It is no surprise that Iraq has rejected the proposals by London and Washington to ease sanctions against it. Saddam Hussein is no more chastened today than he was 11 years ago when he invaded Kuwait and triggered international UN sanctions against Iraq. He still thinks he should be free to do whatever he wants, and including the freedom to import bombs.
In rejecting even partial easing of sanctions, while adamantly insisting that there will be no return of UN disarmament inspectors, he proves himself a continued danger to the region. It is in this light that the Anglo-American plan has to be seen. It combines compassion with common sense. In lifting all controls on Iraq’s commercial trade, allowing it to import all the goods that it needs, it would end the suffering of ordinary Iraqis, which has raised protest not just in Arab states, including those with every reason to distrust the Baghdad regime, but around the world. But it also ensures vigilance in the one field where a wary eye must be kept on Baghdad’s schemings: imports of equipment that can be used by the Iraqi military. Indeed, vigilance is reinforced: it is proposed to tighten border controls around Iraq to ensure that arms do not get across.
No one can argue against this change. In replacing the current system which punishes the Iraqi people more than it punishes the regime with one that that punishes the regime but helps the people, the proposers are at last putting humanitarian considerations on par with security requirements, rather than callously ignoring the one in favor of the other.
But, for all that, the scheme is academic — and that is where it falls down. It is dependent on Saddam Hussein playing ball. He has to say that he agrees to the return of UN arms inspectors whom he expelled in 1998 and accept that he cannot import arms. Only when he does so will the new sanctions regime come into effect. But he is not going to oblige the UN; and certainly not the Americans and British. Given the choice between keeping the present system, which allows him to portray Iraq as the victim rather than the villain, and one where he loses that powerful psychological tool, he is bound to go for the former. For him, it is all or nothing. He does not care if ordinary Iraqis continue to suffer. By making this softening of sanctions dependent on his acceptance of arms inspections, the British and American may think that they have trapped him, ensuring that if he refuses the world will hold him responsible for the Iraqis’ continued plight; but they have not thought this through. All he has to do is ignore the offer and the world will continue to weep tears for the hard-hit Iraqis. The pressure will remain to lift the embargo altogether, and America still blamed for standing in the way.
Saddam Hussein should not be given such a veto. The wiser move would to implement the new system regardless of any word from him on arms inspectors: it is not going to make any difference in any event; they have not been in Iraq for the past two years. The benefits in enacting the new system unconditionally are patently obvious: ordinary Iraqis would no longer suffer; there would be the same controls over arms imports as at present, if not tougher; Saddam Hussein would be deprived of his psychological tool to have all sanctions lifted or at least ignored; and were there any further suffering it would be at last be seen as entirely the regime’s doing; there would be no external reason for it and no one else to blame.
