turn against other countries, including EU members. Four years on, the war has not only redrawn battle lines in Eastern Europe but also reshaped Europe’s political and strategic landscape.
For too long, and for mainly short-term convenience, Europe ignored the fact that post-Soviet Russia was heading toward an authoritarian political system at home and an expansionist policy toward its neighbors, not afraid to violate other countries’ sovereignty by assassinating those who opposed the Kremlin, even on foreign soil.
For decades, much of Europe operated on the assumption that large-scale war on the Continent was unthinkable. This view was convenient because acknowledging an existential threat required a paradigm shift in the way the world operates and an increase in defense budgets —  unpopular with voters —  to confront the source of the threat.
It was also inconvenient because until the invasion of Ukraine, Russia provided up to 40 percent of the gas used in Europe. Instead of seeing this as leverage to influence Moscow, European leaders feared the consequences of confronting the Russian regime.
But there was also something perceptual-structural that held the EU back from responding adequately to Russian aggression: the inability to overcome the psychological barriers to developing a genuine common foreign and security policy. As an idea, the EU harbors an inherent paradox: building a supranational political and economic union while its members are all nation states.
However, while on many levels — freedom of trade, movement of people and capital, and cultural integration — the EU has improved the lives of its populations, it never succeeded, at least until the Ukraine war, in persuading member states to hand crucial powers on issues of foreign affairs and security to Brussels. 

Germany has voted to allow a huge increase in defense spending.

Yossi Mekelberg

The EU’s foreign and security strategy evolved mainly in the aftermath of the Cold War era, a period of relative political stability and optimism about the bloc’s ability to reduce conflicts. A more hostile environment, such as the Ukraine war, required radical change. The result of facing such a war on its doorstep and the necessity to take a side against a powerful aggressor which also happens to be a major energy supplier, came on top of the military threat, with both economic and social consequences. The cost of living surged, production fell in some parts of Europe, and governments were pouring billions into shielding households from soaring prices, at a time when the world was still struggling with the consequences of a global pandemic.
As early as 2014, the EU had imposed a series of sanctions against Russia in retaliation for its role in instigating insurrection in the Donbas conflict and the annexation of Crimea. Nevertheless, it took until early 2021 for its 27 members to seriously reconsider their ties with Russia and create a regime of sanctions independently of the UN. Most significantly, its member states drastically reduced their dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, and found alternative sources of gas and oil. Still, the 2022 invasion caught Europe, if not totally surprised, at least unprepared. Credit is due to the European leadership, which recovered quickly and changed course in what was a defining moment for Europe in the 21st century.
In the aftermath of the invasion, the working assumption shifted from a low likelihood of large-scale war across the continent to a rising fear that Ukraine would be only the first among others, for instance, the Baltic states, to face a similar fate. Between expressing full support for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, arming and training Ukraine’s military forces, and changing its outlook on the need to become self-reliant in defense, Europe has developed something close to a united front.
Two EU countries that for decades declined the opportunity to join NATO, Finland and Sweden, have changed their minds and joined this military alliance, and most other European nations have increased their spending on defense. Germany, for instance, has voted to allow a huge increase in defense and infrastructure spending, exempting the outlay from the country’s strict debt regulations.
Ukraine would not have remained independent and free had it not been for the heroism of its people and leadership. For Europe, it has become a seminal moment in which it realized that the political-economic-social experiment of the EU, which aims to prevent war through prosperity and integration, is not universally subscribed to by all international actors — and with one of them, Russia, on its borders, it needs to be able to defend itself militarily and diversify its sources of natural resources to fend off future threats deep into the 21st century.

• Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House.
X: @YMekelberg