How conflict-torn Sudan has become a magnet for fighters from the troubled Sahel

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A grab from a UGC video posted on the X platform on August 22, 2023 reportedly shows members of the Sudanese army firing at Rapid Support Forces (RSF) fighters in what they say is the al-Shajara military base in Khartoum. (AFP/File)
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The conflict between Sudan's army and the RSF has resulted in many localities burned down by the RSF and allied Arab militias, particularly in Darfur. (AFP/File)
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Sudan Armed Forces chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (C) walks with other army officials during a tour of a neighborhood in Port Sudan, in the Red Sea state, on. (Sudanese Army photo handout/via AFP)
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Updated 05 November 2023
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How conflict-torn Sudan has become a magnet for fighters from the troubled Sahel

  • Fighters from Chad, the Central African Republic, and Libya have flocked to join the Sudan conflict
  • Battlefield gains for the RSF and setbacks for the SAF could change the calculus of peace talks

TUNIS: With fighting in Gaza between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas sending shockwaves through the region, wars elsewhere in the world — particularly in Sudan — are in danger of being overlooked altogether.

For more than six months, the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, has raged across Sudan, leading to mass displacement, shortages of food and medicine, and even cases of ethnic cleansing.

Saudi Arabia and the US have resumed joint efforts in Jeddah to get the feuding parties to reach a settlement after several ceasefires collapsed in recent months. However, the conflict is complicated by the porous borders and instability that characterize the wider region.

Experts say that Sudan has become a magnet for fighters from across Africa’s Sahel — a belt of territory between the Sahara Desert to the north and the savannas and tropical forests to the south, spanning 12 African nations, from Mali in the west to Sudan in the east.




Sudan's conflict has displaced about 6 million people have been forcibly displaced both internally and across international borders, according to the UN refugee agency UNHCR. (AFP/File)

The result of this influx of young men, many driven to desperation by other conflicts and lost livelihoods in their own countries, has potentially significant implications for the security dynamics of the wider African continent, the Middle East, and beyond.

“These forces are not fighting for a cause, but simply for a paycheck, which means they have no regard for civilian life or property,” Cameron Hudson, a senior associate of the Africa Program at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Arab News.

The Sahel, home to about 135 million people, has a semi-arid climate and is characterized by seasonal rainfall and drought-prone conditions. Though rich in minerals, it grapples with extreme poverty, primarily because of poor leadership, corruption and geopolitical factors.

A rash of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and more recently Niger, combined with long-running insurgencies orchestrated by Islamist militant groups affiliated with Daesh and Al-Qaeda, have led to further destabilization.




Sudan has become a magnet for fighters from across Africa’s Sahel, say experts. (AFP/file photo)

With the regional economies in no shape to create jobs for a booming youth population, the Sahel is increasingly a source of recruits — both willing and unwilling — to cater for a multitude of conflicts, to say nothing of endemic violence, small-arms proliferation and violent extremism.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that many fighters from Chad, the Central African Republic, Libya and Sudan’s Darfur region have converged on the devastated Sudanese capital, Khartoum, to join the RSF’s ranks.

On Saturday the RSF claimed to have taken control of the army headquarters in West Darfur’s capital, El-Geneina. The group now wields significant influence in Darfur, where it seized control of Nyala, Sudan’s second largest city, on Oct. 26 and an army base in Zalingei on Oct. 30.




In this still image from a video posted on social media by Sudan's RSF, fighters of the paramilitary group celebrate their supposed liberation of El Geneina in West Darfur state. (X: @RSFSudan)

Around the same time, the RSF seized control of the airport of Balila oilfield in the state of West Kordofan. It also has influence in Al-Jazirah, a state south of Khartoum, and in the far southeastern state of Blue Nile.

The capture of territory, resources and spaces to train new recruits stands to strengthen the RSF. But in order to further extend its grip across the country, it will require additional manpower.

“The paramilitary is clearly trying to expand the scope of this conflict into areas not under its control and the fighting has not yet occurred,” Hudson said. “To do that, they need added forces and an influx of weapons.”

Sudan has been in the throes of internal strife since April 15 when fighting broke out between the SAF, led by the country’s de-facto military ruler, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and his deputy-turned-rival Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo’s RSF.

To date, the conflict has claimed more than 9,000 lives, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, or ACLED, a nonprofit.

Civilians are bearing the brunt of the crisis, with many caught in the crossfire, targeted for their ethnicity, robbed, raped or dying as a result of food shortages and lack of access to medical assistance. Both sides accuse the other of abuses and of blocking humanitarian access. 

According to UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, about 6 million people have been forcibly displaced both internally and across international borders into neighboring Egypt, Chad, South Sudan and Ethiopia since the conflict began.

The RSF is a complex coalition of state-sponsored militias, local armed groups and foreign mercenaries. Its core consists of nomadic Arabs from Sudan’s west, supplemented by Chadian Arab and non-Arab auxiliaries from the Sahel and Sahara regions.

Groups from Sudan’s far west, such as the RSF-aligned Tamazuj, or Third Front, have joined the fray. The stated aim of the Tamazui, which consists primarily of Arabs from Darfur and Kordofan, is to end their perceived marginalization.

However, this rough tribal coalition is far from united as, throughout the ages, local Arab tribes have often been at loggerheads over power and ownership of resources.

Ideologically, “the RSF lacks a clear, unifying political program,” Reem Abbas, a Sudanese author and political analyst, told Arab News. 

“Motivations range from ethnic grievances to a desire for regime change, and some fighters are drawn by the charismatic leadership of Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo. Others fight out of sheer necessity, seeing no alternative livelihoods other than as soldiers for hire.”




Sudan's RSF paramilitary commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo addresses his fighters at an undisclosed location in this still image from a handout video posted on social media. (X; @RSFSudan)

While the flow of fighters currently travels from west to east into Sudan’s urban core, this could change if the RSF’s military efforts stall in central Sudan. In one possible scenario, fighters may return to their villages, leading to more inter-tribal conflicts and radicalization.

“Sudan will be faced with the prospect of thousands of unemployed mercenaries left in the country, preying on populations to sustain themselves,” Hudson said. “This return to warlordism could well keep Sudan’s peripheral regions mired in conflicts for years to come.”

According to a recent Wall Street Journal report, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones have been delivered by a neighboring country to the SAF, while its soldiers are undergoing training abroad to improve their handling of the unmanned aerial vehicles.




Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones are reportedly being used by the Sudan Armed Forces as they battle the paramilitary RSF. (AFP/File)

It quoted ACLED as saying that military airstrikes have inflicted significant damage on RSF facilities and weapon warehouses around Khartoum since late August.

The SAF, meanwhile, faces recruitment problems of its own. Its commander, Al-Burhan, has called on the Sudanese youth to join the army “to counter internal and external threats” in a bid to turn the tide of war.

On the international stage, he has undertaken visits to Egypt, South Sudan, Qatar, Eritrea, Turkiye and Uganda, as well as the UN General Assembly in New York in September, to rally support.

Sudan’s recent announcement of the renewal of diplomatic ties with Iran underscores Al-Burhan’s pursuit of resources and weapons amid persistent concerns about his legitimacy to rule.

But as long as the war and the attendant humanitarian crisis in Gaza rivet international attention, appeals to stem the flow of funding, weapons and fighters to Sudan’s warring factions will likely go unheard, with potentially serious consequences down the line.


Iraq’s political future in limbo as factions vie for power

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Iraq’s political future in limbo as factions vie for power

BAGHDAD: Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.
The November election didn’t produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations.
The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.
Uncertain prospects
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani’s party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.
While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support Al-Sudani’s reelection bid.
“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn’t have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.
Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give Al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”
The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri Al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.
Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Al-Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”
He said that the figure selected as Iraq’s prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani.
Al-Sudani in a bind
In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.
The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by Al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.
Al-Sudani’s results, while strong, don’t allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.
Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when Al-Sudani’s government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthi rebels — Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.
The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.
Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”
“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.
Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.
Other political actors
Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.
The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.
By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.
Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.
The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.
Washington steps in
The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.
They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90 percent of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.
But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the Daesh group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.
It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.
The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.
Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.
“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.