When aid cuts become a security risk

Humanitarian aid is often framed as charity. In reality, it is one of the most cost-effective tools the international system has for maintaining stability. When it is reduced or withdrawn, the consequences are not confined to human suffering. They ripple outward into security, migration and regional politics. What we are witnessing today is a subtle but dangerous shift: aid cuts are no longer just a symptom of donor fatigue, they are becoming a driver of geopolitical instability.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of the Rohingya.

Nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees remain in camps in Bangladesh, the vast majority concentrated in Cox’s Bazar. For years, this population has depended almost entirely on international assistance for food, shelter and basic services. Yet funding for the Rohingya response has consistently fallen short. In recent cycles, the UN’s Joint Response Plan has struggled to reach even 60 percent of the required funding. The consequences have been immediate and measurable.

Where aid recedes, governance weakens. Where governance weakens, nonstate actors step in

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

Food rations have been cut sharply. At one point, monthly allocations fell from $12 per person to $8, before being partially restored under emergency pressure. Even at restored levels, this is barely sufficient to meet basic caloric needs. The result is rising malnutrition. Surveys have shown acute malnutrition rates in some parts of the camps exceeding emergency thresholds, particularly among children. This is not a marginal deterioration. It is a structural decline in living conditions.

But the more important point is this: when aid is cut, the camps do not simply become poorer. They become more unstable.

The first effect is the expansion of illicit economies. When legitimate means of survival disappear, alternative systems emerge. In Cox’s Bazar, this has already taken shape in the form of growing criminal networks involved in drug trafficking, human smuggling and extortion. Armed groups have proliferated, exploiting both desperation and the absence of economic opportunity. Violence inside the camps has increased, placing additional strain on Bangladeshi security forces and humanitarian agencies alike.

This is not unique to the Rohingya context. It is a predictable pattern. Where aid recedes, governance weakens. Where governance weakens, nonstate actors step in.

The second effect is migration. When conditions fall below a certain threshold, containment breaks down. Rohingya refugees are increasingly undertaking dangerous sea journeys toward Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. These journeys are often facilitated by smuggling networks, exposing refugees to exploitation, trafficking and death at sea. Each wave of departures transforms what was once a localized humanitarian crisis into a broader regional challenge.

This dynamic is well understood in policy circles, yet it is rarely acknowledged openly. Aid is often discussed in moral terms but its strategic function is containment. It keeps vulnerable populations in place under conditions that are difficult but survivable. When that support is reduced, mobility increases. In effect, cutting aid is not a neutral act. It redistributes pressure across borders.

The third effect is the shifting of burden onto front-line states. Bangladesh has hosted the Rohingya for nearly a decade with remarkable resilience. But this arrangement was always predicated on sustained international support. As funding declines, the costs are increasingly internalized. Local communities face economic strain, environmental degradation and competition over resources. Political pressure within Bangladesh is rising, with growing calls for repatriation or relocation, despite the absence of safe conditions in Myanmar.

This creates a dangerous feedback loop. As host states become more strained, their willingness to cooperate diminishes. The risk of forced or premature returns increases. Regional tensions begin to rise.

What is particularly striking is that this is happening at a time when global humanitarian need is expanding. Conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and Sudan have placed unprecedented demands on donor resources. But the response has not been a proportional increase in overall funding. Instead, we are seeing prioritization. Crises that are strategically salient receive rapid and substantial support. Protracted crises, by contrast, are quietly deprioritized.

The Rohingya have fallen into the latter category.

This introduces a new and uncomfortable reality. Aid is no longer distributed solely based on need. It is increasingly shaped by political visibility and strategic interest. This does not require explicit intent, it emerges naturally from constrained budgets and competing priorities. But the effect is the same. Some populations are sustained, while others are managed at the edge of viability.

The long-term consequences of this approach are profound.

First, it increases the likelihood of chronic instability in already-fragile regions. South and Southeast Asia are not insulated from these pressures. Rising insecurity in refugee-hosting areas can spill over into broader regional dynamics, particularly where governance capacity is limited.

What we are seeing today is not simply a failure of generosity. It is a failure of strategic thinking

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

Second, it raises the probability of future migration crises. The costs associated with managing large-scale irregular migration, both politically and financially, far exceed the cost of maintaining basic humanitarian support. Yet policy decisions continue to favor short-term savings over long-term stability.

Third, it creates openings for external actors. Where Western engagement recedes, others can step in, whether through informal networks, influence operations or selective assistance. Humanitarian vacuums rarely remain empty for long.

The paradox is that aid, often dismissed as discretionary spending, is in fact a form of preventive investment. The sums required to sustain basic services in places like Cox’s Bazar are modest when compared to military expenditures or the economic costs of instability. Yet they deliver disproportionate returns in terms of stability and risk reduction.

What we are seeing today is not simply a failure of generosity. It is a failure of strategic thinking.

The Rohingya camps are frequently described as a humanitarian space. In reality, they are a pressure point in the regional system. Decisions taken about funding levels will shape not only the lives of refugees but the trajectory of security, migration and political stability across a wide geographic area.

Cutting aid may balance budgets in the short term, but it does so by exporting risk into the future.

The lesson is clear: Humanitarian assistance is not separate from geopolitics, it is part of it. And when it is reduced without a viable alternative, the consequences are neither contained nor temporary. They are cumulative, destabilizing and, ultimately, far more costly than the savings that produced them.

• Dr. Azeem Ibrahim is the director of special initiatives at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington.

X: @AzeemIbrahim