The Rohingya repatriation myth: A crisis quietly abandoned

For years, the international community has spoken with reassuring consistency about the eventual return of the Rohingya to Myanmar. Repatriation has remained the stated objective of governments, UN agencies and diplomatic forums alike. Yet the uncomfortable truth is that this goal has not merely stalled, it has been quietly abandoned in practice. What remains is a policy fiction that obscures a far more troubling reality: the emergence of a permanently displaced, stateless population with no credible pathway home.

Nearly a decade after the 2017 military crackdown that forced some 700,000 Rohingya to flee into Bangladesh, more than 1 million refugees remain in Cox’s Bazar, making it the largest refugee settlement in the world. Despite repeated bilateral agreements between Bangladesh and Myanmar, not a single large-scale repatriation has taken place. Pilot returns have failed, verification processes have collapsed and refugees themselves have consistently refused to go back without guarantees of citizenship, safety and rights. None of these conditions exist today.

The evidence is stark. According to UN assessments, conditions in Rakhine State remain wholly unconducive to return. Large parts of the region are now active conflict zones, as fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army has intensified. Villages have been destroyed, infrastructure is minimal and humanitarian access is severely restricted. The areas from which the Rohingya were expelled are either depopulated or under the control of armed actors with unclear positions on Rohingya identity and rights. In such an environment, repatriation is not simply unlikely — it is implausible.

The Myanmar authorities have consistently refused to recognize the Rohingya as a legitimate ethnic group

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

At the same time, the political framework underpinning repatriation has eroded. The Myanmar state, which the international community continues to treat as the central interlocutor, does not fully control Rakhine State. The junta is locked in a nationwide conflict and has limited authority on the ground.

Meanwhile, the Arakan Army has emerged as a dominant force in large parts of Rakhine, yet it remains largely excluded from formal diplomatic processes. This disconnect is critical. Negotiations are being conducted with actors that do not control the territory in question, while those that do are not meaningfully engaged.

Even if political alignment were achieved, the fundamental issue of identity remains unresolved. The Myanmar authorities have consistently refused to recognize the Rohingya as a legitimate ethnic group, instead referring to them as “Bengalis.” This is not a semantic dispute. It is central to the denial of citizenship and rights that drove the original displacement. Any repatriation process that does not address this issue risks recreating the very conditions of persecution that led to genocide allegations in the first place.

The danger is not that the world is unaware of their plight. It is that it has grown accustomed to it

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

While return has become increasingly unrealistic, life in Bangladesh is also growing more precarious. International funding for the Rohingya response is declining sharply. The UN’s Joint Response Plan has faced significant shortfalls in recent years, with funding levels dropping well below requirements. As a result, food rations have been reduced.

The consequences are already visible. Malnutrition rates among children are rising, education services remain limited and economic opportunities are virtually nonexistent. Restrictions on movement and employment prevent refugees from building self-reliance, trapping them in a cycle of dependency and frustration. This environment has contributed to a deterioration in security within the camps, with increases in criminal activity, trafficking and recruitment by armed groups. What was once framed as a humanitarian challenge is steadily evolving into a long-term security concern.

Bangladesh, for its part, is showing clear signs of fatigue. Hosting so many refugees for nearly a decade has brought significant economic, environmental and political costs. The government has responded by tightening controls in the camps, limiting freedoms and promoting relocation to Bhasan Char, a remote island facility that has been controversial among rights groups. These measures reflect a broader shift in posture: from temporary humanitarian host to long-term containment manager.

This is the crux of the problem. The system has adapted to manage the Rohingya crisis, not to resolve it. International actors continue to fund basic services at reduced levels, Bangladesh maintains stability within its borders and Myanmar faces little immediate pressure to create the conditions for return. The result is a form of equilibrium, but one built on the indefinite suspension of rights and the future of an entire people.

Maintaining the language of repatriation under these conditions is not merely misleading, it is counterproductive. It allows policymakers to defer difficult decisions, avoid confronting political realities and continue operating within a framework that no longer corresponds to facts on the ground. In effect, it normalizes permanent displacement while pretending otherwise.

A more honest approach would begin by acknowledging that repatriation, as currently conceived, is not a viable near-term solution. This does not mean abandoning the principle of return. It means recognizing that achieving it will require a fundamentally different strategy. That includes engaging with all relevant actors in Rakhine State, not just the Myanmar junta, addressing the citizenship question directly rather than sidestepping it, and applying sustained diplomatic and economic pressure to create conditions for safe and voluntary return.

At the same time, there must be a shift in how the international community supports the Rohingya in exile. Chronic underfunding is not a sustainable policy. Investments in education, livelihoods and mobility are essential to prevent the camps from becoming entrenched zones of despair and instability. Host countries like Bangladesh also require greater support, both financially and politically, to manage the burden in a way that respects human dignity.

The Rohingya crisis is entering a new phase. It is no longer defined by mass violence alone but by protracted neglect and strategic drift. The danger is not that the world is unaware of their plight. It is that it has grown accustomed to it.

Repatriation has not failed in a dramatic or visible way. It has simply faded from reality while remaining firmly in rhetoric. Until that gap is confronted, the Rohingya will remain trapped in a system that offers neither return nor resolution, only the slow consolidation of a permanent humanitarian limbo.

• Dr. Azeem Ibrahim is the director of special initiatives at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington.

X: @AzeemIbrahim