Taliban 2.0 vs. Taliban 1.0: Moderate, extreme or the same?
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Since the Taliban took power following the fall of the Ghani regime in Afghanistan, a debate has been raging about whether the Taliban have genuinely reformed or if they are feigning moderation. More importantly, do they have the governance credentials to run Afghanistan? Undoubtedly, 2021 Afghanistan is different from the country that the Taliban ruled from 1996 to 2001. During the last two decades, the Afghans have been exposed to democracy, modern education and professional careers. Hence, the 1990s’ playbook will not work in 2021.
The Taliban are learning the hard way that conquering Afghanistan is easier than running it. Knowing this, they are signalling to the international community that they are pragmatic, despite being a radical Islamist entity. However, they cannot be both at the same time. The Taliban’s catch-22 is to demonstrate their political pragmatism to the international community for recognition and financial assistance but stick to ideological commitments to keep the movement’s organizational coherence. Balancing these two irreconcilable positions will be critical in determining the Taliban’s future.
Against this backdrop, it is important to unpack what Taliban 2.0 represent politically, ideologically and socially? Broadly, there are three main arguments on this issue.
The first argument is that Taliban 2.0 are more extreme than Taliban 1.0. They have fought alongside Al-Qaeda, became more lethal and forged new links with other regional militants. For instance, the use of suicide bombings in Afghanistan was rare pre-9/11. Now, the Taliban, particularly the younger generation, uses suicide attacks as a weapon of choice. Furthermore, they are locked in a fierce turf competition with Daesh. Hence, they cannot afford to show leniency to keep their ideological legitimacy within the militant fraternity. Also, within the Taliban, one broad division is of moderates and hardliners. To keep their organizational unity, it is the Taliban’s structural compulsion to be extreme.
The second argument is that Taliban 2.0 are less extreme and more moderate than Taliban 1.0. They are engaging with their political opponents to form a broad-based and inclusive government. For instance, they have given a general amnesty to their political opponents, such as Gul Agha Sherazi or the CIA-backed notorious militia—the Khost Protection Force. They are allowing girls and women to continue their education within the Shariah framework and media to operate. The Taliban leaders, in their interviews, admit they made mistakes and have learned from them. A case in point is the Taliban leader Anas Haqqani’s recent interview.
In a way, governance became the Taliban’s compulsion. As their territorial control increased in Afghanistan, they were forced to govern to cater to the needs of the local population.
Abdul Basit Khan
The third argument is that Taliban 2.0 and 1.0 are the same. Their ideological worldview has not changed. However, the group has become more pragmatic and PR-savvy to get recognition, avail financial assistance and make space for themselves. Their right sounding political noises and carefully orchestrated social media propaganda is a ploy to soften hostile international opinion.
Another legitimate concern is the Taliban’s governance credentials. It is one thing to be a successful insurgency and quite another to run a state. From 1996 to 2001, Afghanistan under the Taliban was a failed state. The Taliban themselves admit that they struggled to run Afghanistan. The US decision to freeze $9.5 billion of Afghan government reserves, suspension of the World Bank and IMF aid and the brain drain of educated Afghans will make it difficult for the Taliban to run a country of 38 million people. Though the Taliban want an emirate of sorts, they have no clue what it will look like. They do not have a blueprint of a post-victory state.
However, it is not entirely correct that the Taliban do not have governance exposure. The former Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansoor started preparing the Taliban for a post-war life as early as 2015 to move away from fighting to governance. Since 2015, the Taliban have been acting like a government-in-waiting. Mansoor restructured the Taliban, introduced new commissions and moved the group from patronage to a financially self-sufficient proto-state and bureaucratized it.
In a way, governance became the Taliban’s compulsion. As their territorial control increased in Afghanistan, they were forced to govern to cater to the needs of the local population. A dysfunctional, corrupt and weak Ghani government worked to the Taliban’s advantage. They co-opted local government officials in several areas to manage the governance jointly. So, the Taliban not only have governance exposure, but an uneasy working relationship with government officials as well in areas under their control.
Ideology is not a constant or a fixed phenomenon; instead, it is subordinated to any group or movement’s strategic goals. Ideological posturing is used to justify those goals. After returning to power in Afghanistan, if the Taliban’s strategic objective is to build bridges with the international community by addressing their concerns on human rights, an inclusive government, and cutting ties with terrorist groups, it is quite possible that they can evolve in that direction. However, this evolutionary process can be very incremental and fraught with inherent risks of internal fractures.
Palestine’s Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah moved into political life while keeping their militant characters intact. The caveat is whether the Taliban can successfully see through the painstakingly slow and risky process of evolution from an insurgency to a political movement without fracturing. In this regard, the paramount challenge for the Taliban would be to balance their moderate and hardline elements.
Undoubtedly, the Taliban have pardoned their opponents and are engaging them to form a politically and ethnically inclusive government. However, only time will tell whether these well meaning pardons are a ploy to unlock frozen financial reserves and get diplomatic recognition or a genuine change of heart.
While the international community should give the Taliban more space and time by staying engaged, the latter has a narrow opportunity to evolve. Else, Afghanistan will be reduced to an isolated, sectioned and pariah state.
– The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Twitter: @basitresearcher.
