KHARTOUM: Clashes between Arab and non-Arab groups in Sudan’s restive Darfur region have killed at least seven people, state media reported Saturday.
Violence erupted on Wednesday around 20 kilometers from the South Darfur state capital Nyala pitting Arab herders against farmers from the Daju minority and other non-Arab ethnic groups, witnesses said.
It was not immediately clear what sparked the fighting.
“A group of herders riding camels and vehicles attacked the village of Amuri on Friday, leaving the site burnt and four people killed,” the official SUNA news agency said, adding that two people were killed between Wednesday and Thursday.
Another person was killed when the fighting spread to nearby villages, which were “partially burnt” as shops were looted, the news agency added, quoting a government statement.
At least 20 people were treated at Nyala hospital for bullet wounds, a medical source told AFP.
Security forces were dispatched to the area to contain the violence, SUNA said.
Ethnic clashes often break out in Darfur, a vast region the size of France which was ravaged by a bitter civil war that erupted in 2003.
That conflict pitted ethnic minority rebels against the Arab-dominated government of then-president Omar Al-Bashir.
Some 300,000 people were killed and 2.5 million displaced, according to the United Nations.
While the conflict has subsided over the years, violence still flares between nomadic herders and settled farmers over access to scarce water and grazing land.
Sudan is still grappling with the crippling aftermath of a military coup led by army chief Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan in October last year.
Civilian groups signed a preliminary deal with the military to end the crisis earlier this month but it has been criticized as “opaque.”
Conflicts in Sudan’s far-flung regions have killed around 900 people this year and driven almost 300,000 from their homes, according to a report this month by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Clashes in Sudan’s Darfur kill seven: state media
https://arab.news/ne2f9
Clashes in Sudan’s Darfur kill seven: state media
- A group of herders riding camels and vehicles attacked the village of Amuri
- Ethnic clashes often break out in Darfur
Israel’s Somaliland gambit: what’s at risk for the region?
- Somaliland’s strategic location near the Bab Al-Mandab raises fears an Israeli security presence could turn the Red Sea into a powder keg
- Critics argue the decision revives Israel’s “periphery” strategy, encouraging fragmentation of Arab and Muslim states for strategic advantage
RIYADH: It perhaps comes as no surprise to seasoned regional observers that Israel has become the first and only UN member state to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign nation.
On Dec. 26, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar signed a joint declaration of mutual recognition alongside Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi.
For a region that has existed in a state of diplomatic limbo since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, this development is, as Abdullahi described it, “a historic moment.” But beneath the surface lies a calculated and high-stakes geopolitical gamble.
While several nations, including the UK, Ethiopia, Turkiye, and the UAE, have maintained liaison offices in the capital of Hargeisa, none had been willing to cross the Rubicon of formal state recognition.
Israel’s decision to break this decades-long international consensus is a deliberate departure from the status quo.
By taking this step, Israel has positioned itself as the primary benefactor of a state that has long sought a seat at the international table. As Dya-Eddine Said Bamakhrama, the ambassador of Djibouti to Saudi Arabia, told Arab News, such a move is deeply disruptive.
“A unilateral declaration of separation is neither a purely legal nor an isolated political act. Rather, it carries profound structural consequences, foremost among them the deepening of internal divisions and rivalries among citizens of the same nation, the erosion of the social and political fabric of the state, and the opening of the door to protracted conflicts,” he said.
Critics argue that Israel has long lobbied for the further carving up of the region under various guises.
This recognition of Somaliland is seen by many in the Arab world as a continuation of a strategy aimed at weakening centralized Arab and Muslim states by encouraging peripheral secessionist movements.
In the Somali context, this path is perceived not as a humanitarian gesture, but as a method to undermine the national understandings reached within the framework of a federal Somalia.
According to Ambassador Bamakhrama, the international community has historically resisted such moves to prioritize regional stability over “separatist tendencies whose dangers and high costs history has repeatedly demonstrated.”
By ignoring this precedent, Israel is accused of using recognition as a tool to fragment regional cohesion.
In the past, Israel has often framed its support for non-state actors or separatist groups under the pretext of protecting vulnerable minorities — such as the Druze in the Levant or Maronites in Lebanon.
This “Periphery Doctrine” served a dual purpose: it created regional allies and supported Israel’s own claim of being a Jewish state by validating the idea of ethnic or religious self-determination.
However, in the case of Somaliland, the gloves are off completely. The argument here is not about protecting a religious minority, as Somaliland is a staunchly Muslim-majority territory. Instead, the rationale is nakedly geopolitical.
Israel appears to be seeking strategic depth in a region where it has historically been isolated. Netanyahu explicitly linked the move to “the spirit of the Abraham Accords,” signaling that the primary drivers are security, maritime control, and intelligence gathering rather than the internal demographics of the Horn of Africa.
The first major win for Israel in this maneuver is the expansion of its diplomatic orbit. It could be argued that the refusal of the federal government in Mogadishu to join the Abraham Accords was an artificial barrier.
The evidence for this claim, from the Israeli perspective, is that Somaliland — a territory with a population of nearly six million and its own functioning democratic institutions — was eager to join.
Abdullahi said Somaliland would join the Abraham Accords as a “step toward regional and global peace.” Yet, this peace comes with a clear quid pro quo — formal recognition.
Israel can now argue that the “Somaliland model” proves that many other Arab and Muslim entities are willing to normalize relations if their specific political or territorial interests are met.
This challenges the unified stance of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which maintain that normalization must be tied to the resolution of the Palestinian conflict.
The second major gain for Israel is the potential for a military presence in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s strategic position on the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, makes it a prime location for monitoring maritime traffic.
This is a ticking time bomb given that just across the narrow sea lies Yemen, where the Houthi movement — whose slogan includes “Death to Israel” — controls significant territory.
Israel may claim that a military or intelligence presence in Somaliland will boost regional security by countering Houthi threats to shipping. However, regional neighbors fear it will likely inflame tensions.
Ambassador Bamakhrama warned that an Israeli military presence would “effectively turn the region into a powder keg.”
“Should Israel proceed with establishing a military base in a geopolitically sensitive location... such a move would be perceived in Tel Aviv as a strategic gain directed against the Arab states bordering the Red Sea — namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, and Djibouti,” he said.
The Red Sea is a “vital international maritime corridor,” and any shift in its geopolitical balance would have “repercussions extending far beyond the region,” he added.
The recognition is also a clear violation of international law and the principle of territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.
While proponents point to exceptions like South Sudan or Kosovo, those cases involved vastly different circumstances, including prolonged genocidal conflicts and extensive UN-led transitions.
In contrast, the African Union has been firm that Somaliland remains an integral part of Somalia.
The backlash has been swift and severe. The Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the OIC have all decried the move. Even US President Donald Trump, despite his role in the original Abraham Accords, has not endorsed Israel’s decision.
When asked whether Washington would follow suit, Trump replied with a blunt “no,” adding, “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?”
This lack of support from Washington highlights the isolation of Israel’s position. The OIC and the foreign ministers of 21 countries have issued a joint statement warning of “serious repercussions” and rejecting any potential link between this recognition and reported plans to displace Palestinians from Gaza to the African region.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland appears to be a calculated gamble to trade diplomatic norms for strategic advantage.
While Hargeisa celebrates a long-awaited milestone, the rest of the world sees a dangerous precedent that threatens to destabilize one of the world’s most volatile corridors.
As Ambassador Bamakhrama says, the establishment of such ties “would render (Israel) the first and only state to break with the international consensus” — a move that prioritizes “narrow strategic calculations” over the stability of the international system.
