BAGHDAD: Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi’s decision to take direct control of the country’s intelligence agency after dismissing its chief, Hamid Al-Shatri, has raised questions that go beyond a shake-up at one of Iraq’s most powerful security institutions. At stake is the distribution of sensitive posts among Iraq’s political factions and the extent of their influence over the country’s security establishment. Al-Zaidi took charge of the agency on Thursday evening, three days after dismissing Al-Shatri, who was appointed in December 2024 by former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani to replace Raed Jouhi. The government said the dismissal was part of efforts to consolidate sovereignty and confront regional challenges, but gave no details about those challenges or how long Al-Zaidi would remain at the helm. The unusual move carries political implications that extend well beyond a change in leadership. Al-Zaidi has declared that the intelligence agency “belongs to all Iraqis” and should be kept free from partisan, factional and sectarian quotas. Yet by taking the top job himself rather than appointing a successor, he has effectively kept the position outside the political power-sharing arrangements that were expected to govern it, at least under unwritten agreements among Iraq’s ruling factions. Security restructuring Political sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the intelligence agency had been earmarked for Sunni Arabs under agreements to divide senior government posts, although no Sunni figure had yet been appointed to lead it. The sources said Al-Zaidi’s decision to take charge could be aimed at shielding the agency’s next chief from political infighting at a time of heightened regional tensions. They said his “plans to restructure the security establishment are obstructing efforts to seize control of the agency.” Officials affiliated with Shi’ite political parties have led the agency for most of the period since 2003, apart from a brief stint under former officer Mohammed Abdullah Al-Shahwani. Sunni officials have held senior positions within the agency, however, including deputy director for operations, a post whose holder had faced incitement campaigns by Iran-aligned factions. In March 2026, a drone struck the area around the agency’s headquarters in Baghdad’s Mansour district, killing one officer and causing damage inside the compound. Unofficial security reports blamed outlawed armed factions for the attack, linking it to regional tensions between Iran and the United States. A Sunni politician, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, said the intelligence agency belonged to the Sunni Arab share of senior posts under Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic power-sharing system. He said Sunni Arabs had “often been treated unfairly by the quota system, particularly in sensitive and security positions.” Their continued absence from such posts, he argued, exposed a gap between political rhetoric about citizenship and moving beyond the legacy of the past, and the reality of how power is exercised. But the politician drew a distinction between Al-Shatri’s dismissal and Al-Zaidi’s takeover. “The prime minister’s decision to run the agency at this stage could prevent the dispute over the post from turning into a contest among political factions,” he said. Opening the position to nominations amid fierce political competition could have made agreement on a successor impossible, he added. Intelligence agency caught between centralization and political quotas Since 2003, Iraq’s intelligence agency has been caught in the same struggle between professional and political interests that has shaped the country’s state institutions. Senior positions, including in security agencies, have frequently become bargaining chips in negotiations and rivalries among political factions, despite the different roles of security institutions and civilian bodies. Political researcher Abbas Abboud said the blurring of administrative and political roles in Iraq’s post-2003 state had weakened institutions and eroded their independence. That overlap, he told Asharq Al-Awsat, had fueled partisan competition for control of institutions, from administrative offices to sensitive security agencies. The intelligence agency had become another arena for that rivalry, he said, despite Al-Zaidi’s calls to keep it outside the political quota system. The question now is whether Al-Zaidi can turn his direct control of the agency into a broader effort to redefine the relationship between Iraq’s political leadership and its security institutions. The creation of an Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, headed by former Interior Minister Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Al-Shammari, signals a declared push to bring oversight of the security establishment more firmly under the prime minister. But tighter central control does not necessarily mean greater professional independence, observers say. That would also require clear rules on appointments, accountability and the limits of authority. Talib Mohammed Karim, a political science professor at Al-Mustansiriya University, said protecting Iraq from regional and international conflicts required an intelligence agency capable of assessing the strategic landscape, anticipating shifts in conflicts and understanding their implications for national security, sovereignty and economic interests. That, he told Asharq Al-Awsat, would require professional independence from partisan rivalries and coordination with security, diplomatic and economic institutions. It would also require leadership with the authority and vision to run the agency in the national interest, rather than according to the calculations of competing political factions.