Will Lebanon fill the presidential power vacuum or slide into further uncertainty?

Thursday’s election comes at a turbulent moment for Lebanon and its neighbors, which could impact the vote’s outcome. (AFP)
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Updated 09 January 2025
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Will Lebanon fill the presidential power vacuum or slide into further uncertainty?

  • Contenders for the presidency carry the baggage of past conflicts, failures in office, and problematic allegiances
  • Weakening of Hezbollah and the ouster of Syria’s Assad are likely to influence power dynamics in the Lebanese parliament 

DUBAI: Wracked by economic crisis and the recent conflict between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia, Lebanon faces a historic opportunity this week to break its political paralysis and elect a new president.

There are many contenders for the coveted role, but whoever is chosen by members of the Lebanese Parliament to form the next government will have important implications for the nation’s recovery and trajectory.

If Thursday’s election is successful, it could end the debilitating power vacuum that has prevailed since Michel Aoun’s presidential term ended in October 2022, leaving governance in Lebanon in limbo.

Settling on a candidate is now more urgent than ever, as Lebanon faces mounting pressure to stabilize its political and economic landscape ahead of the impending expiration of the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah.

None of Lebanon’s major parliamentary blocs have officially announced a presidential candidate, but several potential contenders have emerged.




Balancing the demilitarization of Hezbollah and the withdrawal of Israeli forces will require delicate maneuvering. (AFP)

One possible candidate is General Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, who local media have tipped as the most likely winner.

Widely regarded as politically neutral, Aoun’s military experience and perceived impartiality could bring stability and credibility, both domestically and internationally.

His success would hinge on building a capable Cabinet with a comprehensive plan to stabilize the country’s governance, economic recovery and security, as well as lead postwar reconstruction efforts and the return of those displaced.

Balancing the demilitarization of Hezbollah and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern territories in accordance with the UN Resolution 1701 would also require delicate maneuvering.

However, his candidacy faces legal hurdles due to a constitutional requirement that two years must pass between his military role and the presidency.

Another potential contender is Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese Forces. As a vocal Hezbollah critic with significant support among some Christian communities, Geagea could appeal to anti-Hezbollah factions.

His extensive political experience and advocacy for reform could help him to prioritize state-building, which many Lebanese see as crucial for the country’s future. His anti-Hezbollah stance could also restructure Lebanon’s stance in regional conflicts and international relations.

However, his polarizing history from Lebanon’s civil war could prove to be a barrier to national unity, raising fears that his candidacy could deepen divisions in Lebanon’s already fragmented political system.

Suleiman Frangieh, head of the pro-Hezbollah Marada movement, is another possibility, but risks alienating Christian communities and international allies.

Hailing from a prominent political dynasty, Frangieh is the grandson of a former president and has himself held various governmental and parliamentary roles. However, being a close ally of Hezbollah and the former Assad regime in Syria makes him a polarizing figure.

Finally, Jihad Azour, a former finance minister and International Monetary Fund official, represents a technocratic option with broad political appeal.




Lebanon faces a historic opportunity this week to break its political paralysis. (AFP)

He enjoys support from key factions, including the Lebanese Forces, the Progressive Socialist Party led by Walid Jumblatt, several Sunni MPs, influential Maronite religious figures and opposition groups.

Azour’s economic expertise could help to address Lebanon’s financial crisis, but some among the opposition view him as a continuation of past administrations.

Securing the presidency in Lebanon requires broad-based political consensus — a challenge in its deeply divided Parliament. Any major faction can block a nomination that does not align with its agenda.

Under Lebanon’s constitution, presidential elections require a two-thirds majority in the first round of parliamentary voting (86 out of 128 members) and a simple majority of 65 votes in subsequent rounds.

The Lebanese president’s powers, as defined by the constitution, reflect a blend of ceremonial and executive functions within a confessional system of governance that allocates political roles based on religious representation.

The president’s powers are limited by those of the prime minister, the council of ministers and Parliament, reflecting Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system established by the 1943 National Pact and reaffirmed by the 1989 Taif Agreement.

Lebanese presidents are traditionally drawn from the Maronite Christian community, as stipulated by the confessional system. This role is critical in maintaining the delicate political balance in the country.

Thursday’s election comes at a turbulent moment for Lebanon and its neighbors, which could impact the vote’s outcome.




A UNIFIL military vehicle conducts a patrol in the southern Lebanese village of Borj El Mlouk. (AFP)

Hezbollah has long dominated Lebanon’s political landscape, parliamentary dynamics and government composition. However, its devastating war with Israel, which began in October 2023 and ended with a fragile ceasefire in November 2024, gutted its leadership and depleted much of its public support.

Hezbollah’s failure to deter Israel’s war in Gaza or mount a sufficient defense against Israeli air and ground attacks in southern and eastern Lebanon has raised doubts about its remaining political influence in steering the selection of a presidential candidate.

The election also follows the sudden downfall of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, toppled by armed opposition groups after a 13-year civil war. This shift has profoundly impacted Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah and other factions in Lebanon.

Syria’s influence on Lebanon historically included backing Maronite militias, interfering in political decisions, maintaining a 29-year military occupation and facilitating the flow of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah.




A destroyed mosque in the southern Lebanese village of Khiam. (AFP)

The change of power in Damascus adds uncertainty to Lebanon’s already fragile situation.

Regardless of these regional shifts, Lebanon’s next president will face the daunting task of guiding the country out of its economic mire while leading postwar reconstruction efforts.

Lebanon’s economic situation remains dire, with its financial collapse in 2019 described by the World Bank as one of the worst in modern history.

The Lebanese pound has lost more than 98 percent of its value against the US dollar on the black market, leading to hyperinflation and eroding the purchasing power of citizens.

Public services, including electricity, health care and water supply, have nearly collapsed, and unemployment has soared. More than 80 percent of the population now lives below the poverty line, according to the UN.

Efforts to secure international aid, including talks with the IMF, have stalled due to political gridlock and resistance to reforms. The new president will need regional and international standing to rally support for Lebanon’s recovery.

Whoever secures the presidency will face a formidable task in addressing Lebanon’s economic, political and social challenges. The alternative is continued paralysis, with devastating consequences for the country’s future.

 


Great expectations: Yemenis look forward to outcomes of Riyadh dialogue

Updated 07 January 2026
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Great expectations: Yemenis look forward to outcomes of Riyadh dialogue

  • Southern factions look to Saudi-hosted talks to defuse tensions after December’s violent escalation
  • Analysts say Riyadh dialogue could help reset the southern cause — but only if militias are excluded

RIYADH: Last December marked a troubled end to the year in Yemen, particularly in its southern and eastern governorates. While much of the world marked the season with hopes for peace and stability, developments on the ground took a sharply different turn.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC), led by Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, moved to seize control of state institutions and military camps, defying expectations in Hadramout and Al-Mahra and mounting a direct challenge to the internationally recognized government.

These actions, carried out through armed force and supported by external actors, led to casualties and an escalation of tensions in both governorates.

In response, Yemen’s political leadership appealed to the Saudi-led coalition to contain the situation, called for the withdrawal of Emirati forces, and initiated operations to reassert control over military headquarters in Hadramout and Al-Mahra.

Subsequently, Rashad Mohammed Al-Alimi, chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, asked Saudi Arabia to host a conference in Riyadh, bringing together all southern factions to discuss solutions — a request accepted by the Saudi leadership. 

Supporters of the UAE-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) wave flags of the STC, during a rally in Aden, Yemen, January 1, 2026. (Reuters)

The initiative comes amid the Kingdom’s affirmation of the legitimacy of the southern cause, coupled with its clear rejection of any solution imposed by force.

Arab News surveyed the views of several Yemeni politicians and analysts on their expectations for the conference, convened at a critical and highly sensitive juncture, and on the key issues anticipated to dominate the dialogue.

Among them was Salah Batis, a member of the Yemeni Shura Council, a member of the Preparatory Committee for the Unified Council of the Eastern Governorates, and a prominent figure in Hadramout.

“We extend our sincere gratitude to our brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia — both leadership and people — for their steadfast support, assistance, and courageous stand alongside the people of Hadramout and the eastern governorates in particular, and Yemen as a whole,” Batis told Arab News.

“Without this support, and without the role of the Saudi Air Force, this victory would not have been achieved, security would not have been restored, and this militia would not have been removed from these sensitive areas, especially Hadramout and the eastern governorates. 

President Dr. Rashad Mohammed Al-Alimi, Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, received on Tuesday at his residence in Riyadh the Senior Adviser to the US President for Arab and African Affairs, Massad Boulos, in the presence of the US Ambassador to Yemen Steven H. Fagin. (Social media)

“We also express our appreciation to the political leadership, represented by the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi, and to the governor of Hadramout and commander of the Homeland Shield Forces, Salem Al-Khanbashi.

“Our gratitude further extends to the heroes of the Homeland Shield Forces, the armed forces, and the security forces who participated in the operation to take control of the camps. It was a swift and decisive operation, carried out at minimal cost, praise be to God.”

However, Batis said he opposes the inclusion of the STC in the upcoming Riyadh conference, citing its involvement in the killing and terrorizing of civilians in Hadramout and Al-Mahra.

He described the call for dialogue as “a positive step toward preserving the southern cause, which the STC had sought to hijack and undermine, nearly causing severe damage had it not been for swift and decisive intervention.” 

Abdullah Ali Fadhel Al-Saadi (second from right at table), Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations, speaks at the Security Council meeting on the situation in the Middle East. (Photo: UN)

Batis said the southern cause must represent all southerners without exception, and that no single party should monopolize it or claim exclusive representation. He said the STC had already harmed the cause by using armed violence to advance its agenda, resulting in killings.

For this reason, he said, the people of Hadramout — where many of these violations occurred — have demanded, and continue to demand, accountability for those responsible and their exclusion from the dialogue.

He accused the STC of mobilizing armed forces, invading governorates, killing tribesmen, attacking villages and civilians, storming and looting state camps, and destroying public institutions, including airports, ports, oil facilities, and government offices in Seiyun, Mukalla, and other locations.

Batis said the STC and its leadership bear full responsibility, arguing they had led and directed the armed groups toward Hadramout under the banner of southern forces. 

This photo taken on January 3, 2026 shows Saudi-backed forces that took control of the Second Military Region Command on the outskirts of Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt, where the UAE-backed secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) recently launched an offensive to seize the resource-rich province. (AFP)

He questioned how the people of Hadramout and the eastern governorates could accept belonging to such a region after what had occurred, noting that these forces operated under a declared leadership and a self-proclaimed supreme commander.

Batis said local communities viewed them as invading forces that killed civilians, shed blood, attacked state institutions, and seized military camps.

He added that, were it not for the decisive intervention of allied forces and local authorities — leading to the return of the camps, the repair of the damage, and the withdrawal of these militias to their original positions — the consequences would have been far more severe.

“I believe this dialogue and conference must have a clear and firm framework: no group that possesses weapons, militias, or armed forces should take part,” Batis said. 

People ride motorbikes on a street in Sanaa, Yemen February 5, 2021. (Reuters)

“Arms must be exclusively in the hands of the state, under the authority of the ministries of defense and interior, and sovereignty must rest solely with the state — not with parties, factions, or individuals.”

Batis warned against repeating what he described as the mistake of 2013, when the Houthi group was allowed to participate in the National Dialogue Conference while still armed and expanding its territorial control.

He recalled that by January 2014 the Houthis had seized Amran Governorate and laid siege to Sanaa, halting the drafting of the federal constitution and forcing meetings to be held at the Presidential Palace.

Batis noted that he was serving at the time as vice president of the National Authority tasked with monitoring the implementation of the dialogue’s outcomes, before the Houthis later stormed the capital and plunged the country into a crisis that continues to this day. 

Fighters recruited into the Houthis as part of a mobilization campaign they have initiated recently, ride atop an armored personnel carrier as they parade to show solidarity with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, in Sanaa, Yemen August 24, 2024. (Reuters)

For his part, political analyst and activist Youssef Ismail Abdo said that any fair and equitable outcomes from the conference would help stabilize the south — particularly Hadramawt and the eastern governorates — fostering security, development, and stability, with positive implications for all of Yemen and the wider region.

Also speaking to Arab News, Dr. Nasser bin Habtour, secretary-general of the Shabwa National Council, said that “the south is home to multiple political projects, including secession and a federal state.

“The events of December demonstrated that not all southerners support secession, leaving the STC isolated in its unilateral move. In my opinion, all political options should be placed on the dialogue table so that southerners can discuss them and reach a unified vision.”

He argued that “secession is neither feasible nor appropriate at the present stage, given Yemen’s dire circumstances, with the Houthi militia controlling Sanaa and state institutions and posing a serious threat to Yemen and the wider region.” 

Vehicles drive on a street, as Saudi and Omani delegations hold talks with Houthis, in Sanaa, Yemen April 10, 2023. (Reuters)

He stressed that “restoring the Yemeni state must come first, after which all political projects can be presented to the people, who should then decide the future form of the state.”

He added: “The meeting, to be held in Riyadh, came at the request of southern political and social figures and groups who convened after recognizing both their responsibility and the danger into which the STC had placed the southern cause.

“They contacted the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, urging him to ask the Kingdom to host a southern dialogue conference.” He noted that “this initiative was consistent with Saudi Arabia’s longstanding role in supporting Yemen.”

“The conference must focus on repairing the damage inflicted on the southern cause by the STC’s unilateral decisions and attempts to monopolize it, as well as restoring the issue to its proper course through a consensual vision shared by the people of the south.” 

A drone view shows people attending a rally organized by Yemen's main separatist group, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), in Aden, Yemen December 21, 2025. (Reuters)

Regarding the expected outcomes of the comprehensive southern national dialogue, Habtour said: “The first priority is reaching consensus on a unified southern vision that reflects the aspirations of the people of the south.”

He added: “The southern issue must be situated within the broader national struggle to restore the state from the Houthi militia, as well as integrated into the negotiation process aimed at restoring security and stability in Yemen.”

He further stressed “the importance of defining the role of southerners in the upcoming phase, particularly within the framework of a future federal state and their contribution to nation-building and development.”