A closed border is a very loud message, until the other side stops listening. For decades, Torkham has been the backbone of business between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Islamabad used the route as an effective bargaining chip against Kabul. The closure of Torkham and other crossings does not stem from a tariff or customs dispute but from one demand: action against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan’s position has been consistent. Kabul must stop sheltering the TTP, which Kabul denies doing, deny it space and replace rhetoric with real steps on the ground.

The closure is now testing whether Pakistan is punishing terrorism or trade, and whether Islamabad is containing Kabul or its own influence over Kabul.

The evidence suggests it is hurting both sides, with more structural loss to Islamabad, and changing the trade map rather than the terrorism landscape. Earlier this month, an exchange of fire near Angoor Adda in South Waziristan was followed by a temporary shutdown at Torkham, which reopened only after intermediaries from both sides stepped in. Pakistan’s military spokesperson said the Afghan Taliban “won’t be able to bear the cost” of harboring terrorists.

The terrorism front remains volatile. Torkham stays closed to trade. No change in behavior, no change in demands.

With no change in what the closure was meant to achieve, its impact on trade shows how the strategy is backfiring.

For Afghan traders, Torkham was not merely a crossing. It was familiar, almost familial. It was cheap and they knew the system. Now they are learning new systems. You can close a border on Afghanistan, but you cannot close business out of an Afghan.

In June 2026, World Bank data showed that 48 percent of Afghan imports came through Central Asia and 46 percent through Iran. Almost nothing came through Pakistan. The trader who used to send his truck through Torkham now sends it to Iran or Uzbekistan. He has found new agents, new bank channels and new drivers. Once he learns the new route, he will not easily come back.

Pakistan cannot punish the TTP by punishing trade.

-Naila Mahsud

This does not mean Afghanistan has unlocked new trade volume. Coal exports, which used to go to Pakistan, are now almost zero. But Kabul is adapting in other ways. In June 2026, its textile exports reached $21.5 million, 304 percent higher than a year earlier. It is a small amount, but it proves a point: close Torkham, and people will not meet a dead end, at least not entirely.

Torkham was closed to make Afghanistan reflect. Instead, it has pushed Islamabad to reflect on the cost of harsh measures in a world where traders have other options, even if only temporarily.

According to official Trade Development Authority of Pakistan figures reported by Dawn, Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan fell by 74 percent, from $1.391 billion in 2024-25 to $358 million in 2025-26. That is a huge loss for Pakistan.

Medicines are the clearest example. Pakistan’s total medicine exports fell by 30 percent, from $457.46 million to $319.01 million, and factory owners say the closure is the main reason. Factories in Lahore that made medicine for Afghanistan, flour mills in Peshawar and cement shops in Quetta all have fewer customers now.

Fedro Pharmaceuticals in Peshawar, which packed around 70 percent of its medicines for Afghanistan and Central Asia, was left with orders it could not fulfill and packaging in Persian and Russian that had to be thrown away, its chief executive told CNA. For MM Ellahi Traders, which exports rice, meat, citrus and potatoes, Afghanistan and Central Asia once made up 80 percent of revenue. That share has fallen to 5 percent.

What about Islamabad’s own plan to sell goods to Central Asia? That has become far more expensive. One exporter told CNA that cargo through Torkham used to reach Uzbekistan in a week for $2,000 to $3,000. Shipping through Iran now costs around $10,000 to $13,000, on a route that takes nearly six weeks and passes through Balochistan, where security threats are high. At that cost and pace, Pakistani goods struggle to compete.

Think of it like a shop. If you are angry at a customer and close your own shop, you do not punish the customer. You teach him to look elsewhere.

Leverage only works if a border is open most of the time and closed some of the time. Close it for too long and it stops deterring anyone. People stop trusting it and look for other routes. Leverage works only if three things are true: the other side has no other choice, you can absorb the loss longer than they can, and you are willing to lose that business forever.

So has closing Torkham forced Kabul to change? The numbers tell a different story. In relative terms, Afghanistan suffered more, because it depended on Pakistan for food and medicine. But in structural terms, Pakistan lost more: its customers, its role as a gateway and its leverage as Afghanistan’s main route to the sea.

By keeping Torkham closed for so long, Islamabad is not increasing its leverage. It is damaging the very trade link that gave it leverage in the first place. Customers are punished, not terrorists.

Now that both sides know the real cost, talks on new terms should start immediately.

Pakistan cannot punish the TTP by punishing trade. It must engage directly with Kabul, but with more realistic expectations. Kabul will not openly turn on men who once fought alongside it against the US.

This does not mean infinite patience. Pressure must come with a clear deadline and a clear cost.

Three steps could separate the TTP problem from trade.

First, a quiet path: intelligence-based operations carried out with Kabul’s implicit consent, in which Kabul looks the other way instead of being forced to defend its old allies in public.

Second, a joint intelligence cell with a neutral mediator such as Qatar to verify action, so neither side can claim ignorance.

Third, a 90-day benchmark. If TTP camps are not dismantled, Pakistan should move from quiet cooperation to open diplomatic and economic pressure, but still not to closing trade.

Naila Mahsud is a Pakistani political and International relations researcher, with a focus on regional politics and security issues. X: @MahsudNaila