Patronage, corruption and resistance to change in Pakistan

Patronage, corruption and resistance to change in Pakistan

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The new government has barely completed 60 days in office, but already the accusations of “failure,” “incompetence,” “lack of direction” and “messed-up priorities” are getting louder during the evening television talk shows.

Actually, the media and political campaign against the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government began even before the counting of the votes was completed, as the powerful, elite “old politics” club that had been in power for the past four decades watched the rise of an outsider, a non-member — Imran Khan. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, a man with no connection to any dynastic political party or ruling family came to power. What scared the cowed members of the club the most was his leadership qualities, determination, grit and perseverance. At last, here was a political leader with popular legitimacy who is committed to eradicating corruption, holding accountable all those accused of ruining the country, and establishing the rule of law.

Although many of these things are enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution and statute books, the parties controlled by the members of the elite club played their game of power politics by a different set of rules: Populism, expediency, patronage and corrupt bargains with anyone and everyone that could help them obtain or retain power. The leading members of these parties employed systematic corruption as a political tool to acquire wealth, in order to strengthen an aligned elite network throughout the country. Since the leaders needed collaborators in the bureaucracy, and defenders and image-builders in the media, the spoils of their system were widely distributed. Thus, they built a powerful oligarchy of elites from different sectors of society. It is now common knowledge that these Pakistani oligarchs laundered and stashed away more than $200 billion in foreign banks, shady companies and real-estate assets.

For the plunder of this country, or any country, to succeed, such large-scale corruption would not have been possible without influence being exerted over the judiciary, ruining the institutions that are supposed to safeguard law and accountability, and drafting a lot of influential figures into the power networks.

The consequences of this corrupt strategy have been horrendous for Pakistan. The governing capacity of the state institutions has declined. With corrupt people leading them, their legitimacy is diminished in the eyes of the public. Terrorist groups, extremist elements and religious and ethnic militancy — all engaged in conflict with the state and society — have emerged and flourished in the legitimacy vacuum that the ruling elite of Pakistan created.

 

The multiple crises that the country faces are the outcome of multiple tenures of dynastic political parties that created a widespread network of patronage that is now densely woven into the fabric of our political order, state institutions, businesses and powerful media houses.

Rasul Bakhsh Rais


Behind the portrayal of the contemporary character of Pakistan as a failing, failed or fragile state lies a story of elite corruption. The multiple crises that the country faces are the outcome of multiple tenures of dynastic political parties that created a widespread network of patronage that is now densely woven into the fabric of our political order, state institutions, businesses and powerful media houses. So, it is not only the opposition parties that are ganging up on Khan and his government; in its efforts to implement a reforms agenda the PTI faces the entire system of patronage, which is a curse and a political cancer. It is always the vested interests in the patronage establishment that resist reformist agendas, leaders and parties. Essentially, the system of patronage and the manifesto and mandate of the PTI are in conflict over accountability, the rule of law, ending corruption, reforming institutions and going after a land-grabbing mafia.

During a nationally televised speech on Oct. 24, Prime Minister Khan again stated that he will not be pressurized into offering a deal to anyone accused of corruption that would allow them to avoid facing the charges against them. He was referring, in particular, to one of the most corrupt bargains in Pakistan’s history, between the politically embattled President Pervez Musharraf and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in 2007.

In the coming weeks and months, this conflict between reform and resistance will escalate, raising the political temperature. It might turn ugly in the assemblies and spill over onto the streets. Those who wish to push for reform at any cost believe that Pakistan’s political business cannot continue as a dysfunctional state, and that it is impossible to do anything to improve things for society and the people while hampered by crippled institutions and a collapsing economy.

While taking immediate remedial measures, they also have long-term plans to bring about structural reforms, from the economy to state institutions, and focus on energy, the environment and, most importantly, human development. They also believe that none of their plans will succeed until the root cause of Pakistan’s abiding crisis — the system of patronage and corruption — is addressed. In doing so, they are bound to encounter resistance from the members of the old political club, as many of their leaders are facing corruption cases in the courts and more are likely to be investigated.

The big question is whether the PTI can stay the course and pursue non-discriminatory accountability, or will succumb to pressure from the beneficiaries of the old order; will it be prudent and practical or dogmatic and ruthless? Either way, we will see lot of instability and turbulence before the PTI succeeds in creating a naya (new) Pakistan.

• Rasul Bakhsh Rais is professor of political science in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, LUMS, Lahore. His latest book is “Islam, Ethnicity and Power Politics: Constructing Pakistan’s National Identity” (Oxford University Press, 2017).
Twitter: @RasulRais

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