Pakistan’s worsening threat landscape in 2025

As 2025 draws to a close, Pakistan’s internal security landscape has deteriorated further while grappling with two full-scale insurgencies in the restive Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. While the Pakistani state took several steps to address the security challenges, militant groups evolved their operational strategies to persist with their violent campaigns. Pakistan’s porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan, easy access to small and light weapons that the US left behind in Afghanistan to militant networks, the growing state-society gap in Pakistan and the existence of several ethnic and sectarian fault-lines together, shaped Pakistan’s threat landscape. 

The foremost security challenge came from cross-border terror attacks of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP). The latter is an inter-group alliance of Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, Lashkar-e-Islam and the newly formed Harkat Inqilab-i-Islami Pakistan (HIIP). Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Pakistan used two tracks, negotiations and diplomatic persuasion to overcome cross-border terrorism from Afghanistan with no avail. Resultantly, Pakistan adopted a more aggressive and bold stance of targeting terror camps of Pakistan-focused networks in Afghanistan every time a cross-border terror attack was launched. Nonetheless, the Taliban regime continued with its policy of denying the presence of TTP on Afghan soil. 

Taliban-Pakistan relations nosedived due to Pakistani airstrikes in Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan. Though tensions have subsided to a large extent due to mediation by Qatar, Turkiye and Saudi Arabia, Islamabad has made it clear that cross-border attacks from Afghanistan will be retaliated to immediately. In 2026, the future trajectory of Afghanistan-Pakistan ties will be determined by their ability or lack of, to deal with TTP’s challenge. 

In 2026, the future trajectory of Afghanistan-Pakistan ties will be determined by their ability or lack of, to deal with TTP’s challenge. 

-Abdul Basit Khan

Another concerning trend in 2025 was the use of commercially available quadcopters for attacks, surveillance and propaganda operations. While almost all major terror networks in Pakistan possess quadcopters, only TTP and IMP have successfully weaponized them. All quadcopter attacks witnessed in 2025 were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The use of quadcopters by TTP and IMP strengthens the impression that they benefited from the transfer of knowledge, expertise, funding and technology from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Baloch insurgents were using drones only for propaganda operations and surveillance. However, it is only a matter of time before they weaponize drones as well. 

The Baloch insurgency, despite several setbacks, took a violent turn in 2025 which manifested mainly through repeated road blocks, brief capturing and ransacking of remote towns in Balochistan as well as several high profile attacks against military camps, government infrastructure and security checkposts. The most daring attack was the hijacking of a Peshawar-bound passenger train from Quetta by the Baloch Liberation Army. BLA’s ability to hijack a passenger train points to its growing operational capabilities and sophistication. 

Another trend in Baloch insurgency which merits mention is the expansion of female suicide bombing in Baloch insurgents. The expansion of female suicide bombers also underscores the fact that reservations within Baloch separatist groups about suicide bombings are fading and there is a consensus that suicide terrorism can be used as a strategic tool to highlight ethnic grievances and demands.

Pakistan’s existing security template in Balochistan is premised on the brutal use of force without recourse to political means, and is doing more harm than good. In 2026, the situation will evolve keeping in view how government policies are implemented. If it persists with the current framework, violence will increase. Alternatively, if it strikes a balance between kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of counterterrorism, it can restore a semblance of normalcy in some areas. 

Likewise, while Pakistan’s bold aggression against the Taliban regime over cross-border terrorism is justified and has come after four years of using diplomatic means to convince Kabul, Taliban-Pakistan tensions will hurt common Pashtuns living on both sides of the border. At the same time, these tensions will create new fault-lines which groups like TTP and IMP will exploit. Therefore, Pakistan should use a combination of diplomacy and force to change the Taliban’s strategic calculus concerning TTP.

Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaign is at an inflection point and a right combination of hard and soft power components coupled with improved service delivery and overcoming the existing state-society gap will be critical in reversing the rising tide of terrorism in 2026. 

The author is a Senior Associate Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. X: @basitresearcher.