Will Lebanon fill the presidential power vacuum or slide into further uncertainty?

Thursday’s election comes at a turbulent moment for Lebanon and its neighbors, which could impact the vote’s outcome. (AFP)
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Updated 09 January 2025
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Will Lebanon fill the presidential power vacuum or slide into further uncertainty?

  • Contenders for the presidency carry the baggage of past conflicts, failures in office, and problematic allegiances
  • Weakening of Hezbollah and the ouster of Syria’s Assad are likely to influence power dynamics in the Lebanese parliament 

DUBAI: Wracked by economic crisis and the recent conflict between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia, Lebanon faces a historic opportunity this week to break its political paralysis and elect a new president.

There are many contenders for the coveted role, but whoever is chosen by members of the Lebanese Parliament to form the next government will have important implications for the nation’s recovery and trajectory.

If Thursday’s election is successful, it could end the debilitating power vacuum that has prevailed since Michel Aoun’s presidential term ended in October 2022, leaving governance in Lebanon in limbo.

Settling on a candidate is now more urgent than ever, as Lebanon faces mounting pressure to stabilize its political and economic landscape ahead of the impending expiration of the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah.

None of Lebanon’s major parliamentary blocs have officially announced a presidential candidate, but several potential contenders have emerged.




Balancing the demilitarization of Hezbollah and the withdrawal of Israeli forces will require delicate maneuvering. (AFP)

One possible candidate is General Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, who local media have tipped as the most likely winner.

Widely regarded as politically neutral, Aoun’s military experience and perceived impartiality could bring stability and credibility, both domestically and internationally.

His success would hinge on building a capable Cabinet with a comprehensive plan to stabilize the country’s governance, economic recovery and security, as well as lead postwar reconstruction efforts and the return of those displaced.

Balancing the demilitarization of Hezbollah and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern territories in accordance with the UN Resolution 1701 would also require delicate maneuvering.

However, his candidacy faces legal hurdles due to a constitutional requirement that two years must pass between his military role and the presidency.

Another potential contender is Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese Forces. As a vocal Hezbollah critic with significant support among some Christian communities, Geagea could appeal to anti-Hezbollah factions.

His extensive political experience and advocacy for reform could help him to prioritize state-building, which many Lebanese see as crucial for the country’s future. His anti-Hezbollah stance could also restructure Lebanon’s stance in regional conflicts and international relations.

However, his polarizing history from Lebanon’s civil war could prove to be a barrier to national unity, raising fears that his candidacy could deepen divisions in Lebanon’s already fragmented political system.

Suleiman Frangieh, head of the pro-Hezbollah Marada movement, is another possibility, but risks alienating Christian communities and international allies.

Hailing from a prominent political dynasty, Frangieh is the grandson of a former president and has himself held various governmental and parliamentary roles. However, being a close ally of Hezbollah and the former Assad regime in Syria makes him a polarizing figure.

Finally, Jihad Azour, a former finance minister and International Monetary Fund official, represents a technocratic option with broad political appeal.




Lebanon faces a historic opportunity this week to break its political paralysis. (AFP)

He enjoys support from key factions, including the Lebanese Forces, the Progressive Socialist Party led by Walid Jumblatt, several Sunni MPs, influential Maronite religious figures and opposition groups.

Azour’s economic expertise could help to address Lebanon’s financial crisis, but some among the opposition view him as a continuation of past administrations.

Securing the presidency in Lebanon requires broad-based political consensus — a challenge in its deeply divided Parliament. Any major faction can block a nomination that does not align with its agenda.

Under Lebanon’s constitution, presidential elections require a two-thirds majority in the first round of parliamentary voting (86 out of 128 members) and a simple majority of 65 votes in subsequent rounds.

The Lebanese president’s powers, as defined by the constitution, reflect a blend of ceremonial and executive functions within a confessional system of governance that allocates political roles based on religious representation.

The president’s powers are limited by those of the prime minister, the council of ministers and Parliament, reflecting Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system established by the 1943 National Pact and reaffirmed by the 1989 Taif Agreement.

Lebanese presidents are traditionally drawn from the Maronite Christian community, as stipulated by the confessional system. This role is critical in maintaining the delicate political balance in the country.

Thursday’s election comes at a turbulent moment for Lebanon and its neighbors, which could impact the vote’s outcome.




A UNIFIL military vehicle conducts a patrol in the southern Lebanese village of Borj El Mlouk. (AFP)

Hezbollah has long dominated Lebanon’s political landscape, parliamentary dynamics and government composition. However, its devastating war with Israel, which began in October 2023 and ended with a fragile ceasefire in November 2024, gutted its leadership and depleted much of its public support.

Hezbollah’s failure to deter Israel’s war in Gaza or mount a sufficient defense against Israeli air and ground attacks in southern and eastern Lebanon has raised doubts about its remaining political influence in steering the selection of a presidential candidate.

The election also follows the sudden downfall of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, toppled by armed opposition groups after a 13-year civil war. This shift has profoundly impacted Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah and other factions in Lebanon.

Syria’s influence on Lebanon historically included backing Maronite militias, interfering in political decisions, maintaining a 29-year military occupation and facilitating the flow of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah.




A destroyed mosque in the southern Lebanese village of Khiam. (AFP)

The change of power in Damascus adds uncertainty to Lebanon’s already fragile situation.

Regardless of these regional shifts, Lebanon’s next president will face the daunting task of guiding the country out of its economic mire while leading postwar reconstruction efforts.

Lebanon’s economic situation remains dire, with its financial collapse in 2019 described by the World Bank as one of the worst in modern history.

The Lebanese pound has lost more than 98 percent of its value against the US dollar on the black market, leading to hyperinflation and eroding the purchasing power of citizens.

Public services, including electricity, health care and water supply, have nearly collapsed, and unemployment has soared. More than 80 percent of the population now lives below the poverty line, according to the UN.

Efforts to secure international aid, including talks with the IMF, have stalled due to political gridlock and resistance to reforms. The new president will need regional and international standing to rally support for Lebanon’s recovery.

Whoever secures the presidency will face a formidable task in addressing Lebanon’s economic, political and social challenges. The alternative is continued paralysis, with devastating consequences for the country’s future.

 


How Israeli land grabs are redrawing the map of Palestine’s Jordan Valley

Updated 18 December 2025
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How Israeli land grabs are redrawing the map of Palestine’s Jordan Valley

  • A major incursion in Tubas caused damage and displacement, but residents say a planned 22-km barrier poses bigger threat
  • Israel calls the “Scarlet Thread” wall a security measure; activists say it’s a land grab severing the Jordan Valley

LONDON: Israeli raids are not new to Tubas, a Palestinian governorate in the northern West Bank’s western Jordan Valley. But fears of de-facto annexation have intensified since November, after land confiscation orders were issued for a planned barrier dubbed the “Scarlet Thread.”

On Nov. 26, Israeli security forces, backed by a helicopter that reportedly opened fire, sealed off the governorate and raided Tubas City and nearby towns, including Tammun, Aqqaba, Tayasir and Wadi Al-Fara — home to more than 58,000 people.

The operation involved drones, aircraft, bulldozers and curfews, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA.

At least 160 Palestinians were injured, OCHA said, while homes and infrastructure sustained extensive damage. The raids also displaced residents and disrupted essential services, including water supplies.

A man stands okn the ruins of a Palestinian building destroyed on the day of an Israeli raid in Tammoun, near Tubas, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on May 15, 2025. (REUTERS)

In Al-Fara refugee camp, OCHA noted, Israeli forces seized at least 10 residential buildings, forcing at least 20 families to flee, and detained and interrogated dozens of Palestinians before withdrawing.

The Palestinian Detainees’ Affairs Society said 29 young men were detained in the camp and later released, with the exception of one.

Israeli military and internal security officials described the operation as part of a broad “counterterrorism” campaign.

Locally, however, concerns have grown not only over the scale of the assault but also its timing, which coincided with new land confiscation orders in the Jordan Valley.

Ahmed Al-Asaad, the Tubas governor, said the Israeli military has issued nine land confiscation orders to carve out a 22-kilometer settlement road that would isolate large areas of the Jordan Valley and extend to within 12 kilometers of the Jordanian border.

Israeli soldiers take part in an operation in Tubas, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on November 26, 2025. (REUTERS/Mohamad Torokman)

Although the orders were signed in August, Al-Asaad told Arab News that Palestinian landowners were not notified until Nov. 21, nearly three months later, and were given insufficient time to appeal.

An Arabic-language notice obtained by Arab News via WhatsApp from Mutaz Bisharat, a Palestinian official overseeing Jordan Valley affairs in Tubas, stated that the Israeli military ordered the confiscation of Palestinian land “for military purposes.”

Signed by Avi Bluth, head of the Israeli military in the West Bank, on Aug. 28, the order took effect “on the date of its signing” and remains in force until Dec. 31, 2027.

It instructed those “in possession of the lands” to remove all equipment and vegetation within seven days. It also said objections could be filed within seven days of the notice’s publication date through Israeli liaison offices.

Al-Asaad said landowners were given “only one week” to file objections, noting that two days fell on a weekend, while four days coincided with curfews during the first raid and two more during a second large-scale incursion.

“As a result, residents were unable to prepare land ownership documents,” he said.

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Palestinian landowners were invited on Dec. 3 to tour the land earmarked for confiscation. The seven-day appeal window, Al-Asaad said, was counted from the day of that tour.

But on Dec. 1, Israeli forces launched another large-scale operation, a day after withdrawing from the nearby Tammun. The three-day raid imposed an open-ended curfew on Tubas City and surrounding towns, according to OCHA.

During the operation, forces blocked five main roads with earth mounds, three in Tubas City and two in Aqqaba, as well as several secondary roads, severely restricting movement for about 30,000 Palestinians.

At least eight residential buildings were converted into military posts, forcibly displacing at least 11 families, OCHA said in a Dec. 4 situation update.

The land earmarked for confiscation under the “Scarlet Thread” project covers about 1,160 dunams, 85 percent of which is privately owned by residents of Tubas and Tammun, The Times of Israel reported, citing an X post by Israeli civil rights activist Dror Etkes.

Dunam is a unit of land area equal to 1,000 square meters or 0.1 hectares.

The Israeli military told the newspaper that the project was introduced based on a “clear military need” to prevent arms smuggling and “terror attacks.”

Etkes rejected that justification, saying the real aim was to “ethnically cleanse” the land between the proposed barrier and what Israel calls the Allon Road to the east, an area of about 45,000 dunams, with residents ultimately forced out.

On Dec. 1, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the army was preparing to build a new separation wall deep inside the occupied West Bank, in the heart of the Jordan Valley. The wall would stretch 22 kilometers and span 50 meters in width, cutting Palestinians off from tens of thousands of dunams of land.

According to the report, the project would require demolishing homes, agricultural buildings, wells, water lines and trees along the route.

It would also encircle the herding community of Khirbet Yarza, isolating about 70 residents who depend on several thousand sheep for their livelihood, and separate agricultural and pastoral communities from their lands, similar to what the separation barrier in the western West Bank has done.

Palestinians say the plan, if implemented, amounts to annexation of the northern West Bank.

“New notices have been issued, pursuant to the military orders, for the seizure of citizens’ lands in the areas of Tubas and Tammun, for the purpose of removing homes and agricultural projects, including greenhouses, sheds, and sheep pens,” Bisharat told Arab News.

He said authorities also ordered the removal of a 5-kilometer water pipeline.

“This decision will effectively end the Palestinian presence and agriculture on more than 22,000 dunams of cultivated land and lead to the displacement of more than 60 families,” he added.

While the Israeli military says the land is being seized for a road and barrier, Bisharat argues the true objective is annexation.

“These notices are issued under the pretext of opening a road and constructing the separation wall in Buqeia and the Jordan Valley,” he said. “But through these notices, the (Israeli) occupation is waging a war against the Palestinian presence in all residential communities, and against all farmers and agricultural projects.”

He added that Israel’s plan involves a “50-meter-wide corridor, along with a wall, gates and an earthen trench,” measures he described as “a new border demarcation” that would separate the Jordan Valley from the rest of the governorate.

“This is an annexation process,” he said. “As a result, we will be left without borders, without water, and without Palestine’s food basket, and will lose approximately 190,000 dunams of land.”

Al-Asaad echoed those warnings, saying Israel’s plans amount to de-facto annexation.

“The new settlement plan, under which the occupation forces intend to establish an apartheid separation wall, will separate the Jordan Valley from Tubas governorate and confiscate areas estimated at hundreds of thousands of dunams,” he said. “This constitutes a plan to annex the Jordan Valley.”

He warned the project would inflict severe political, economic and agricultural losses, undermine prospects for a Palestinian state and isolate Tubas from its eastern border with Jordan under 12 km of Israeli control.

By Dec. 12, around 1,000 dunams of Palestinian land have been reportedly confiscated. The UN Human Rights Office described Israel’s military road project as “another step towards the progressive fragmentation of the West Bank.”

“This is the most fertile land in the West Bank and the road is likely going to separate Palestinian communities from each other and the Palestinian farmers in Tubas from … land they own on the other side of the planned barrier,” said Ajith Sunghay, head of the OHCHR’s office in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Immediately after the seizure orders were issued, Al-Asaad said, local authorities submitted an initial objection through the Northern Jordan Valley file and the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, collected powers of attorney and land deeds, and coordinated with land departments to document ownership.

“We continue to work on submitting objections through attorney Tawfiq Jabarin,” he added, reiterating that curfews and military operations severely limited their ability to complete the legal file.

Etkes, however, dismissed the objection process as meaningless, saying Israel’s judiciary would reject the appeals.

Still, Tubas residents say they will continue to resist. Al-Asaad said officials plan to internationalize the issue, urging the Palestinian Foreign Ministry to organize tours for diplomats and raise the case in international forums.

“We will mobilize local and international media to expose the danger of a plan that would seize half the governorate’s land and destroy the two-state solution,” he said.

IN NUMBERS:

188 Palestinians killed in occupation-related violence in the West Bank since January 2025.

45 Children accounted for nearly a quarter of the above-mentioned victims.

(Source: UNRWA)

Jabarin, a Palestinian lawyer and human rights activist representing landowners, submitted an initial objection in late November, according to the Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper.

He argued that Jordan already shares a secure border with the Jordan Valley and that an internal wall would not prevent arms smuggling.

He said Palestinian communities are the ones who need protection from repeated settler attacks.

The developments in Tubas come amid a broader West Bank escalation following the Hamas-led Oct. 7, 2023, attack on southern Israel from Gaza and the devastating Israeli military retaliation.

Israel has sharply restricted movement, erecting new checkpoints and sealing off communities.

Since January, Israeli forces have intensified operations, killing dozens and displacing tens of thousands. The campaign began in Jenin refugee camp on Jan. 21, dubbed “Operation Iron Wall,” and expanded to Tulkarem and Nur Shams, displacing at least 32,000 people in January and February alone, according to UN figures.

Human Rights Watch said on Nov. 20 that Israel’s forced expulsions in West Bank refugee camps amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity — allegations Israel denies.

The UN says large-scale operations in Jenin and Tubas governorates affected more than 95,000 Palestinians between Nov. 25 and Dec. 1.

All of this has unfolded alongside accelerated settlement expansion and rising settler violence.

So far this year, OCHA has documented 1,680 settler attacks across more than 270 communities — an average of five per day — with the olive harvest season marked by widespread assaults on farmers, trees, and agricultural infrastructure.

In a landmark decision in July 2024, the International Court of Justice ruled that Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories is unlawful.

The Court also ruled that Israel must “immediately and completely cease all new settlement activities, evacuate all settlers, stop the forcible transfer of the Palestinian population, and prevent and punish attacks by its security forces and settlers.”

UN experts in 2025 referred to this advisory opinion to criticize ongoing settlement expansions and military operations as violations of international law.