Changing dynamics of Baloch insurgency
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The Baloch separatist groups fighting the Pakistani state began to realize in recent years that they had to overcome their differences and change tactics to launch more effective operations. This was not surprising. Statistics reveal that the number of terrorist attacks by these militant outfits have declined by 75 percent since 2015. While they managed to launch 194 attacks five years ago, they could only pull off 51 of them in 2019. This must have been a major cause of concern for Baloch militant leaders who decided to join hands to keep up the fight.
The unity talks involved four armed groups, including the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), the biggest outfit led by Hyrbyair Marri who is based in London and is the son of a prominent ultranationalist, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, who died in June 2014. The other three were the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), headed by Brahumdagh Bugti who lives in Switzerland and is the grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti who was killed in a military operation in August 2006; the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), founded by a physician, Dr Allah Nazar Baloch, who is thought to have stayed put in his native Makran region to fight the state instead of fleeing abroad; and the smaller Baloch Republican Guard.
The alliance was named Baloch Raaji Aajohi Sangar (BRAS). There was no merger and the groups kept their separate identities, but they also decided to share their resources and undertake joint attacks against major targets in Balochistan and Sindh provinces to make an impact.
Although the low-intensity insurgency fueled by the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti became a security challenge for Pakistan, it never acquired enough strength to be able to achieve the ultimate objective of an independent Balochistan. The egoistic approach of tribal chiefs, the fact that certain elders of influential families played both sides by supporting or opposing the government, and the alleged links of some militants with foreign intelligence agencies contributed to the disunity among their ranks.
While the tribal chiefs retain some of their influence, their absence from the scene in Balochistan, having escaped abroad to avoid harm at the hands of Pakistan’s security forces, seems to have diminished their control over their fighters. This has enabled mostly educated middle class Baloch militants, hiding in the province or safely ensconced across the border in Afghanistan, to emerge in leadership roles
Rahimullah Yusufzai
Previously, several Baloch militant groups operated independently and drew support from the tribe to which chief belonged. While the tribal chiefs retain some of their influence, their absence from the scene in Balochistan, having escaped abroad to avoid harm at the hands of Pakistan’s security forces, seems to have diminished their control over their fighters. This has enabled mostly educated middle class Baloch militants, hiding in the province or safely ensconced across the border in Afghanistan, to emerge in leadership roles. The Baloch Students Organization (BSO), which always remained a nursery for Baloch nationalists, has now become a breeding ground for militants.
Suicide bombings is the latest weapon in the hands of Baloch separatists. Earlier, it was the domain of religiously motivated militants, including the Taliban, but the emergence in 2011 of the Majeed Fidayeen Brigade, which is part of the BLA, motivated the Baloch youth to carry out such attacks. While these bombings are still few and far between and have largely been unsuccessful, the Majeed Brigade remains committed to the strategy and exclusively conduct suicide missions.
The first suicide attack by the brigade was carried out in December 2011 in Quetta when the bomber tried to kill former federal minister Mir Naseer Mengal, a pro-government and anti-militant tribal elder. He survived but 13 people were killed and 30 others wounded. The second suicide bombing was conducted in Dalbandin seven years later in August 2018 when a bus carrying Chinese engineers working on a project in Balochistan was attacked by a bomber who happened to be the son of a slain Baloch terrorist commander, Aslam Baloch aka Acchu. Three Chinese and five Pakistanis were injured in the attack.
The third suicide mission targeted the Chinese Consulate in Karachi in November 2018 in which two policemen and two visa applicants were killed. In May 2019, a five-star hotel in Gwadar was also attacked, resulting five deaths. The latest high-profile attack launched by Baloch separatists was on the Karachi Stock Exchange on June 29, 2020. The security personnel foiled the attack within 10 minutes, though it was later said that Chinese investors, who hold 40 percent share in the bourse, were the intended target. In all these terrorist attacks, the attackers got killed, failing to take any hostages or take out their targets.
As was the case in the past, most militants continue to carry out explosions using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted by the roadside or on railway tracks. Many of them blow up gas and electricity supply lines, ambush security convoys, and target pro-government citizens. The suicide bombings, however, grab bigger headlines, especially when conducted in cities like Quetta and Karachi. The losses in such attacks are not high and the situation is manageable. Among all the mayhem, one thing is obvious: As publicly stated by BLA, the primary target of Baloch terrorist attacks are the Pakistani and Chinese economic interests. It is equally obvious that the state is ready to respond to the separatist challenge as we witnessed when four Baloch militants were gunned down before they could enter the Karachi Stock Exchange.
*Rahimullah Yusufzai is a senior political and security analyst in Pakistan. He was the first to interview Taliban founder Mullah Mohammad Omar and twice interviewed Osama Bin Laden in 1998. Twitter: @rahimyusufzai1
