LONDON: Missiles and drones are again crossing Middle Eastern skies, while tanker traffic stalls at the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears that the killing of Iran’s supreme leader could spiral into a regional war with far-reaching consequences.

Oil has jumped beyond $80 a barrel, with warnings it could go much higher if key shipping lanes remain disrupted. The economic shock waves caused by any prolonged disruption could reverberate across the globe.

So far, Tehran’s retaliation against US-Israeli strikes has generated more alarm than advantage.

Arab capitals have condemned the attacks and markets have wobbled, but Iran has not succeeded in forcing governments into a stark choice between backing Israel or appearing weak by calling for restraint.

Instead, leaders have tried to hold the line, denouncing violations of sovereignty while keeping diplomatic channels open, even as the risk of miscalculation grows.

At the heart of this precarious moment sits Iran’s “axis of resistance” — Hezbollah in Lebanon, an array of Iraqi militias, and Yemen’s Houthi movement — whose responses to the crisis have appeared patchy.

For some observers, this reaction is by design.

“That didn’t happen unevenly, and I believe it is very well-rehearsed and directed from Tehran that has been for long expecting such a scenario,” British-Lebanese journalist Mohamed Chebaro told Arab News.

“Accordingly, I think each is playing their role to complement the jigsaw puzzle of how to use what’s called the strategic advantage that Iran has nurtured and prepared over the years.”

Chebaro said the militias fit into a broader strategic game in which Tehran “has not shown all its hand” and may choose to escalate later, depending on how the confrontation evolves.

In the early hours of March 2, Hezbollah fired missiles and drones at military sites in northern Israel — its biggest cross-border barrage since the 2024 ceasefire.

Israel hit back within hours, striking targets across south Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs, including command centers, weapons stores, and Hezbollah-linked media, while ordering troops to seize “strategic areas” along the border.

The Lebanese government, which had hoped Hezbollah would show restraint, took the extraordinary step of banning the group’s military activities.

Beirut appeared to go even further, with reports of the army arresting 12 Hezbollah members after rocket fire on Israel. The decision reflects public anger at being dragged into another war, as the nation’s economic crisis deepens and tens of thousands are displaced in the south.

Analysts said Hezbollah is calibrating its response — showing it will not sit idly by after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s killing, while avoiding the 2006-style rocket barrages that Lebanon cannot afford.

After a year of absorbing Israeli strikes and assassinations with limited replies, the escalation stands out as much for its delay as for its scale.

“I think the decision by Hezbollah to launch attacks on Israel really plays into Israel’s hands here,” Robert Geist Pinfold, lecturer in international security at King’s College London, told Arab News.

Pinfold said Israel had been seeking an opening for a renewed campaign, frustrated by the pace of Hezbollah’s disarmament by the US-backed Lebanese army.

“They were simply waiting for opportunities to take the matter into their own hands … giving them the excuse they needed for a new and fresh campaign, particularly south of the Litani River,” he said.

Hezbollah has framed its strikes as revenge for Khamenei’s killing and part of a wider “resistance” campaign — not a standalone Lebanon-Israel fight. Yet on the Iraqi and Yemeni fronts, Iran-aligned groups have so far moved more cautiously.

In Iraq, the umbrella Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) says it has launched waves of drone and rocket attacks on US positions in Iraq and elsewhere, citing Khamenei’s death as the trigger.

A constituent faction, Saraya Awliya Al-Dam, has claimed strikes on Irbil airport, Camp Victory near Baghdad airport, and other US-linked targets, though some claims remain unverified.

IRI statements between March 1 and 3 touted 20-plus operations a day using drones and missiles against US bases in Iraq and neighboring states, but reported damage appears limited and there have been no confirmed casualties.

Some launches were also linked in reports to attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura refinery. Tehran has denied direct responsibility while describing economic targets as “legitimate,” feeding suggestions that at least some drones may have originated from Iraq.

The militias describe their campaign as “resistance to occupation” and solidarity with Iran, insisting they are not acting on direct Iranian orders — a narrative that gives Tehran plausible deniability.

“Regardless of how much Iran is trying to (play down) its direct control of all these militias … attacking a refinery of strategic importance in a big oil producing country in the region is no small game done by militia,” said Chebaro, arguing Tehran cannot “hide behind a finger” to escape responsibility.

For Baghdad, each launch from Iraqi territory chips away at claims of restored sovereignty and complicates relations with Gulf neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia.

The larger dilemma — in Iraq as in Lebanon — is whether governments can contain these groups through dialogue and pressure, or whether any serious attempt to rein them in risks the very confrontation they are trying to avoid.

“Hezbollah did not ask permission, neither in Iraq nor in Lebanon, to do what it’s doing,” said Chebaro.

“And it’s now, as usual, the official governments (that) end up picking up the pieces to try to give reassurances and hope that the military response will only target those militia groups.”

Reining in the militias, he said, is “easier said than done.” Governments are effectively being “held hostage” — increasing pressure where possible, but avoiding direct confrontation “because that’s what they want.”

Perhaps the most surprising stance has come from Yemen’s Houthi movement.

After a spate of attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea in 2024-25 — purportedly in solidarity with Gaza — invited retaliatory strikes by the US and UK, the Houthis scaled back operations and agreed to a fragile truce.

Shipping on key routes is far safer today, although maritime analysts warn the situation remains volatile.

The movement’s leader, Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi, has issued fiery speeches insisting the “Israeli shipping ban” stands, with forces “finger on the trigger” ready to resume strikes. Such an escalation, atop the Iranian blockade of Hormuz, could cripple Red Sea-Suez trade routes.

Experts call this “controlled escalation,” preserving threats and capability without actions that would risk retaliation or threaten the Houthi militia’s control of Yemen’s coastline.

“I think that’s indicative of their relative autonomy,” said Pinfold. “The Houthi have always been more independent minded, whereas Hezbollah is very much a product of Iranian design and command and control and training.”

Past clashes have also taught the Houthis to limit direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

“This is the Houthi flexing their muscles, showing they won’t just say ‘how high’ when Tehran says ‘jump.’ They’ve got their own long-term interests in mind and their survival at stake here.”

Meanwhile, Western security agencies have repeatedly warned of Iranian intelligence plots against dissidents in Europe, but there is no public evidence so far of an activated network of “sleeper cells” linked specifically to the present crisis.

Officials said the risk is real, but remains in the realm of contingency planning and targeted surveillance rather than visible mobilization.

As Iran moves toward choosing a new supreme leader — with Mojtaba Khamenei, the late leader’s son, seen by many as the frontrunner — it remains unclear whether Tehran will unleash its proxies more aggressively or keep them restrained.

Analysts describe Iran’s current approach as “strategic patience” — deploying proxies to impose measured costs and demonstrate reach, while avoiding all-out war against the combined might of the US, Israel, and key Arab states.

Hezbollah’s limited-objective strikes and Iraqi militias’ harassment campaigns appear to fit that logic.

This restraint fuels the “paper tiger” perception of a regime that roars loudly and can certainly cause damage through partners and proxies, but has so far shown little appetite to cross thresholds that might trigger overwhelming retaliation or pull Arab countries into direct conflict.