The Pakistan-Afghan Taliban duel has revealed irreparable cracks

Recent deadly clashes between Pakistani forces and the Afghan Taliban mark a perilous new chapter in the fraught relationship between the two countries, transforming a long simmering dispute into a direct military confrontation.

The core issue— Pakistan’s assertion that the Afghan Taliban harbors the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)— has brought tensions to a boiling point, leading to an overt use of force that has reportedly killed dozens.

Recent months saw some of the deadliest attacks by the TTP and allied groups on Pakistan’s security forces. On October 9, it was followed by an airstrike in Kabul, which the Taliban blamed on Pakistan. The strike reportedly aimed to target Noor Wali Mehsud, the TTP chief, who is believed to be the mastermind of the cross-border attacks against Pakistan. The TTP claims Mehsud is alive and released his video message on social media. 

In response, Taliban forces launched what they termed “retaliatory operations” against Pakistani military posts, leading to intense fighting across multiple locations along the long, porous, and mountainous border. Pakistan also launched airstrikes in Kabul and Kandahar, which it claimed targeted terror hideouts.

This armed conflict underscores a dramatic reversal of Pakistan’s strategic expectations. After the fall of Kabul in 2021, Islamabad had anticipated that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would be a friendly regime that would curb the TTP, a group blamed for hundreds of attacks inside Pakistan.

Even the then-Prime Minister, Imran Khan, boasted of the Taliban takeover by saying, “Afghans have broken the shackles of slavery.” A photograph of the country’s ISI chief, Gen. Faiz— now on court-martial— sipping tea in Kabul within days of the Taliban’s ascension to power was also featured controversially in world media.

For the Taliban, caught in its ideological bedrock, fulfilling the demand of reining in terror groups may not be possible.

Owais Tohid

Instead, relations have soured. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing sanctuary and increasing support to the TTP— a paradoxical consequence of Pakistan’s perceived foreign policy gain. Several direct and indirect attempts at talks were held with both the Afghan Taliban and the TTP leadership to stop cross-border terror attacks, but without any success.

During this time, the TTP regrouped and gradually intensified attacks against Pakistan, from 573 in 2021 to 1,200 in 2023— a trend that has continued to date. 

Pakistan perhaps misread the deeply rooted ideological bonding between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. The Taliban do not conceive of the TTP as a terror group, and the debt they owe to the TTP is enormous. The Pakistani Taliban provided recruits, shelter, and fought alongside the Afghan Taliban against US and NATO forces. TTP fighters have also sworn allegiance to the supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban, Hibatullah Akhunzada.

A UN report in 2024 confirms the growing support of the Taliban rulers for the TTP, described as the largest militant group in Afghanistan with an estimated strength of 6,000–6,500 fighters. Under Taliban rule, the UN report adds, Al-Qaeda runs training camps in Afghanistan and also extends support to the TTP, including providing fighters for military staffing or attack formations.

The Taliban also believe that pressuring the TTP might push it to collaborate with Daesh Khorasan, which is challenging the regime’s writ and has been accused of carrying out deadly attacks inside Afghanistan and in neighboring countries, including Pakistan, Iran and Russia.

Meanwhile, each new wave of TTP attacks on Pakistan’s soil deepens mistrust between Islamabad and the Taliban rulers. Pakistan has been vacillating between talks and an all-out crackdown, but now believes enough is enough— hence the duel with the Afghan Taliban.

The armed conflict comes as the Taliban deepen ties with India, Pakistan’s regional rival. The red carpet welcome for Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in New Delhi, and India’s announcement that it would reopen its embassy in Kabul, are viewed with deep suspicion in Islamabad.

By engaging with a regime desperate for legitimacy, India appears to aim at counterbalancing Pakistan’s influence and mitigating China’s growing footprint in Afghanistan. Having invested $3 billion in Afghanistan’s reconstruction post-9/11, India has found an opportunity to regain its lost ground. India’s friendship with the Taliban seems to be a calculated geopolitical maneuver to advance its strategic interests.

The situation remains volatile. Although a temporary ceasefire has been brokered by Qatar, key border crossings at Torkham and Chaman remain closed, disrupting vital trade and movement.

This border, however, appears set to remain a dangerous flashpoint, with a high risk of spilling over into greater instability in Afghanistan and the region. 

The core dispute over TTP safe havens remains unresolved. Pakistan also accuses the Taliban of sheltering the Baloch insurgent group BLA and believes the group has ties to the TTP.

This new state of belligerence poses significant challenges for both sides. The Afghan Taliban, champions of guerrilla warfare, lack the resources and technology for a sustained conventional conflict. Their return to power has not brought stability to Afghanistan, nor the international recognition they seek.

Internally, the regime is besieged by factional rivalries and a weakening state. The leadership is apparently divided between the hard-line Kandahari faction led by Akhundzada, and moderates led by figures like Mullah Baradar and the Haqqani network, widely perceived as pro-Pakistan. The hard-liners are currently running the show, fearing a loss of control, while the moderates and the Haqqanis’ influence remains dormant.

This internal power struggle is fueled by a dire economic situation. The regime is broken, with foreign aid severed, central bank assets frozen, and rigid social controls threatening to erode the group’s dominance from within.

The internal turmoil has explosive external consequences, most visibly in the relationship with Pakistan, which serves as a lifeline for Afghanistan. The presence of terror groups like the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and Daesh

Khorasan inside Afghanistan is also particularly worrisome for regional powers including China, Russia, and Iran. China views ETIM as a separatist threat to its projects in South and Central Asia and has repeatedly urged the Taliban to crack down against the group.

For the Afghan Taliban, the dilemma of reining in the very terror groups it has long sheltered poses serious consequences; akin to sticking its hand into a wasp’s nest.

For Pakistan, the prospect of a sustained two-front security dilemma, facing pressure from both Afghanistan and India, represents a strategic challenge it can ill afford. It cannot tolerate a hostile regime in Kabul, particularly one inclined toward New Delhi, as reflected in the Taliban’s friendly gestures toward India.

In the future, the Taliban might raise the longstanding dispute over the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan to gain the sympathies of Pashtuns and ignite an existing political issue. Since 1947, Afghanistan has refused to accept the British-drawn border, arguing it should control all Pashtun areas, while Pakistan rejects this idea. This has long strained relations between the two nations, regardless of who is in power in Kabul.

The recent skirmishes are seen as a major policy shift of Pakistan with warning shots, declaring zero tolerance for the Taliban’s support of cross-border terror groups like the TTP. In a rare and strongly worded statement, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed hope that “one day the people of Afghanistan will be free and live under a truly representative and popular government.”

It challenges the Taliban’s legitimacy and distances itself from the past image of the Taliban’s patrons. 

“We have never denied dialogue, but the prerequisite is that they should stop sponsoring terrorism,” a senior Pakistani security official hinted, suggesting a possible future policy toward Afghanistan.

Efforts are underway to facilitate talks between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan.

For the Taliban, caught in its ideological bedrock, fulfilling the demand of reining in terror groups may not be possible. The efforts of intermediaries and temporary ceasefires could end a stalemate— but the root causes of conflict appear to have caused irreparable cracks in a decades-old relationship between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban.

– Owais Tohid has reported extensively on war and conflict in Asia for 30 years and witnessed the rise and fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. He has also covered the Palestinian conflict in the Occupied Territories and worked for the BBC World Service, AFP and CS Monitor. X: @OwaisTohid