The Democratic victory in the US midterms shifts the balance in Congress, but it is unlikely to bring a major change in Washington’s Iran policy or in Pakistan’s diplomatic role. President Donald Trump remains in office, and the new Congress takes its seats only in January 2027. Democrats can scrutinize the war and contest funding, but the president retains broad authority over foreign policy. Pakistan’s mediation grew out of the regional conflict and the diplomacy already under way, not the US election. Congressional influence is real, but indirect.

Pakistan’s role grew from developments that preceded the midterms, and from how Islamabad came to be seen in Washington and Tehran. The India-Pakistan crisis and ceasefire of May 2025 raised Pakistan’s profile in Washington. On June 18 2025, President Trump hosted Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House, where the two discussed the Israel-Iran conflict. The field marshal is said to have warned Trump against striking Iran, saying Tehran could deny the US a military victory. Events have borne out that warning.

Three developments shaped Pakistan’s mediation.

Pakistan could not guarantee a settlement, but it kept communication open, reduced immediate risks, kept the parties at the table and worked to prevent a wider war.

—Nasim Zehra

First, Islamabad could talk to parties that were not speaking to each other. It maintained relations with Tehran while engaging Washington and Gulf capitals. Pakistan had supported the China-brokered restoration of Saudi-Iran diplomatic relations in 2023, reflecting its longstanding preference for dialogue.

Second, Pakistan combined principle with balance. After US-Israeli strikes on Iran began on Feb. 28, 2026, it condemned the attacks on Iran and, in the same statement, Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. At the UN Security Council, Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad reiterated both positions. Islamabad argued that sovereignty and civilian security mattered across the region.

Third, Pakistan turned access into diplomacy. It carried messages, helped bring US and Iranian representatives to Islamabad in April and pressed for a ceasefire when talks risked collapse. Vice President JD Vance led the US delegation, while Iran’s was led by parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The round ended without a settlement. Pakistan’s air force later escorted the Iranian delegation home after security concerns arose, extending Islamabad’s role beyond hosting meetings.

The process then widened. In May, a Qatari team traveled to Tehran in coordination with Washington to help resolve outstanding issues, and Oman also provided diplomatic channels. Qatar’s involvement reflected its longstanding effort to position itself as an intermediary, from the US-Taliban talks to other conflicts. Its role was reinforced by Iranian funds held in Qatari banks. The prospect of releasing some of those assets became part of the negotiations, giving Tehran an incentive to engage and Doha another way to facilitate talks. No transfer to Iran has been confirmed.

On June 18 this year, Islamabad announced that Washington and Tehran had electronically signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. Pakistan and Qatar convened a follow-up meeting at Bürgenstock, Switzerland, on June 21, attended by Vance and Ghalibaf. The agreement created a framework for further negotiations but did not settle the nuclear issue. Pakistan could not guarantee a settlement, but it kept communication open, reduced immediate risks, kept the parties at the table and worked to prevent a wider war.

The midterm result does not change the central logic of Pakistan’s mediation. The channel was built before the election, through back-channel contacts, the Islamabad talks and the June memorandum. Congress may scrutinize the war and debate funding, but the election is unlikely to redirect the process or displace Pakistan. Islamabad’s influence will depend on balanced ties, open communication and continued advocacy for collective security and de-escalation.

This is where Pakistan’s wider regional role matters. Its approach to “smart security” combines military capability, diplomacy and dialogue, with collective regional security as a central principle. The Makkah Joint Defense Agreement, signed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye on Aug. 7, gave their cooperation a formal framework. Its diplomatic dimension was evident on Oct. 26, when senior representatives of all three countries traveled to Tehran to meet Iranian leaders. They discussed regional peace and security and agreed to continue talking. The visit showed that Pakistan’s vision requires engaging Iran and treating every country in the region as a sovereign partner.

That approach was reaffirmed on Nov. 16, when Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar hosted the Economic Cooperation Organization’s Council of Foreign Ministers in Islamabad, attended by Araghchi. Pakistan pledged to keep working to ease US-Iran tensions. Its contribution is to connect diplomacy with security, and to press for a settlement shaped by regional dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation.

Nasim Zehra is an author, analyst, and national security expert. X: @NasimZehra