Hard and soft power in Turkiye’s Horn of Africa policy

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid an official visit to Ethiopia this week as part of his regional tour, which included Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It was the first time in more than a decade that a Turkish president had visited Addis Ababa. It was, therefore, symbolically significant. Yet the visit conveys more than that. It came at a highly significant time, when the focus has shifted from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa, particularly following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December.

From Addis Ababa, Erdogan once again criticized Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, saying the move “would benefit neither Somaliland nor the Horn of Africa.” Despite Somaliland’s declaration of independence in the early 1990s, no state other than Israel recognizes its claim. Erdogan’s remarks came as Ethiopia maintains close relations with Somaliland. Two years ago, Ethiopia reportedly reached an agreement with the breakaway republic of Somaliland to lease a coastline for a port and military base in exchange for diplomatic recognition.

This agreement angered Somalia at the time, and it was Erdogan who mediated an end to the dispute, which had prompted fears of a wider conflict. The Somalia-Ethiopia deal grants Ethiopia “reliable, safe and sustainable” access to the sea under Somali sovereignty. As a result, Addis Ababa stepped back from its memorandum of understanding with Somaliland and agreed instead to pursue commercial port access in coordination with Somalia. Ethiopia was positive of Ankara’s mediation, not only because Turkiye has significant influence in Somalia, but also it has backed Ethiopia’s current president during the civil war. 

Somalia has been a pivot of Turkish policy

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Somalia has been a pivot of Turkish policy in the Horn of Africa since 2011. Turkiye has invested heavily in the country, establishing maritime ports, its largest embassy in the world, and a military training academy. Thus, Erdogan’s visit was widely understood as an effort to persuade Ethiopian leadership not to recognize Somaliland and to support Somalia’s unity and territorial integrity. 

Since the Turkish leader’s first visit to Ethiopia in 2015, several developments have taken place in the Horn of Africa. The rivalries among the states in this region, such as Eritrea and Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Somalia, and Somaliland and Somalia, have also posed challenges for Turkiye’s policy. However, they have also opened doors for Turkiye to implement its soft power elements, particularly mediation. With this visit, Erdogan aimed to show Turkiye’s commitment to deepening its ties with the Horn of Africa states through both soft and hard power elements.

During this visit, Turkiye and Ethiopia signed two major economic agreements. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said at a joint news conference that the talks aimed to relaunch economic and security cooperation against a backdrop of strong tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Abiy also said that he discussed Ethiopia’s “quest for sea access” with the Turkish leader and welcomed the constructive discussions on the matter. Ethiopia, which has been landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, has repeatedly described gaining reliable maritime access as a strategic priority. Ethiopia views Turkiye’s mediation role in the region as significant, which is most likely why this issue came onto the agenda.

Amid his Addis Ababa visit, Turkiye sent a deep-sea drilling vessel, Cagri Bey, to Somalia for what Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar described as Ankara’s first offshore exploration mission outside its maritime zone. In late January, it also deployed F-16 fighter jets to Somalia, accompanied by T129 ATAK helicopters. This marked the first time Ankara has stationed high-end manned combat aircraft in the country, highlighting Ankara’s long game in the Horn of Africa. 

Security shifts have influenced these priorities 

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

In the Horn of Africa, Turkiye first became involved through humanitarian aid initiatives. However, over the past years, Ankara has been expanding its military footprint in the region. This expansion is closely related to increasing insecurities caused by Israel’s policies in the Middle East, which is reflecting its impact in another region. By recognizing Somaliland, Israel–Turkiye rivalry in Syria is now mirroring itself in the Horn of Africa.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other regional states also align with Turkiye’s approach toward Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and extend their support to Somalia. In early February, for instance, Riyadh also signed a military agreement with Somalia. Israel’s interventionist policies have brought the Horn of Africa among the foreign policy priorities of Turkiye, as well as some Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia. The region’s geographical proximity to the Gulf leads to close attention, particularly from a maritime security perspective.

With the Ethiopia visit, Turkiye aims to show that it wants to go beyond its policy in Somalia and expand its role in the Horn of Africa. Turkiye has already signed a military agreement with Ethiopia in 2021, which was ratified by the Turkish parliament two years ago. This military cooperation agreement was comprehensive, covering various fields. The ratification of the deal came at a time when Ethiopia and Egypt were involved in a dispute over the construction of a dam on the Nile. This is also an issue that Ankara wants to resolve.

For Turkiye, policy toward the Horn of Africa is situated within its broader strategic priorities. The security shifts in the Horn of Africa have also influenced these priorities. This policy also departs from Ankara’s conventional diplomacy in the Horn of Africa, which has relied on soft power elements, moving instead toward a harder power diplomacy that involves military training and exports of defense products. While maintaining its soft power element of mediation to prevent rivalries among the Horn of African states, it also aims to counter Israel’s expansion. This is a challenging task and depends on the commitment of both the Horn of African states and the support of regional actors. 

- Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz