Kabul’s peace overture, the Taliban’s dilemma and the way forward
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani extended an olive branch to the Taliban at the Kabul Process-II meeting on February 28, 2018, when he proposed a comprehensive peace proposal to the armed opposition group. The road map he unveiled accepted all the demands made by the Taliban, barring the announcement of a time frame for withdrawal of foreign forces.
Even this concern has, to a certain extent, been addressed by Kabul, after the chief executive officer of the High Peace Council last week said that, as part of peace talks, the withdrawal of the international forces from Afghanistan can be top of the agenda.
Following the announcement of this comprehensive offer, the Afghan public has also been calling on the Taliban to explore the possibility of ending the longstanding Afghan conflict through a political settlement. The Helmand sit-in is one of the many forums that have arisen for people to show their support for the peace process. The sit-in was organized in the aftermath of a deadly suicide attack in Helmand’s capital, Lashkargah, and is being emulated in many other provinces. Such unprecedented initiatives have increased the pressure on the Taliban, making it difficult for them to ignore Kabul’s peace offer.
However, the Taliban has not offered a response, negative or positive, in the seven weeks since the Kabul Process-II meeting. The long silence is uncharacteristic given how quickly previous peace overtures were rejected. They have always had reasons to refuse but this time the delay is a clear indication that the Taliban leadership is faced with a conundrum. The road map offered by Ghani leaves them with limited reasons to continue fighting and avoid negotiating.
Having said this, it has also been difficult for Taliban leaders to embrace a formal negotiation process, mainly because they fear this might harm the legitimacy of the war they have been waging since the collapse of their theocratic regime in 2001. The Taliban’s struggle is rooted in a narrative that portrays the post-9/11 Kabul regime as a puppet of western countries, and considers the presence of foreign forces operating under a mandate from the United Nations Security Council as an invasion.
This narrative, further supported by bad governance and a corrupt judicial system, has helped the Taliban not only mobilize foot soldiers but also financial resources inside Afghanistan and beyond. Agreeing to peace talks with a government that has always been tagged as a marionette will potentially cause skepticism among the ranks, as it would mean the group has opted to negotiate with a regime they portrayed as illegitimate. Joining the peace process could make the Taliban’s mid-level leadership and foot soldiers, the segment practically engaged on the battlefield, question the legitimacy of the anti-Kabul government rhetoric.
It has been difficult for Taliban leaders to embrace a formal negotiation process, mainly because they fear this might harm the legitimacy of the war they have been waging since the collapse of their theocratic regime in 2001.
Mushtaq Rahim
In addition, there are segments of hardliners among the Taliban who only believe in military conquest, so the leadership might be wary of the formation of factions among their ranks at the senior level. The Taliban can be classified as comprising three main groups: the clergy, which gives religious legitimacy to the ongoing warfare; the political leadership, responsible for agenda setting; and the military. Hence, there is likely to be a concern among the Taliban leadership that if they join talks for a political settlement, breakaway factions might cause disharmony within what has been a very coherent structure.
There is also no guarantee that peace talks between Kabul and the Taliban would make headway. The nature of the peace process is such that it is usually a tiresome, time-consuming and prolonged process with the equal possibility of failure or success. Hence, the Taliban is not prepared to risk its well-established structure, strong narrative and network of formal and informal relations with people and groups for the overture. However, ignoring the comprehensive peace proposal presented by Ghani, and the mounting public pressure, leaves the Taliban facing a dilemma.
In light of the challenges that the militant group is faced with, expecting it to provide a formal response to Ghani’s Kabul Process-II package would be naive. In this context, with the Taliban unable to make a public decision, the Ghani administration should take things a step further by finding ways to open behind-the-scenes channels that could kick-start peace negotiations.
In the past, Kabul has had little interest in informal talks, believing that they could distract from formal negotiations. However, given the circumstances and concessions offered as part of the overture in Kabul Process-II, this additional brave step could be a decisive moment in the quest for peace in Afghanistan.
The opportunity to engage in a peace process without a public announcement will provide the Taliban with a chance to test the waters regarding negotiations and their potential for success. During the process the two sides could also agree on a distinct set of actions as part of confidence-building measures.
As the negotiations mature, all parties can gradually make their progress public and engage with additional stakeholders as required for the success of the process. Now that Ghani has offered a very generous package, meeting almost all the demands of the opposition groups, just one additional step could lead to those long-awaited peace talks.
— Mushtaq Rahim is an independent political and security analyst, and expert on conflict management and peacebuilding. He has been working in Afghanistan for the past 16 years on the promotion of good governance with specific focus on security sector reforms and peacebuilding.
Twitter: @mushtaq_rahim
