The battle of ideas at the heart of Iran war

It is not a coincidence that Iran is firing missiles at the Arab Gulf states. The fundamental difference between them is what this current war is really about. They represent two opposing worldviews, one based on a militant and radical version of Islam and the other on a liberal practice.

Their battle is one of ideas. Radicalism was inherited from the revolutionary decades of the 1970s and 1980s and the anti-imperialist movements opposed to the US. The other side is liberal, allied to the West and the US and in tune with its world order. For the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxy militias, the Gulf Cooperation Council states represent the real danger: a viable and prosperous alternative model for the region.

This is also not about theology. There are similar theological schools, like Salafis or Sufis, on both sides. It is also not strictly about religion either. There are radical and liberal secularists allied to both sides. It is a clash of radical versus liberal ideas that sometimes uses religion as a vehicle. In Catholicism, it is the difference between Latin American liberation theology and conservative movements like Opus Dei. When radical Islam started to expand in the late 1970s, many of its militants were former leftist revolutionaries and some were not even Muslim. It is not Islam that was radicalized, rather it was radicalism that was Islamized, according to French academic Olivier Roy.

For the IRGC and its proxies, the GCC states are a viable and prosperous alternative model that must be destroyed

Nadim Shehadi

Analysts are often wrong, especially when they make sense. An elegant theory based on a binary is always attractive and, after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the US, many misleading arguments emerged. One was that of a clash of civilizations, Islam against the West, due to their incompatible values. Another even more simplistic one was about the Shiite-Sunni divide, which in my view existed far more among the experts inside the Washington beltway than in the Middle East itself. The most misleading was that of Islam versus secularism or modernity.

These were not just simple analytical tools — they were dangerous because policies were based on their assumptions. Such as when a leaked nongovernmental organization report, written by an expert influenced by the Syrian regime, described the conflict in Syria as being between radical Islam and secularism. This was instrumental in Europe’s engagement with the Assad regime. Bashar Assad, who was described as a secular modernist, could be reformed whereas radical Islam could not.

The European Commission, for example, had a lot of experience with its EU enlargement programs of transforming the former Stalinist countries of Eastern Europe into modern liberal states. The “acquis communautaire,” or the tools of this transformation, was ready to be delivered by an army of experts who descended on Damascus with their PowerPoint presentations. In the meantime, Assad was allowed to crush the revolt and destroy the country, enabled by an elegantly false dichotomy that was compatible with EU bureaucracy.

Another fallacy was that of the Sunni-Shiite divide. People have been living together for centuries and continue to do so. This idea also became dangerous in the hands of experts. Simply put, Daesh and Al-Qaeda were considered as Sunni and the IRGC, which was Shiite, was considered an ally in the war on terror. In reality, radical Sunni groups like Al-Qaeda considered pro-Western Muslim states to be the principal enemy and the IRGC an ally.

The result was that most institutions that received counterterrorism funding were focused on combating the Sunni variety. None of these funds or organizations were dedicated to countering militias like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Units of Iraq or the Houthis in Yemen. In fact, Project Cassandra, which was investigating the Hezbollah network, was shut down by the Obama administration to prevent it potentially disrupting the nuclear deal negotiations with Iran.

This was a time when counterterrorism experts considered Iran an ally. In reality, both the IRGC and Daesh were radicals who were on the same side — they both considered liberal, pro-western Muslims as their real enemies. What the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks revealed was that the radical wings of Sunni Hamas were also allied to the IRGC’s Shiite militias. Even the Muslim Brotherhood is divided between radical anti-Western and more liberal branches, as we have seen among the young generation of exiles with Brotherhood background in Syria.

In the current war, a widespread fallacy among experts is that, for the IRGC or Hezbollah to win, all they have to do is survive

Nadim Shehadi

In the current war, a widespread fallacy among experts is that, for the IRGC or Hezbollah to win, all they have to do is survive; whereas those fighting them have to achieve all their objectives, whether declared or undeclared. How many times have we heard or read that the US has no strategy, no plan or no endgame, whereas all the Iranian regime has to do is survive? Imagine asking a player during a game of chess — a game that simulates war — to reveal their strategy.

This is also based on the supposition that, if the Iranian regime can still threaten the Gulf countries with a few rockets, then it continues to hold the whole region hostage, including global trade routes. Similarly, Hezbollah wins if it survives long enough to be able to throw half a dozen rockets across the border into Israel. Because then it maintains the ability to destabilize both Lebanon and Israel and ignite a war. This is not really a victory — it is merely prolonging the conflict until the next round.

The real battle is not solely a military one, it is between two narratives. The choice is between the vision of the region represented by Tehran and that of the Gulf states: a liberal Islam allied with the West versus a radical Islam in confrontation with the West. Radical groups will lose support when their constituencies realize that all that they bring is death and destruction. Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and even Iran itself bear witness to this fact.

The conduct of war can be counterproductive — bombing people in Iran and destroying infrastructure has its limits. An Israeli invasion and occupation of parts of south Lebanon would give Hezbollah a boost because it would legitimize its status as a group resisting occupation. But Hezbollah would likely lose its grip over the Lebanese population it has indoctrinated for more than two generations with the realization that the totally unnecessary war it provoked by throwing rockets at Israel in support of Iran has brought nothing but misery.

• Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser. X: @Confusezeus