LONDON: Israel is scrambling to counter a new battlefield threat after Hezbollah’s growing use of fiber-optic drones — a weapon many experts say has fundamentally changed modern warfare — exposed a dangerous gap in its defenses.
Cheap, difficult to detect and immune to electronic jamming, the drones have become one of the defining weapons of the war in Ukraine and are now appearing in conflicts elsewhere, including southern Lebanon.
On April 26, the Israel Defense Force suffered its first known fatalities from a fiber optic drone when one soldier was killed and six others wounded after their position in southern Lebanon was struck. Hezbollah later released footage of the attack filmed by the drone.
A screengrab taken from a video released by Hezbollah says to show an Israeli tank and soldiers gathered next to it moments before being hit by an FPV drone attack, in Taybeh, Lebanon, with the date of the video given as April 26, 2026. (Hezbollah military media/Handout via Reuters)
According to reports, at least a dozen Israeli soldiers have since been killed by the drones after fighting in Lebanon resumed in March.
Unlike conventional first-person-view drones, fiber-optic versions are connected to their operators by an ultra-thin cable that reels out behind them as they fly.
The cable acts as an umbilical cord between the operator’s control console and the drone, carrying commands and high-definition video without relying on radio signals that can be jammed.
A screengrab taken from a video released by Hezbollah says to show an Israeli D9 armored buldozer moments before being hit by an FPV drone attack, in Bint Jbeil, Lebanon, with the date of the video given as April 15, 2026. (Hezbollah military media/Handout via Reuters)
Some can carry up to 50 kilometers of cable. Flying low, fast and almost silently, they are exceptionally difficult to detect, track or shoot down.
According to Jonathan Lippert, president of Defense Tech for Ukraine, “soldiers have told DTU that fiber drones now make up 70 percent or more of the enemy’s first-person-view drone attacks and cause more than half of overall casualties.”
To date, he added, “there are currently no dependable defenses in widespread use against fiber drones, beyond hiding.”
An fpv or First-Person View, drone Stalker, using fiber optic, flies during tests at an undisclosed location, on July 10, 2025, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (AFP file photo)
The fiber-optic drone, said Lippert, “is definitely a game-changer.” Compared with radio-frequency-controlled drones, “it’s much harder to know that it’s coming, and so it’s very common to be completely surprised by it, and also to be unable to do something about it.”
Increasingly, both sides in Ukraine use these drones as ambush weapons. Operators fly them to roadsides or likely avenues of approach before placing almost every onboard system into standby mode to conserve power.
Because transmitting through fiber consumes far less energy than radio, the drone can wait for up to 24 hours while still “transmitting beautiful high-definition video.”
When a target appears, it launches its attack with only seconds of warning.
A drone pilot controls a Ukranian fiber-optic fiber-optic First-Person View (FPV) Drone Stalker, during tests at an undisclosed location, on July 10, 2025, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
(AFP file photo)
On its website, DTU recounts the experience of a Ukrainian soldier injured in a Russian fiber-drone ambush.
He “told us that his team had become quite adept at shooting radio frequency-controlled drones approaching them, since the drones approached from enough distance and altitude to give them enough advance notice to aim and fire off several rounds each.
“But in the fiber ambush, he estimated there were as few as three seconds total from the drone starting to move until its impact.”
Although the extra weight of the fiber spool limits the explosive payload, the drones excel against troops, light vehicles and defensive positions: “It’s best against manpower, light armor and stockpiles,” said Lippert.
Their maneuverability makes them particularly dangerous.
“They are really good for going inside structures that are normally harder to reach otherwise,” he said. “You can go in the open door of a well-reinforced bunker that’s resistant to air attack and wind your way down tunnels and make turns, which you could never do with a radio frequency drone. It’s quite stunning to watch.
“I have also seen them go down into a trench, turn left, go through the entrance of a covered portion, and kind of go down into the bowels and just pick out someone inside there who thought they were quite safe.”
The technology first emerged in Ukraine in 2024.
Jonathan Lippert. (Supplied)
Lippert says fiber-optic-controlled drones “were adapted into the current form originally by the Chinese. My understanding is they were marketing them even before even the full-scale invasion (of Ukraine) happened, but at that time there was no demand for them.”
That changed in March 2024 when Russian forces introduced their own version. Russia demonstrated the drones’ effectiveness during Ukraine’s Kursk offensive in August 2024.
“This got some publicity on social media, somebody in our network saw that and he took it upon himself to try to reverse-engineer it to get it to Ukraine,” Lippert said.
DTU supported the effort.
“The first successful Ukrainian use was supported by my organization ... and that was at the beginning of October 2024.”
Today, he said: “I think the Russians probably still have an advantage, but it’s not an overwhelming advantage anymore. It’s close to parity.”
Although these drones are transforming today’s battlefield, the principle behind them dates back to the Second World War.
Nazi Germany developed the Ruhrstahl X-4, the world’s first wire-guided air-to-air missile, designed to let Luftwaffe fighters attack Allied bombers from beyond defensive gun range.
A German WW2 Ruhrstahl X-4 air to air missile. (Wikimedia Commons: National Museum of the United States Air Force)
Although never used in combat, it influenced later systems including the BGM-71 TOW — “tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided” — which has remained in service from Vietnam to the present day.
The technology is leaving another legacy across Ukraine.
When the drones explode, the fiber cable remains draped across fields, forests and towns, creating vast webs of plastic waste. Images circulating on social media show landscapes blanketed in the discarded strands, while birds have even begun weaving the cable into nests.
Lippert acknowledges the environmental cost: “It’s unfortunate, but this kind of thing happens when you’re fighting for your freedom, for your way of life.”
Fiber optic wires of FPV drones lie over a barbed wire at the front line position near the town of Chasiv Yar in the Donetsk region, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (AFP file photo)
The Conflict and Environment Observatory warns: “Plastic pollution from fiber optic drones may threaten wildlife for years.”
Like abandoned fishing line, “fiber optic cable could become wrapped around the necks of animals causing amputation, asphyxiation or starvation.”
People and even vehicles have also become entangled in the cables.
The spread of the technology has triggered an international search for effective countermeasures. In March, Britain’s Ministry of Defence sought novel ideas to detect and defeat fiber optically controlled uncrewed aerial systems.
NATO also launched an innovation challenge focused on detecting and defeating fiber-optic FPV drones, with winning proposals ranging from artificial intelligence-enabled radar software to autonomous turrets and remote weapon stations.
Meanwhile, Israel continues searching for immediate answers.
Caption
Some reports suggest Hezbollah is producing the drones locally using 3D printing and commercially available dual-use components.
As Israeli defense firms work on technological countermeasures, troops have been forced to rely on mesh netting and even shotguns.
But first they have to see the drones coming.
